TWO-YEAR
POST-GRADUATE DEGREE PROGRAMME (CBCS)

IN

GEOGRAPHY

SEMESTER-III

Paper Code: GEO/CC/T-314

Paper: Political Geography and Historical Geography

Self-Learning Material

DIRECTORATE OF OPEN AND DISTANCE LEARNING
UNIVERSITY OF KALYANI
KALYANI-741235, WEST BENGAL

COURSE MATERIALS COMPILED BY:

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Unit-1	Basic perspective of Political Geography; Geographical perspectives on formation of State; Concept of frontiers and boundaries	Dr. Abira Dutta Roy Assistant Professor Bankura Zilla Saradamani Mahila Mahavidyapith, Bankura University
Unit-2:	Concept of State after Ratzel and Marx	
Unit-3:	Colonialism, Imperialism and Federalism; Core-periphery concept	
Unit-4:	Politico-economic blocs: SAARC, EU and BRICS	
Unit-5:	Concept of Geopolitics; Geopolitical significance of international water disputes: India and its neighbouring countries; Geopolitics of petroleum	
Unit-6:	Concept of Electoral Geography; Approaches to the study of electoral politics: Spatial and ethnic behavioural approaches	
Unit-7:	Scope and content of Historical Geography; Historical Geography and Historiography	
Unit-8:	Ancient period: Territorial organization of JANAPADAS in India	
Unit-9:	Agriculture, industry, trade and urbanization under the Mughal Empire	
Unit-10:	Plantation farming and textile industry during Colonial India	
Unit-11:	Post-colonial urbanization in India	
Unit-12:	Partition of India and linguistic formation of state; Deterritorialization for the formation of new provinces in India in the new millennium	

June, 2025

Directorate of Open and Distance Learning, University of Kalyani

Published by the Directorate of Open and Distance Learning, University of Kalyani, Kalyani-741235, West Bengal

Printed by East India Photo Composing Centre, 209A, Bidhan Sarani, Kolkata-700006

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Director's Message

Satisfying the varied needs of distance learners, overcoming the obstacle of Distance and reaching the unreached students are the three fold functions catered by Open and Distance Learning (ODL) systems. The onus lies on writers, editors, production professionals and other personnel involved in the process to overcome the challenges inherent to curriculum design and production of relevant Self-Learning Materials (SLMs). At the University of Kalyani a dedicated team under the able guidance of the Hon'ble Vice-Chancellor has invested its best efforts, professionally and in keeping with the demands of Post Graduate CBCS Programmes in Distance Mode to devise a self-sufficient curriculum for each course offered by the Directorate of Open and Distance Learning (DODL), University of Kalyani.

Development of printed SLMs for students admitted to the DODL within a limited time to cater to the academic requirements of the Course as per standards set by Distance Education Bureau of the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, India under Open and Distance Mode UGC Regulations, 2020 had been our endeavor. We are happy to have achieved our goal.

Utmost care and precision have been ensured in the development of the SLMs, making them useful to the learners, besides avoiding errors as far as practicable. Further suggestions from the stakeholders in this would be welcome.

During the production-process of the SLMs, the team continuously received positive stimulations and feedback from **Professor (Dr.) Kallol Paul, Hon'ble Vice-Chancellor, University of Kalyani**, who kindly accorded directions, encouragements and suggestions, offered constructive criticism to develop it with in proper requirements. We gracefully, acknowledge his inspiration and guidance.

Sincere gratitude is due to the respective chairpersons as well as each and every member of the PG-BoS (DODL), University of Kalyani. Heartfelt thanks are also due to the Course Writers-faculty members at the DODL, subject-experts serving at University Post Graduate departments and also to the authors and academicians whose academic contributions have enriched the SLMs. We humbly acknowledge their valuable academic contributions. I would especially like to convey gratitude to all other University dignitaries and personnel involved either at the conceptual or operational level of the DODL of University of Kalyani.

Their persistent and coordinated efforts have resulted in the compilation of comprehensive, learner-friendly, flexible texts that meet the curriculum requirements of the Post Graduate Programme through Distance Mode.

All the Self-Learning Materials are self writing and collected from e-book, journals and websites.

Director
Directorate of Open and Distance Learning
University of Kalyani

Syllabus

Semester-II

Paper Code: GEO/CC/T-314

Paper: Political Geography and Historical Geography (Open Course)

Internal Evaluation/ Assessment-10, Examination/ Report/ Viva Voce – 40

(Semester End Examination), Credit- 4; Marks -50

Unit-1: Basic perspective of Political Geography; Geographical perspectives on formation of State; Concept of frontiers and boundaries

Unit-2: Concept of State after Ratzel and Marx

Unit-3: Colonialism, Imperialism and Federalism; Core-periphery concept

Unit-4: Politico-economic blocs: SAARC, EU and BRICS

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Contents

Introduction

Political geography is a systematic branch of human geography that focuses on the interface between politics and geography, focusing on spatial dimensions of power and political phenomena at various spatial scales. It encompasses a wide variety of themes, with some studying spatial political units, while others focus on major processes like colonialism. The discipline has evolved over time, with changes in themes, approaches, and methods reflecting intellectual and methodological developments within the broader discipline and academia. The main preoccupations of political geography have changed over time, with key practitioners like Halford Mackinder in the United Kingdom focusing on international relations and the state and its associated geographical characteristics. The field has also evolved with the introduction of more radical and politically engaged perspectives, and elements of social theory have been incorporated to broaden its conceptual base. The decline of geopolitics can be attributed to a tainted episode in its history. In the 1930s and 1940s, American geographer Richard Hartshorne attempted to delineate the field of geography and outline the sphere of political geography as a subdiscipline. This led to a focus on states and their borders, as well as the study of natural and artificial borders. Later the development of electoral geography took place, which emphasized the importance of place and locality in examining patterns and the intersections of national issues with local concerns. This led to the introduction of more structuralist perspectives and a very politicized geography, focusing on the distribution of wealth and power, control over resources, and issues of discrimination and development. Core themes in political geography include territory and territoriality, state, geopolitics, nation, identity and citizenship, electoral geography, and environment. These themes are not discrete but cross-cut the more general geographic themes of space and place. Political trends have focused on the ways in which sovereignty is asserted and contested, including global processes, secessionist nationalism, and suprastate institutions. Some predict the end of the state as a viable political-territorial entity, while others argue that it will continue to play a key role. Geopolitics, defined as the geographical dimensions of power, has tended to be concerned with international relations and the geo-ostrategic concerns of major powers. Early examples of geopolitical writing include Ratzel and Mackinder, who emphasized the geographic bases of political strategy. Geopolitical discourses used by governments and

political leaders have been explored through various means, including film and media. The state has long been a central element in political geography, focusing on various facets of the state, its origins, spatial development, key properties, roles, and functions. Globalization has led to the perception that the state is disappearing as it becomes a more significant political entity. This learning module will enable the students to investigate the concepts of territoriality and to be able to establish a link between the historical process of state creation and present developments. It will enhance the capability to examine and comprehend crucial stages in the emergence of the modern nation-state. To comprehend the origins of political systems and to be able to use examples from various locations to explain the diversity of world orders today. The write up will help the pupil to have a grasp of the primary causes and probable repercussions of regional conflicts, process of territorialisation, geopolitical situationand international politics

Learning Objectives

- To comprehend the formation of nations, states and to investigate the connections between these and the political organisation of land.
- To analyse the establishment of states with a focus on how internal and external influences act centripetally and centripetally on the integrity of state territory with special reference to India.
- To gain an understanding of how borders affect economic, political, and social processes.
- To evaluate in depth the theoretical principles and issues that underpin the study of geography and politics.
- To determine the political, economic, and natural resources strengthen or weakening the current nation-state structure.
- To be conversant with the most recent research subjects in political geography, such as electoral geography, geopolitics etc.

Assessment of Prior Knowledge

Students should have a preliminary understanding of Ancient, Medieval and modern Indian history, Global and national politics, current affairs

Learning activities

This module will provide opportunities for knowledge development through interaction among teacher and students, individual presentations and group discussions, debates, tutorials, classroom seminars, assignments, projects on the many topics and themes discussed in this paper. Learners may be required to create assignments on the politico-economic conditions during Vedic, Mughal, British India, the problems post-independence, electoral scenarios and geo politics.

Feedback of learning activities

After the learning process is finished, quizzes and internal assessment will be conducted Some portions of the curriculum will be refocused based on the performance of the students, their feedback and evaluation reports, depending on student needs.

UNIT 1: BASIC PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Politics have been an intertwined part of the human civilization from its very inception as a part of curriculum-based study it has been found in the writings of philosophers like Aristotle, Strabo, Ptolemy and Plato in the west and that of Chanakya in the east, and it being implanted to rule and expand kingdoms. Politics is solely a human thought process and its implementation and is therefore a sub discipline of human geography.

What Is Politics?

Is politics the way of how an economy is run? Is politics the process by which people are governed? Is politics the very lifestyle? Yes, it is an amalgamation of all. It includes who is being elected as the head of states? What is his and his party's agenda and perception, priorities towards betterment of those being ruled or governed? Would that country import oil or produce oil? Will it import technology or develop one? Will it supportwarfare or favour peace talks? Will it increase prices of commodities? Will it increase the salaries and purchasing capacities? etc.

Figure 1 Formal Politics (source: Financial Times)

In the time the module is been written Ukraine and Russia are atwar, the world is polarized as to whom to support or whether to stay neutral. Therehave been world wars, coldwars, gulfwar, and war on terror and dispute on climate change, global warming and its main culprits. Every person on this earth has been either directly or indirectly influenced by these political decisions. This is known as *"formal politics"*. There is something known as *informal politics* as well. It is within enclosed spaces and has human interactions and office or workplace, at house hold level, betweenrelatives, between management and labour, where there are power struggles. Formal politics fall under the purview of study of political geography.

Now why do politics even arise? There are innumerable people with their unlimited wants and desires, and several opinions. When these opinions do not match, there starts groupism, strategicplanning, cooperation, powerstruggle, selection and election to avail resources of different sorts. Here comes political identity and geography. Heregeography comes into play with its context of space, landscape, place and environment. Here spatial organisation or societies, resources, cultures, institution, means of production demonstrates their importance.



Figure 2 Informal Politics
(Source: Genesisbackgroundscreening.com)

Definitions of political geography

Richard Hartshorne, in 1935, wrote that "the study of state as a characteristic of areas in relation to the other characteristic areas." Later in 1954 he defined political geography as areal differences and similarities in political character as an interrelated part of the total complex of aerial difference is and similarities". Thus Muir, 1989 mentions, "politicalgeography is concerned with the spatial interaction between Political and geographical phenomena". According to Sprout, 1968,"political geography may be defined from the disciplinary perspective of either geography

Cox, 2002, writes Political Geography is by no means the sum of its two parts. in political geography, is drawn on in selective ways:in ways which illumine the political". W. A. Douglas Jackson defined it as,"the study of political phenomena in their areal context".

Political geography as it was named has been an integral part of geography since it's very inception. It's journey and history of being a university taught discipline has been long since the perspective towards this branch of study has been a tumultuous one. The history of political geography during the studies could be roughly divided in three eras:

a) The era of the second world war where the rise of political geography initiated
b) The error of marginalisation
c) The era of positivist revival of the era of the 21st century

Basic perspective of Political Geography

Around 2300 years ago Aristotle dealt with political geography with an environmental deterministic approach in order to determine boundaries of territories, location of capital cities, while Strabo emphasized the physiography andsheer size of the territory as factors for dominance of Roman empire. Political geography as a discipline gained its prominence in the curriculum of different universities with Germany gaining global prominence by 1871 under the ambitious Prussian leadership. Under such circumstances territorial expansion became synonymous to political dominance. More over the concept of evolutionary theory of Darwin or Darwinism had started to influence every nook and corner of the international academia. Concepts such a survival of the fittest, newLamarckism of social division had a stupendous impact on the writings of Frederick Ratzel, "*Politische Geographie*" (1897). Ratzel emphasized on the term Lebensraum, for he considered political territories as species which would naturally tend to expand its territory. His concepts provided and impetus towards Germany's expansion policies on one hand and on the other hand it simultaneously justified them. This proved to be highly detrimental to the world politics and change the world's history forever. Further Sir Halford Mackinder of a Britain also known as the founder and father of modern geography glorified the role of political geography towards solving political dilemma in the post-world war scenario. In spite of raging war Mackinder was primarily dealing with the balance of power between state which was mostly suitable for Britain. During this era Alfred Mahan, a United States Marine stressed on the fact that rather than expanding land territories, dominating sea surface would mean global dominance. Alfred Mackinder's map consisting of 'inner crescent', 'outer crescent', 'heartland' or'PivotArea', 'World Island', 'Buffer State' gained large popularity. The interpretations of Ratzel and Mackinder boosted the thoughts of German nationalist and intellectuals among whom called KarlHoushofer, a military officer cum geographer became a member of the nazi party and accumulated public support for his expansionist theories. The birth of geopolitics based on these issues of racism and war painted a dirty picture of political geography and its misleading, indoctrinating concepts leadto the era of marginalisation. The impacts of various theories of political geography on the real-world politics had been a brutal one that it faced severe backlash and criticism. Hartshorne attempted to depoliticize political geography stating that it should not focus on strategizing, but rather analysing the internal and external dynamics such as

ethnicity, economics, and communication networks. Isaiah Bowman, tried to detach politics from political geography. Early in 1937, Bowmanattempted to establish political geography as the discipline studying political differentiation, thus analysing the human and physical dynamics within a political territory. But its identity became diluted with that of regional geography. Political geography saw its revival again in the 1970's.It got a new task of incorporating the facets of quantitative revolution, where electoral geography came into existence. Models, hypothesis and the theories were developed based on the easily available data related to votes across boundaries both internal and external, across different demographics and ethnicities. The positive movement brought about another changein the way political geography was perceived with geographical phenomenon. Capitalism, Marxism and neo-Marxisttheories were introduced into the scenario by likes of David Harvey, Welsh and Peter Taylor. Wallerstein on the other hand rejected the idea of studying country based political economy and propounded a Holistic World system. Later in 1990s post structuralist ideas also played a major role in shaping the scope and content of political geography. There was a shift in the traditional perspective of studying political geography such as that of form, function, apparatus, externalrelations, internalstructures, democratic process to politics of representation, gender participation etc. Michelle Foucault, one of the leading philosophers of the 21st century conceptualized about political geography as the study of space and its correlations that



Figure 3 Paradigm shifts in political geography and eminent political geographers (created by author)

exist upon it. According to him these power struggles should be studied by political geography both as geography of power and as geography of resistance. With exponential increase in the number of populations, pressure on natural resources, especially petroleum and water, the world politics had taken a different turn. The Gulfwar, the war in Afghanistan, climate politics, civilwars have taken the centre stage of the content of political geography in the past few decades. These has been the basic perspective of political geography through centuries. Thus, political geography actually is an intersection of three lines forming a triangle and the intersection are of politics or power, geography of space or place or territory and the outcome is policy. It becomes a congregation ofcultural, economic, historical and physical geography.

The geographical perspective on formation of state

With the genesis of agriculture and its expansion to various other continents of the world, land ownership by humans became a priority. The agricultural expansion led to deforestation and building of neolithic huts. But as these settlements expanded and took the shape of primitive towns.A class of land owners and labourers developed, where the vast expanse of agriculture land was deemed unmanageable by the owner and his family. As various other resources and means of production began having ownerships and the cities developed techniques of demarcating its area to prevent occupancy by other groups of humans, conflict began. Lawmakers, kings, chieftains, priests emerged, so did armies and weaponry. Towards the end of the iron age through the chalcolithic and bronze age, weapons evolved and developed. The need to protect old land gave rise to so called territorialisation. But what differentiatesterritory from a state? and that too with a geographical



perspective. According to Max Weber (1918), a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory. Michael Mann (1984), statesa state should have the following elements namely a set of institutions and their related personnel degree of centrality with political decisions emanating from the centre point, at definite boundary marking the territorial limits, and monopoly of coercive power and law making ability. Geographers have a major role in studying the process of formation and functioning of a state. As Peter Taylor writes that analysis of world systems will help in understanding the theories of political geography, the mode of production, the types of economy like that of north south division, the first and the third world concepts, the process of exploitation, the impacts of policies can be studiedby geographers which would enable in better understanding with respect to society cultures and history. Geographers can contribute towards understanding of the state because of the state's effort to govern within its territorial limit, frame policies which may and may not prove to be favourable for all sections of people. So, state often becomes synonyms to a process of exploitation as well as development.

As geographical factors whether it is the mountains, plateaus, rivers, river basins, forests, states play a major role in declaring the wealth and resources available to the community residing in it, it also helps in demarcating the boundary of the territory of the residence as per the claim. Geographical features such as rivers, mountains, deserts andcoastlines also determine the variation in the culture, economy and political characteristics of the people living on either side of these natural boundaries. Regions which are rich in natural resources such as fertile soil, rivers that have sufficient water, minerals and oils are often envied upon by people dwelling in the vicinity of that region. As a result, it becomes the cause of conflict in order to occupy such resources and hence the territory. Geographical features such as mountain passes, rivers and oceans offer transportation and communication route and leads to connectivity for growth and prosperity of some territories. Favourable temperatures and rainfall often aid in development of agriculture sector and various other economic activities around human settlementsthus making territory more prosperous. Demographic factors such as the distribution of population, density, migration factors, sex ratios, linguistic diversity and cultural diversity are often the cause of political conflict and identity crisis among various territories. Therefore, these territories develop two form states with the help of the geographical factors.

Concept of frontiers and Boundaries

Boundaries and borders are present everywheresince the beginning of civilization. By drawing differences between groups, locations, times, objectsand meanings, individuals and human societies define and shape the social world specially to demarcate their properties, belongings, area of operation or function and their natural resources. We frequently meet borders in our daily lives, and we are aware of whether to respect or cross them based on intuition, experience, awareness about legalities or logic. In general, borders and boundaries constitute a vast area of study that covers practically everything that is relevant to people and communities. The subject is significantly more narrowly defined in the political geography setting. Borders have traditionally been seen by the subdiscipline via a geopolitical lens, generally as components of nation-state territoriality or as barriers between geopolitical blocks.

As the most influential political entity determining the future of people and communities, borders and frontiers have a distinguishing characteristic. Major international conflicts were generated by state rivalry in order to attend to natural resources either in terms of land, water, oil or even human resources to show their dominance. In such cases of conflicts, the invasion of territory and land of another nation state becomes inevitable to show the level of dominance.States have worked to establish global institutions for political and economic control, such the United Nations, the European Union, and the North American Free Trade Area, in an effort to address the causes of these disputes. After the First World War, when academicians were tasked with defining the boundaries, the practical applicability of boundary studies may have peaked. Philosophers like Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Elisée Reclus, Pyotr Kropotkin and Sir Halford Mackinder have constantly researched upon the issues related to barriers, frontiers and boundaries. The majority of this study on borders was done by political geographers, demonstrating their fascination for the amalgamation of physical and cultural characteristics that boundaries convey. More theoretically, several attempts have been made to discriminate between various boundary types, such as between natural and man-made state boundaries. Often, the goal was to simply make comparisons between the physical characteristics of political boundaries and the cultural landscape. For instance, Richard Hartshorne categorised borders based on how closely they related to characteristics and culture of humanpopulation.

Althoughmany would inaccurately claim that borders were always merely seen as natural barriers separating various cultures, political structures, and economic systems,much of the early work assumed that in nation-states many times, borders were ‘walls’ or ‘curtains’ separating opposing ideological systems of governments that were at war with one another. *So, what exactly are boundaries and frontiers and what are their characteristics?*

Frontiers

The term “frontier” refers to a region that is between two social systems or institutions. It is the location where two opposing forces of expansion or resistance balance each other out and become stable. The French term *front,* which means forehead, and the Latin word *Frons,* both of which are etymologically evocative of that “which is in the front,” are the roots of the word frontier. Referring to a region that was a component of a larger whole, particularly the region that was located before the hinterland, termed the march, the foreland, or the borderland. *Ukraina* is the Russian word for the English March, and *Marche* in French. *Mark* is used in German, and both words literally mean “margin” or “borderland.” Frontier serves as a sign of the progress of civilization. The frontier is not a term that pertains to law, politics, or thought.



Figure 5a: Map of North West Frontier Province and Kashmir (Source: “The Indian Empire.” From Imperial Gazetteer of India, New Edition, vol. 19: Na yakanhatti to Parbhani Oxford, 1908, inside front cover. Map by J. G. Bartholomew. 01 2023).

Figure 6b: Map of North East Frontier Area (Source: Australian National University, Open Research Library)

It is fundamentally a natural or social idea since it contributes to the expansion of civilization as a whole. Creation of frontiers is more of a phenomenon of everyday reality and a sign of the ecumenical movement's natural urge to spread than a historical occurrence. For each specific ecumene, such as that of the agricultural societies as opposed to the nomadic society, there existed a frontier in antiquity that was tied to and situated on the edge of the inhabited world. Since there aren't many non-ecumenes in the globe, they're separated by large, accessible intervening spaces that serve as borders because they don't have any connections to ecumenes. The people who live in these non-ecumenes were seen as inferior and as barbarians. As a result, the frontier had always been a point of contact between two distinct cultures, and there had even been occasional cases of cultural mixing which explains that zones of overlapping cultural worlds between the European, Chinese, and Indian ecumenes has always prevailed.

In the past, states were divided by regions rather than lines throughout the political formation of a state. It was known as a frontier because its purpose was to keep adjoining states from coming into direct touch. Thus, a frontier may be described as a political-geographical territory that is beyond of a political unit, an unambiguous limit and into which extension is possible. Lapradelle, 1928, claims that the frontier goes through three stages as it develops:

(i) Specified zone of impact of various physical occurrences;

(ii) Anthropological-geographical notion; and

(iii) Political boundary.

Frontiers seems to have gone through three distinct eras or phases in their geographical evolution, starting with the first phase. The frontier was merely the state's border, and beyond it lay a void like an unexplored ocean beyond the shore. The whole Indian subcontinent, as seen from a Western perspective, was a geographical vacant space just before to the advent of the Europeans.The second phase started with the establishment of the frontier marches, which were transitional areas between the state's territory and the remaining unpopulated areas. This is how the vast region that surrounds the crowded nucleus of the several contemporary states got its start. The marshland, deserts, forest mountains, or marshes occupied this vast land. It constitutes a physically difficult region with a much smaller population than the ecumenes. Even though they were separated by

a lot of distances, frontier marches also surrounded the ancient civilizations. China, India, Persia, the Roman Empire, and the Arab world were all cut off by a semi-desert region that was only sometimes traversed by traders.The original protective void surrounded these areas. However, the majority of states set up these zones in a crude manner by stationing soldiers there, giving them an administrator to supervise, or turning them into satellite state. Due to this, the political nature of frontier marches varied.The frontier evolved into a frontier line in its last stage. This merely occurred when their marchland around it eventually disappeared as ecumene or a civilisation evolved. In the interim, there were some discernible changes in the marchland. This involved removing the forest and extending agriculture to boost the area's economic significance. Its demographic makeup changed as well, and it ceased to be a No Man's Land. Its physical characteristics were quickly adapted to become a component of an increasingly structured defence, changing it into a fortified frontier that was more effective than the original isolating zone. Frontier developed into a line. It became essential due to the antagonistic and combative behaviour of the rival state near which the frontier post was located. In particular, the marchlands' growth of civilization on either side of the frontier moved the two civilizations closer to one another, posing a possible military threat that required the alignment of a line to avert open hostilities and war. For example, The Indian marchlands in the Assam Himalayan area were inevitably threatened by ongoing Chinese conflicts in the early years of the twenty-first century, making the Mac Mohan line a geopolitical necessity. The Mac Mohan Line was positioned along the Eastern Himalayas' high crest cum watershed in an effort to stop China from engaging in open warfare along the frontier. The concept or existence of frontier came to an end when the world system stopped functioning down at the beginning of this century. Frontiers no longer exist; they are now historical events.

There are various types of frontiers the four basic types of frontiers are as follows:

1. The physical or natural frontier;
2. The racial or anthropogeographic frontier
3. Astronomical or geometrical frontier
4. Political frontier

The physical or natural frontier : Large, open, welcoming areas between the ecumenes that are completely devoid of human habitation tend to form a natural frontier. Even vast expanses of deserts, mountains, rivers, marshlands, and forests that were inside the borders of the territorial states but were not physically connected with the political ecumenes were not considered to be man-made territories, and the states simply exercised de facto authority overthem. In the past, these places or locations were inherently categorised as natural or physical borders. All former boundaries had combined to become natural frontiers. There was a physical or natural Frontier for example between China and Russia.



Figure 7 Sino-Russian Frontier, (Source:The Sino-Russian frontier, by Cécile Marin (Le Monde diplomatique - English edition, July 2018))

Ethnic or anthropogeographic frontiers are those that are between two or more political ecumenes and are thinly or sparsely populated by people of various racial origins who may be less advanced in terms of culture than those who live in the ecumenes. The large vacant region in South East Europe, which is home to Slavs, is a prime illustration of the modern ethnic Frontier between the Turkish and German ecumene.

Geometrical or astronomical frontier: During the 19th century's period of colonial development, many geometrical or astronomical frontiers emerged on virtually every uninhabited patch of a mostly unfamiliar continent.

Political Frontier: Starting from Iran's mountainous frontiers in the west of the Hindu Kush mountains, there was an expansive political Frontier. The expansion of the British state in South Asia, the Turkish state, and the Russian state on the periphery of Eurasia led to the formation of the huge mountainous cum desert frontier. Due to their flexible political nature, political borders were structured into marchlands more quickly. Similarly,the British and Chinese governmental systems were sort of distinguished by the Assam and Trans-Himalayan Tibetan Frontier, a political frontier.

There are two additional types of frontiers besides the ones mentioned above, for instance, ideological and settlement frontiers. Recently, there existed a large territory in

Central Europe between the Soviet realm and Atlantic Mediterranean Europe. The Cold War between Washington and Moscow, which began shortly after World War II, was truly manifested in the ideological frontier. Settlement frontier is an indicator that the national territory has expanded into a region that has previously been uninhabited due to its hostile nature. In other words, it tends to show the growth of ecumene into the uninhabited territories under the state's territorial authority. Settlement Frontier is an indication of social dynamics.

Boundaries:

Boundaries are the standards on today's world map. The earth has been roughly surveyed, and exact lines have been drawn which defines the states' territory. This is a relatively new development: preceding the twentieth century, when most sections of the world had massive expanses of unclaimed territory. The safety valves were usually represented by marchlands, neutral territories, and buffer states for supporting the population of the fast-developingstates. However, the requirement of a boundary means that the safety valve or, for that matter, the frontier was subjected to pressure from both sides and so could not be claimed. Though frontier circumstances are occasionally purposefully produced by governments, the state tends to consider borders and Frontiersmen as a transitory necessity fitting to a moment of transition. As a result, a frontier was defined as a region on the outskirts of the states or any political unit integrated with its territory into which growth may occur.

With the rapid fall of territorial states in the past, and the rise of political entities of varying sizes, there was a rapid dissolution of frontiers and an emergence of boundaries, which replaced them, because without these boundaries, the current system of states might be reduced to a chaos. A universe of sovereign states must be bounded in a world separated by borders. As a result, it is a necessary component of the modern international economy. Boundaries are a partial reflection of the legal order since they are supported by jural laws. They are political geographical events caused by humans, which led to drawing of boundaries. In nature or by itself, a border does not exist. It has always existed because of man.The global patterns of borders, have formed through three distinct mechanisms. primarily arbitrary procedure, process of evolution andarbitration process.

Borders are essential in national politics because they define the limits of a state's sovereignty. They are sketched either where one sovereign state's territory intersects another's or at the most distant limit of its territorial seas. In a few cases, the extent extends over the surface of the continental shelf but not over lying seas. According to international accords, borders also extend down to the centre of the earth, providing rights to subsurface resources. The nature of borders has evolved through time due to their function, which is the separation of sovereignty, which has also altered with time.

Borders were more than administrative convenience rather than of compromise, and expressive of colonial expediency. Boundaries in the peripheral competitive and noncompetitive arenas seem to have evolved through the arbitrary action of the core states regardless of the local territorial and human elements. The British-Indian border through the Himalayas was emblematic of what may be described as a unilateral act of arbitrary decision-making without due consideration for the other party. To their pleasure and for their political survival, the imperialist core state had arbitrarily aligned the vast majority of borders in the periphery. Arbitrariness is also reflected in the imperialistic and power-political limits established on the periphery areas. During the post-feudal era in Europe, regions were randomly aligned, and boundaries changed as a result. Both the state of America and the state of Australia obtained their current geographical sizes through arbitrary territorial expansionat the expense of the local or indigenous inhabitants' flimsy social structure. Internal federal borders were drawn unilaterally, disregarding geographical human components. Geographical boundaries in Africa had long been established arbitrarily, in a way that did not correspond to the actual geography of the continents. Boundaries, which are the result of agreements between the relevant areas and populations, have evolved or expanded through a process that goes through many stages.

The following is the desired outcome of events in the setting of a boundary:

The first step entails negotiations between the involved states, which results in a description of the border that includes locating the boundary and identifying the terrain through which it has been aligned. Observable physical elements such crest lines, watersheds, hilltops, passes, and saddles, as well as cultural characteristics like structures, agricultural fences,

Figure 8 Poles at Brazil -Uruguay border

and roads, may be mentioned. The less friction there is to be afterward, the more specific the description. This initial step, which is represented by language and can be found in many steps, is known as the defining of border, which denotes that it is a process when States have agreed upon the location's characteristics and coordinates.

The second stage of the boundary evolution begins when the involved States have finished the formalities of describing and defining the geographic coordinates or features of the boundary in question. At this point, the real work of the cartographers begins as they locate the coordinate and delimit them on large-scale maps by joining them through a line. Delimitation is carried out with extreme caution and attention, and the cartographers of the affected states are expected to have a thorough understanding of the area's geography as well as the delimitation process in order to do so in front of their respective officials. Any departure during the delimitation procedure might result in a significant controversy down the road.



Figure 10 Radcliff line drawn for partitioning India

The surveyors' responsibility is to draw the border on the ground during the third and last step of boundary creation, known as demarcation. Different methods of demarcation are used, including fences, pillars, stones, wires, and simple lines of poles. Again, the procedure of demarcation is carried out with extreme attention to ensure that nothing deviates from the limited line. On the surface, there aren't many clearly defined world boundaries. It is a costly procedure, and when a state does not have difficulties along its borders that make demarcation absolutely necessary, it frequently delays the step indefinitely. However, barriers have been erected in some sensitive places where precise delineation is necessary. The high crest cum watershed zones is very difficult to demarcate since they are inaccessible, have persistent snowfields, and there aren't any effective approaches. The majority of the mountain is a permanent pass. Snowfield boundaries have yet to be established. Because of how they have developed and how their alignment reflects bilateral or, in some cases, multinational agreements, these borders may be considered de jure boundaries.

UNIT 2: CONCEPT OF STATE AFTER RATZEL AND MARX

A state is traditionally defined as an area of land with internationally recognized boundaries, inhabited by people with an independent political identity and loyalty. It is an area organized politically by an indigenous or resident people with a government in effective control of the area. The concept of state emerged from the Latin status and its mediaeval usage, with the idea of a public power separate from the ruler and ruled as the supreme political authority in a given territory not occurring at this time. The modern concept of state developed from this mediaeval usage in the 16th century, first in France and then in England. These two countries provided early examples of the properties that make up the modern state, a centralized regime based on a bureaucracy operating within well-established boundaries. By the end of the 16th century, the modern concept of state was well established in these two countries, with modern political analysis focusing on the nature of the state. Sovereignty assumes the existence of the state, and territoriality only operates through the medium of the state. This is a two-way relationship. At the simplest level, the state is defined by its possession of sovereignty, which distinguishes it from all other forms of human organization. The state gives order to all and receives order from none within its recognized boundaries. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, the division of Yugoslavia, and the division of Czechoslovakia are examples of internal violations of sovereignty.

Figure 11 Kings coronation in Medieval Europe by Churchmen

In Western Europe, the institutional framework of the Christian Church survived the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. Church organization had been based on the empire system, with bishops holding exclusive territorial responsibility. The Church administration

remained to teach the barbarian tribes two important legal principles: territoriality, the principle of dominion, and succession through only one inheritor of the kingdom and wealth. During the centuries, the barbarians converted to Christianity, hoping that either the pope or a purely secular ruler could reestablish one universal Christian empire. The church allowed with the powerful Frankishkingdom and proclaimed the Frankish king Charlemagne protector and restorer of Christiandom in a new Holy Roman Empire. This new relationship between church and state power was defined by the emperor ruled over matters by divine right and church sanction. The Church monopolized religious authority and political authority, leading to the separation of function and responsibility between church and state. This separation led to stability and legitimized the sovereign, while the sovereign protected the Church. The development of numerous independent European kingdoms outside the Holy Roman Empire further influenced the Church's philosophical accommodation with each of them. The rise of modern Europe can be traced back to the second-half of the 15th century, when monarchies in Western Europe became centers of national consciousness, pride, and trade. This led to a shift towards territorial unity and the recapture of feudal privileges by the central authority. The growth of parliamentary government and the extension of the franchise to self-government also influenced Europe's revolutions in industries, commerce, and agriculture. The political

Figure 12 The French Revolution

history of modern age is largely the study of successful struggle to wrest omnipotence from an individual or a privileged few. The rise of nationalism as an all-pervading political force in Europe during the second half of the 18th and much of the 19th century was a prime example of this process. People transferred their prime allegiance to their territory, their state, which they helped create through participation in revolutions that swept away the old order. The post-French Revolution period in the 19th century underwent a future change, with liberty, freedom, democracy, and fraternity as the basic ingredients. The geographical consequences of this change in the idea of the state in the post-revolution period and the post-napoleonic period included realignment of territories based on ethnic criteria, the emergence of more states in Central Europe, and the Russian Revolution in the present century adding equality and fraternity to the idea of the state. The Protestant Reformation movement destroyed the church-state relationship and redefined sovereignty in its spatial context. Martin Luther introduced the idea of individuality and individual autonomy into European thinking, and the struggle to develop a new theory of the national state led to the breakup of the church-state nexus in the 18th century. Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau replaced the notion, that sovereignty resides in the king with the idea that sovereignty resides in the people themselves, laying the foundation for their allegiance to the state as the people.

Thus, the Church played a crucial role in shaping the political landscape of modern Europe, with the rise of nationalism and the rise of the Church as a powerful force in shaping the nation's identity and governance. Politics played a crucial role in both physical protection and moral redemption, with perfect ability and virtue attainable through absolute identification with the majority will be expressed in the government. The French Revolution introduced national liberty and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, stating that sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. The nation became a political community, feeling that it belongs together and should enjoy self-government. The nation state, as a political authority, ideally represented the nation and aimed to achieve community and virtue. The revolutionary slogan of liberty, equality, and fraternity inverted the older religious tradition, focusing on fraternity as the goal of political action.

The evolution of the nation state can be traced through four broad phases: free agrarian, agrarian industrial, and post-industrial. In agrarian societies, tribal loyalties and patriotism were common, while gradient societies remained in doubt. The emergence of

literacy and a specialized clergy class allowed for the centralization of records, rules, and culture, but communities remained isolated. Industrial societies allowed for a specialized division of labour and the emergence of high culture. In post-industrial societies, a centralized state agency took over the role of socialization, education, and authority. The development of supra-nation states based on settings like trade and defence agreements demonstrates the importance of politics in achieving social and moral redemption.

A state is a region that is an unbroken and integrated unit, with most states having small areas of political units. A state has a special controlling system and a definite control line or boundary line. Philosophers and geographers have different views on the definition of a state, with philosopher Aristotle and social reformer Macaivar or Lenin defined states from their own perspectives. Aristotle believed that a state was made by self-dependent families and villages, while Macaivar believed that a state was an institute with power to apply force and control the discipline of the social unit. Lenin argued that a state was an instrument of administration, while philosopher Garner described a state as a society related to the people, with a definite landmass where people leave permanently. States in political geography share similarities, such as having definite landmarks, a definite population, sustainability, government rule, and a sovereign character. Land mass, population, climate, election techniques, and internal administration policies are all influenced by a state's geopolitical and administrative issues. Special infrastructure, which changes its character with class division, is influenced by the state's geopolitical and administrative issues.

Ratzel's concept of organic state.

Before the development of the Organic State, the state was considered a living personality and was based on life science. Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species compared the state to an animal, with Plato comparing it to a human being. Aristotle argued that every part of human body had a keen relation with human life, and there is a relationship between humans and states. Cicero compared the state with a person, suggesting that the brain was the source of a body, and government was the source of energy for a state. From the mid-19th century to the early 20th century, the state was as like a human body, with Saint Bernard using the Solon weapon in the hand of the churches.

Goblet, a well-known geographer, emphasized the importance of political theory in understanding the expansion of a state's area. Political theory is divided into two parts: political assistant and human system, while the physical system is divided into three subparts: land power system, ocean power system, and air force system. Frederick Ratzel, a follower of Karl Ritter, analysed the organic state theory in his book, *PolitischeGeographie*. He believed that the expansion of a region with resources was the source of human civilization. According to Ratzel, states are involved in an endless struggle for space, with people living with their political power and fighting to get more space. Ratzel's concept of the organic state refers to the difference between users of material and immaterial things. The differences include the uses of land, interchanged between regions, development of transport networks, gradual development of transport routes, and features of landmarks. Ratzel's law is based on different rules, which influence the growth of a state. These rules include the size of the state growing with its culture, the growth of states following other manifestations of people's growth, and the influence of the cultural mind of human beings. Examples of personalities who helped expand a state's geography and social economic structure include Caesar, Vasco da Gama, etc. The growth of a state proceeds by annexing smaller members into the aggregate, while also fostering a closer relationship between population and land. Wrestle argues that the boundary is the peripheral organ of the state, and the builder of its growth and fortification plays a role in the transformation of the state's organism. Ratzel's view is related to the changing power of administration in Indian dominion. However, the first stimuli to spatial growth of states came from outside sources, with territorial annexation becoming increasingly intense.

Figure 14 Fredrich Ratzel (1844-1904)

Ratzel's law has faced criticism from various personalities, with critics arguing that the true powerful state is determined by the state's political power status. Critics argue that there is no boundary line for a state under Ratzel's organic state theory. They also argue that the expansion of a state is necessary for the development of resources in culture, as

small states are healthier for their resources. They also argue that other factors, such as population, nation's character, human feelings, culture, education, communication networks, and international cooperation, are also necessary for the healthy development of a state. The organic state of Ratzel's law may be related to the life cycle of animals, which is against political science and geopolitics.

Marxist Theories of the state.

Karl Marxist did not develop a theory of the state himself, but his followers have contributed to alternative interpretations. Two ideas dominated Marxist political thinking: the Communist Manifesto of 1848, which argued that the state is a committee for organizing affairs, and the state as a base superstructure model. These ideas are difficult to accept in the complexities of the modern state, as they lead to a reduction of politics and the state to a mere reflection of economic forces. The theory of the state proposed by lending reflected economism, finding a deep relationship between economic development stages and state types. This led to the development of competitive capitalism, bureaucratic military states, and monopoly capitalism. Modern orthodox Marxist theory fused economics and politics in the stage of monopoly capitalism. However, learning provided a developmentalist model of economic growth, such as the cycle theory of states or Rostow's stages of economic growth. Both ideas are simple but more difficult to accept in the modern state due to its complexities. The Communist Marxist of 1948 and the foundation of economic relations on which the political and ideological superstructure stand are considered economism. Monopoly capitalism has entered into modern Orthodox Marxist theory. Marks also proposed general state theories related to different explanations of the



Figure 15 Karl Marx (1818-1883)

nature of the state, known as the general state theory of Karl Marx. Marxist theory focuses on the relationship between a state and society, arguing that there is no existence of a state. The theory traces back to prehistoric societies, with a bonded labour society and a glass-oriented society. Marx believed that a state is an instrument controlling class-based societies, with an isolated power that can be applied through courts, or other organizations. Modern capitalist states are similar to former bonded labour-oriented societies and republic-oriented societies, with differences in economic and political levels. Capitalist societies are not necessarily machines controlling power, but rather machines that preserve class-based societies. If society becomes classless, there is no need for a state, as the state will never control the social relations of the society. Critics of Marxist theory include A.J.P. Taylor, argue that the state is a machine that preserves class-based society. The pluralist theory, on the other hand, is based on the public needs of society and serves the interests of labour, farmers, house owners, and businessmen. However, Marxist theories have not tackled the problems of Lenin’s developmentalism and are outdated. Therefore, Marxist theory has been criticized for its focus on the state and its relationship with society, as socialistic states in the modern period do not accept Marxist theories due to their gradual development.

UNIT 3: COLONIALISM, IMPERIALISM AND FEDERALISM; CORE-PERIPHERY CONCEPT

Colonialism

Colonialism is a historical phenomenon. It refers to a period between the contemporary historical development and the traditional economy which further led to the modern capitalist economy. It is a well-structured totality, a unique social construct in which a foreign capitalist class controls the economy and society. The form of the colonial structure fluctuates with the changing conditions of capitalism's historical growth as a global system. Colonialism refers to the establishment and maintenance of rule by a sovereign power over a subordinate and unfamiliar people separated from the ruling power. It has been associated with colonisation, which involves the physical settlement of people from the Imperial Centre to the colonial periphery. Academiciansoften state that what happened during colonialism was much more than just the imposition of foreign governmental dominance on a native economy. It was also the result of a massive confidence trick based on the colonized's docility, collaboration, or disunity, bolstered by the racial arrogance of their better-armed white overlords. Morris D. Morris, (1975) characterised colonialism as an attempt at modernization, economic progress, and capitalist transplanting that did not succeed due to the stifling influence of tradition in the colonies. The colonial economy was neither pre-capitalist nor capitalism; it was a hybrid construct. Colonialism was a skewed kind of capitalism. Integration into the global economy did not result in the colony experiencing capitalism. The colony did not develop in the home country's divided image - it was its opposite, non-developmental side. Colonialism did not develop social and productive forces; instead, it underdeveloped them, resulting in contradictions and a progression to the next stage.

The fundamental characteristics of Colonialism's are as follows:

I. One fundamental element of colonialism is that the colony is subordinately incorporated into the global capitalist system.

II. Colonialism is distinguished by unequal trade. The exploitative international division of labour meant that the metropolis produced high-value items with high

technology, while colonies produced low-value and low-productivity goods with low technology. The colony created raw resources, whereas the metropolis created finished items. The pattern of railway growth in India in the second half of the nineteenth century reflected the interests of British industry. The Indian nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak characterised it as "decorating another's wife." The colony was articulated with the global market but disarticulated domestically.



Figure 1 Beating the vat by hand in Indigo factory, (Source: https://www.oldindianphotos.in)

III. Its agricultural sector served the urban economy and the global market rather than its industries. Free Trade and laissez-faire policies stifled the growth of industries in British India, making India "the agricultural farm" of industrial England. The excessive taxation of agriculture, causing frequent famines in British India was criticized. The outflow of wealth occurred as a result of unrequited exports and governmental spending on military forces and civil services. The colonial era brought about uneven economic development that worked to the immense advantage of the colonizers. By the mid-20th century, most colonies were free from the tyranny of colonial power, but the colonies still suffer from incomplete road networks, inadequate physical infrastructure, and the challenge of completing regional development at high costs.

Figure 1 Impact of British Rule, (Source: Photo by © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS/Corbis via Getty Images)

IV. Foreign political domination is another crucial feature of colonialism. the four primary characteristics of colonialism were unequal exchange, external integration and internal dislocation, wealth drain, and foreign political dominance. Another critical duty was to modify the colony's social, economic, cultural, political, and legal environment so that it can reproduce on a large scale.

Figure 2 (Source: The Sentinel)

V. The colonial state is a relationship between the foreign ruling class and the colonial people as a whole, with all indigenous social classes dominated. The colonial state ensured law and order, as well as its own protection from internal and external threats. It repressed indigenous economic forces that were opposed to imperial objectives. The colonial authorities deliberately promoted caste and group identities in order to undermine national unity. All of the colony's indigenous castes are oppressed under colonisation. The ruling coalition of class forces did not include any of the indigenous social classes, and their interests were sacrificed for those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie at any point. Even the colony's top classes began to resist colonialism because it was detrimental to their interests. It's worth remembering that large landowners spearheaded anti-colonial revolutions in Poland and Egypt.


Figure 3 A mass meeting of Muslims held at Dhaka on 4 September 1906 in favour of the partition of Bengal. The photo was published in The Sphere on 27 October 1906

VI. The colonial state was built on dominance and force rather than leadership and agreement. It did, however, function to some extent as a bourgeois state, with rule of law, property relations, bureaucracy, and a constitutional framework to restrain colonial dissatisfaction. The colonial state was an integral and intrusive element

in the structuring and functioning of the colonial economy, serving the long-term interests of the capitalist class in the home country. It did not represent the sectional interests of groups within the bourgeoisie, who were competing with each other. It was the method by which the metropolitan capitalist class governed and exploited the colony. The colonial state served the long-term interests of the home country's capitalist class as a whole, not any of its constituent elements.

VII. The primary incentive for colonialism was undoubtedly economic game, but they also spread Christianity in Latin America, India and other colonies. The colonial experience brought enormous change to indigenous culture groups.

Stages of Colonisation

Two major periods of colonialism have been identified: the first period was associated with the European discovery of land in the Western Hemisphere in 1942, the Treaty of Tordesillas, which divided land areas between Portugal and Spain. The second period occurred in the late 19th century, with Brazil being the second major colony. The Berlin Conference of 1884 decided to divide Africa among European countries, causing unprecedented changes to Africa,south of the Sahara Desert. The colonial experience involved resistance, adaptation to colonial rule after 1945, the rise of anti-colonial movements in the colonies, and economic crises within an imperial system. The colonial system was found by imperial powers to be expensive and increasingly ungovernable. Both politically and ideologically, colonialism was discredited by emergent nationalist movements, often supported by socialist blocks. Independence of colonial rule came quickly after the Second World War, although white settler colonies were especially resistant to any notion of indigenous rule.

The colonial system was divided into three distinct stages, each lasting over two hundred years. These stages were influenced by four factors: the historical development of capitalism as a world system, the change in the society, economy, and polity of the metropolis, the change in its position in the world economy, and the colony's own historical development.

The first stage of colonialism involved monopoly of trade and the political conquest of the colony, which led to the drain of wealth from India to Britain. This stage was

characterized by monopoly of trade, direct appropriation of revenue or surplus through state power, and the purchase of colonial products from revenues collected from the colony. The drain of wealth from India to Britain during this stage was considerable, accounting for two to three per cent of the national income of Britain at that time. No basic changes were introduced in the administration, judicial system, means of transport and communication, agricultural or industrial production, business management, education, intellectual fields, culture, and social organization. The only changes made were in military organization, technology, and the top level of revenue administration. This lack of intervention was due to the fact that colonialism could be superimposed over the traditional system of economy and polity, without the need to penetrate villages deeper than earlier rulers had done. The ideology in the first stage was not one of development, with no criticism or understanding of traditional values, religion, or customs. Traditional systems of learning were encouraged, and administration was carried on in the vernacular. The colonial system's historical development and the influence of these factors contributed to the development of the colonial system.

Figure 20 Stages of colonisation

The second stage of colonialism, known as the Era of Free Trade, was characterized by the industrial bourgeoisie's interest in the markets available for manufactured goods and the need to increase exports to pay for the purchase of manufactured imports. They also wanted to develop the colony as a producer of raw materials to lessen dependence on non-empire sources and to pay for the high salaries and profits of merchants. The industrial bourgeoisie opposed plunder as a form of appropriation of surplus, believing it would destroy the golden eggs. In this stage, changes in the economy, polity, administration, social, cultural, and ideological structure were initiated to enable exploitation in a new way. The slogan was development and modernization, with the colony integrated with the world capitalist economy and the mother country. Capitalists were allowed to develop plantations, trade, transport, mining, and

industries, and capitalist farming was introduced. The system of transport and communications was developed to facilitate the movement of massive quantities of raw materials to the ports for export. Railway expansion was undertaken, and a modern post and telegraph system was established. Administration was deemed necessary to make it more detailed and comprehensive, allowing imports to penetrate villages and raw materials to be easily taken out. Capitalist commercial relations were enforced, and the legal system was improved to ensure upholding the sanctity of contracts. Modern education was introduced to prepare the new administration, and westernization was expected to increase the demand for imported goods. In the field of political ideology, liberal imperialism was the watchword, with the perspective of training the people of the colony towards self-government. There was confidence that the economic relationship would continue even if formal political control was ended. The ideology of modernization was critical of existing modes of living, with the intention of development rather than deliberately underdevelopment. Therefore, the second stage of colonialism was marked by the industrial bourgeoisie's interest in the markets available for manufactured goods, the development of the colony, and the development of the colony's political ideology.

The third stage of colonialism saw an intense struggle for markets, raw materials, and food grains, with large-scale accumulation of capital in the metropolis necessitating the search for avenues for investment abroad. Imperial powers had colonies, leading to more intensive control over the colony to protect their interests. The need for intensive control increased, and the new ideology of benevolent despotism replaced self-government. A major contradiction in this stage was the colony's inability to absorb metropolitan capital or increase its exports of raw materials due to overexploitation in the earlier stages. A strategy of limited modernization was implemented to address this issue, but the logic of colonialism could not be subverted, and underdevelopment became a constraint on further exploitation. The third stage often did not take off, as the colonies' economies were wrecked by colonialism, making it difficult to absorb capital investment. Older colonies continued to export capital, as colonialism had wrecked their economies and could not absorb capital investment to any appreciable extent. Capital was invested in products with a ready market abroad or infrastructure for such exports. In many colonies, the older forms of exploitation continued, with the earlier two forms remaining more important even in the third stage. Therefore, the third stage of colonialism saw significant changes in the nature of world capitalism, with the rise of industrialization and the decline of the British supremacy. The colonial system faced two types of contradictions: the external one, which

expressed the anti-imperialist movement, and the internal one, where the colony could no longer serve the interests of the metropolitan capitalist class.

Colonised Worlds

The era of European colonialism began in the late 15th century with the voyages of exploration and discovery. Spain and Portugal were the early pioneers, with Christopher Columbus reaching the Americas in 1492. Subsequently, other European powers, including England, France, the Netherlands, and later Belgium, Germany, and Italy, embarked on colonization efforts. The European powers established colonies in Africa, Asia, the Americas, and Oceania. European colonization of the Americas had a profound impact on the indigenous populations. The Spanish established colonies in present-day Mexico, Central and South America, while the English, French, and Dutch founded colonies in North America. The colonizers sought wealth through the exploitation of natural resources and the establishment of plantations, often relying on forced labour, such as African slaves.

In the 19th century, the so-called “Scramble for Africa” occurred as European powers competed to claim territories in the continent. This period saw the carving up of Africa through treaties and conferences, leading to the establishment of colonial territories. Colonial rule in Africa had devastating consequences for indigenous cultures and societies, as exploitation and oppression were common. The conquest of Africa in the late nineteenth century led to the expansion of European rule across the continent. The Industrial Revolution increased rivalries and the search for colonies, leading to three eras of conquest: 1880-1919, 1919-35, and 1935-1945. The colonial system was uprooted from over 94% of Africa within 45 years. The impact of colonialism was significant, destroying self-sufficient African economies, transforming and subjugating African societies, and disrupting African countries’ connections to each other and the world. The primary motive behind colonialism was to satisfy imperial interests, with both positive and negative effects. The arbitrary superimposition of territorial boundaries on tribal societies led to ethnic conflicts that persist today.Egypt, under French and British protection, experienced colonialism and became an agrarian appendage. By 1914, cotton Colonialism accounted for 43% of agricultural output and 85% of exports. Egypt’s single crop economy was disastrous, as it relied on imports for essential food supply. Foreigners controlled cotton,

land, processing, and transport. Egypt was a valuable investment field, with 55% invested in industry, 12.36 in trade, and 79% in public debt. The First World War exposed Egypt's exploitation, with natural resources, manpower, and economy being harnessed for war efforts. In 1914, Egypt became a British protectorate. British troops were withdrawn to the Suez Canal area in 1947, but nationalist, anti-British feelings sustained to grow after the war. The 1952 coup defeated the Egyptian monarchy and established the modern Republic of Egypt. The last British troops left Egypt in June 1956.

Australia's colonisation is an important chapter in the history of European expansion and its influence on indigenous communities. Prior to European settlement, aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people had lived on the continent for tens of thousands of years. Although European exploration and interaction with Australia can be dated back to the early 17th century, it was not until the late 18th century that the British began to establish a permanent presence. Captain James Cook, a British explorer, surveyed Australia's eastern coast in 1770 and claimed it for Britain. Following Cook's trip, the British government intended to establish a convict colony in Australia in order to relieve overcrowding in British jails and to secure a strategic base in the Pacific. Captain Arthur Phillip led the first fleet, which comprised of 11 ships transporting around 1,500 people, including convicts, troops, and free settlers, to Australia's southeastern coast in 1788.They arrived at what is now known as Sydney Cove in Sydney, New South Wales. This was the start of British colonisation in Australia. Other penal colonies created by the British in Australia include Tasmania (formerly known as Van Diemen's Land) in 1803 and Western Australia in 1829.These colonies were used to punish British criminals, but they also drew free people eager for fresh chances. Conflicts with indigenous communities emerged as the colonies spread. Dispossession of land, loss of traditional ways of life, and the introduction of illnesses wreaked havoc on aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. There were violent battles between settlers and indigenous people, which resulted in a fatal outcome. Large-scale immigration from Britain and other European nations dramatically changed Australia's demography in the nineteenth century. The discovery of gold in the mid-1800s also drew a large number of immigrants, which aided the expansion of Australian cities and the economy. The individual colonies began to federate over time, and on January 1, 1901, the Commonwealth of Australia was created as a self-governing federal dominion within the British Empire. With the enactment of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act in 1942,

it gained complete independence from Britain. Australia's colonial past is complicated. While it provided economic progress and European colonisation, it also led in indigenous peoples' marginalisation and abuse. The impact of colonisation on aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander populations is being felt today, and attempts to rectify historical injustices and seeking reconciliation are critical components of Australia's national conversation.

European colonial powers also established colonies in Asia. The British Empire, for example, ruled over India, Burma, Malaysia, and other territories. The French colonized parts of Indochina, while the Dutch had control over the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). Portugal and Spain established colonies in parts of Southeast Asia and the Pacific. South-East Asia experienced five centuries of colonialism, affecting countries like Thailand, causing the disappearance of traditional government, disruption of trading patterns, and destruction of rich cultural traditions.India has been a classic colony, with various stages of colonialism operating in the country. The first stage involved the conquest of Bengal, parts of South India, and the rest of India, with the East India Company acquiring monopolistic control over Indian trade and handicrafts. This led to the ruin of



Figure 21: Colonised nations (Source: www.thoughtco.com)

Indian traders and forced weavers to sell cheap manufactured goods. The drain of wealth was admitted by British officials, and the colony did not undergo fundamental changes in this stage. The second stage saw India emerge as a market for manufactured goods and a supplier of raw materials and food grains. The import of Manchester cloth increased in value from 96 lakh sterling in 1860 to 27 crore sterling in 1900, destroying traditional weavers. The decline of industry or deindustrialization took place, with the weight of industry in the livelihood pattern of the people reduced by half from 1809-13 to the census year 1901.The third stage was known as the era of finance capital, with a significant amount of capital invested in railways, loans to the Government of India, trade, and plantations, coal mining, jute mills, shipping, and banking. This stage was constantly challenged by the rivalry of new imperialist countries, resulting in further consolidation of reactionary imperialist policies characterized the viceroyalties of Lytton and Curzon, who declared British rule to be permanent trusteeship over the child people of India. Major spurts in industrial investment took place during periods when India's economic links with the world capitalist economy were temporarily weakened or disrupted. In India, foreign trade and the inflow of foreign capital were reduced or interrupted thrice during the 20th century, but as the links were not disrupted, only industrial growth took place, not industrial revolution. By the end of the second world war, the Britishers faced heavy economic losses, severe backlashes from Indian nationalists and were forced to leave the country.

Effects of colonialism in India

The destruction of traditional Indian industries was one of the earliest consequences of colonialism in India. The early stage of mercantile capitalism was when the products of Indian industries were still prized as valuable items of commerce. The English East India Company, which was competing with other East India Companies of the French or Dutch and other merchants of Indian and Asian origin, was in a good bargaining position. However, in the last decades of the 18th century, the British gradually eliminated most of their competitors, particularly the French and Dutch. Moreover, their military power and political and administrative position allowed them to become monopolists in the market. This allowed the English traders to reduce the prices paid to thenative artisans in India and

thus to reap high profits from sale in the European market. This excessive exploitation of Indian artisans weakened the very basis of our handicraft industries by reducing the artisan to a low level of income and destroyed the possibility of accumulation of resources to invest in the industry and to improve its technology. The Industrial Revolution first wiped out the market for India's artisans in Europe, because the economies of large-scale production in the new English factories made it impossible for artisanal products to compete with factory products. By the beginning of the 19th century, staple industrial exports, cotton textiles, began to decline and soon they ceased to be exported. Some other items, such as Indigo and raw silk, continued to be exported, though from 1813 it was no longer the East India Company but private trade which became the agency for exports. Not only was the export market of the Indian artisans taken away by the foreign factories, but the home market began to be invaded by imported factory products. The growth of new industrial activities in the last decade of the 19th century is established beyond question, and the process of de-industrialization had already done the damage well before census operations began. The repeated occurrence of current famines tells its own story. From the middle of the 19th century, a number of famines devastated India, with loss of life at least 1 crore and 52 lakhs, and the total number of famine-affected people being 39.7 crores. These massive numbers indicate periods of subsistence crisis, which were the root of the crises lay in what was the "normal" rate of agrarian production. A significant index of the normal situation in respect of food supply is the per capital availability of food-grains in India. There are three estimates in this regard for the period 1901 to 1943. All estimates indicate that the supply of foodgrains declined in the last half-century of British rule, though they differ on the extent to which it occurred. The statistics of agricultural production indicate a substantial increase in non-food grain output while foodgrain production shows an opposite trend. The commercialisation of agriculture led to the generation of usury and merchant capital in rural society, increasing the levels of differentiation among the peasantry. The common cultivator's dependence on the village bania for credit, marketing, and loans increased as commercialisation progressed. The village bania also played a role in supplying cash and facilitating the penetration of the rural market by imported industrial consumer goods, particularly Manchester cloth. The poorer peasants were hypothecated in advance to money lenders, while the better-off section was relatively free. They could store their goods, wait for better prices, and make their own crop decisions. In some regions, the rich peasants themselves became money

lenders to poorer peasants, accentuated the differentiation process. As a result, an increasing number of peasants began losing their land and becoming ‘de-peasanted’ landless laborers. This economic process and the larger number of landless agriculturists emerged as characteristic features of the colonial period.

Imperialism

Colonialism and imperialism are two sides of the same coin, with imperialism viewed from the metropolis and colonialism from the colony. Imperialism is an image of metropolitan capitalism and colonialism being its negative image.

Imperialism is the capitalist growth process that causes capitalist countries to invade and control pre-capitalist countries across the world. Imperialism is the system of political control exercised by the metropolis on another polity’s domestic and foreign policies, as well as its domestic politics, which is often referred to as periphery (countries at the bottom of the economic hierarchy). The word imperialism refers to the capitalist world’s international practises and relations during the separate period of mature capitalism that begins in the last part of the nineteenth century.

Imperialism is a contemporary phenomenon distinct from pre-modern modes of conquest and political dominance. In this context, four important features of imperialism are: a sharp increase in the international flow of commodities, men, and capital, an interdependent set of relations between countries at various stages of industrial development, advanced and superior technology in imperialist countries, and competition between advanced capitalist countries.

Theories of imperialism

There are various theories and explanations for imperialism, which can be classified into economic and non-economic explanations. The economic explanation includes factors such as overproduction and underconsumption, finance capitalism requirements, unequal exchange between imperial powers and colonies, and the highest stage of capitalism. Non-economic explanations have focused on imperialism as a pre-modern atavistic force,

focusing on the developments in colonies rather than the metropolis, or as an expression of political struggles within Europe. In the early twentieth century, economists and historians sought to understand the phenomenon of imperialism, which emerged from Marxist theory. Karl Marx had not developed any theory of imperialism, but his analysis of the capitalist mode of production led to the idea that the capitalist mode of production was driven by the need to extract surplus value from a class of wage-laborers. J.A. Hobson, a British economist, developed this theme in his work Imperialism (1902), which argued that the development of imperialism was a characteristic of advanced capitalism. R. Hilferding, a professional economist and banker, noted that the merging of finance and industrial capitalism throughout the industrialized world created monopoly conditions. Imperial expansion was preferred by monopoly capitalists because it brought new areas under their control, developed raw material production, safeguarded capital investment, and guaranteed markets for their output. This required a strong state to carry out a policy of expansion and gather in new colonies, which also involved giving up the principle of free trade, first championed by Britain. Rosa Luxemburg, a great theorist of imperialism, described the process by which advanced powers mopped up the markets of the still remaining non-capitalist world and left them poorer. She pointed out that exporting capital to underdeveloped non-European lands did not lead to local industrial development, as there was an artificial division of labour in the world, whereby underdevelopedlands were doomed to remain as primary producers forever. V.I. Lenin, the leader of the Russian Bolshevik Party, developed this line of thought in his work Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916. He explained that the notion of exporting capital to the underdeveloped world to maximize profits was challenged later by those who found that industrialized nations were exporting most of their surplus capital not to the underdeveloped world but to more industrialized areas. In Britain, only about 20% of British capital exported before 1914 was invested in British colonies including India and another 20% in South America. The main investment was in other capitalist countries, mainly Europe and North America. At least three quarters



Figure 22

of British capital exports before 1914 and again between the two world wars went as loans to governments and government guaranteed public utilities. Therefore, the development of imperialism was influenced by Marxist theory, the rise of monopolistic firms, and the growing influence of industrialized nations on the world. Until 1914, most foreign capital in the world was British, and deindustrialization in the colonies was disadvantageous for imperialist power. The impoverishment of colonial peoples led to a reduction in production in Britain's industries, increasing unemployment in Britain. Capital exports to European lands and North America provided greater benefits for British goods. Joseph Schumpeter's 1931 book Imperialism and the Social Classes argued that capitalism and imperialism were two separate phenomena. Imperialism was generated by pre-capitalist social and political forces, while capitalism developed through innovation and the combination of different factors of production. The logic of capitalism involved productive engagement of manpower, while war involved withdrawal of manpower for unproductive activities. For capitalism, it was not necessary to acquire territory, as economic development could be achieved without it. Cambridge historians Jack Gallagher and R.E. Robinson contested the notion that capitalism led to imperialism, arguing that it was the consequence of European power politics, which involved mutual deterrence in Asia and Africa. They also argued that the economic interests of capitalism did not play a role in empire building, arguing that the British cabinet had no businessman at all.

Stages of Imperialism

Mercantilism and Early Trading Empires

In 1500, Europe's dominant position in the world was not taken for granted, as the Ottoman Empire, China under the Mings, and India under the Mughals were at the same stage of development. However, their domination by a centralized authority did not provide conditions conducive to intellectual growth. In contrast, competition between different European powers encouraged the introduction of new military techniques, such as the long-range armed sailing ship, which increased military power combined with economic progress to push Europe forward and ahead of other continents. The growth of trans-Atlantic trade was spectacular, increasing eightfold between 1510 and 1550 and threefold between 1550 and 1610. The Spanish and Portuguese intended their empires in America

to be permanent, acquiring goods such as gold, silver, precious metals, spices, oil, sugar, indigo, tobacco, rice, furs, timber, and new plants like potato and maize. The shipbuilding



Figure 23 Map of Neo-Imperialistic nations

industry developedaround major ports of London and Bristol in Britain, Antwerp in Belgium, and Amsterdam in the Netherlands. The Dutch, French, and English soon became keen rivals of the Spanish and Portuguese, encouraging the progress of the science of navigation. The discovery of America and the route to the Indies via the Cape of Good Hope had great consequences for Europe, liberating Europe from a confined geographic and mental cell. Discoveries, trade, and conquests had practical consequences, with every colony or trading center being a new

Figure 24 Vasco Da Gama

economic stimulus. America was a market, and American bullion increased the supply of money circulating in Europe and intensifying existing economic and social developments. The volume of trade with America increased for four centuries. Before 1815, Spain and Portugal were the pre-eminent imperial powers, both of which made huge profits from their colonies. Portugal had a huge empire in Asia and then in America and Brazil, with colonial revenues bringing in the equivalent of 72,000-pound sterling in 1711. However, France made no fiscal profits on her colonies, in sharp contrast to Portugal. By 1789, France lost most of her colonial possessions in America and India to Britain. The crucial weakness was her inferior naval power. Some Western states developed their colonies in the tropics, India, Africa, Latin America, and Australia, while the Europeans did not settle in Africa, content with slaves, gold dust, and ivory. The colonies were crucial to the British economy, providing raw materials and markets for metropolitan products. Britain emerged as the leader of the five big European powers, with a developed banking and financial system, geographical location at the westward flank of Europe, and the Industrial Revolution. These empires represented European ambition, determination, and ingenuity in using limited resources rather than European predominance throughout the world. In summary, Europe's dominance in the world in 1500 was a result of its strategic location, strategic alliances, and the development of new military techniques and technologies.

Decline

Old colonialism had its natural limits, as the flow of precious metals declined, Spanish and Portuguese power declined, and their colonies lost. The Dutch monopoly on shipping ended, and the rivalry between France and Britain ended. Britain became the world leader in empire, finance, and trade. Old colonialism did not grow into new colonialism, but collapsed and was replaced by new colonialism. Europe's conquest of America, Africa, and Asia in the sixteenth century was due to its mastery of the seas. However, Europe's domination was disastrous for other peoples, leading to the extinction of indigenous populations in the Americas and the forced slavery of twelve million Africans between 1500 and 1860. This era saw Europe benefit greatly from merchant capital, institutions like the modern state, bureaucracy, and scientific knowledge, which laid the foundations of the modern world.

Modes of Imperialism

Imperialism can be formal or informal, with formal imperialism involving annexation and direct rule, and informal imperialism involving indirect rule by independent local elites. There are three types of empires: trading empires, industrial empires with full-fledged colonies, and industrial empires without formal colonies. Capitalist expansion occurred through five stages: the end of the 15th to mid-17th century, the mid-17th to latter 18th century, the late 18th to 1870s, the late 1880s to 1880s, the 1880s to World War I, and the post-World War I era of socialism, decolonization, and multinational corporations. The changing nature of imperialism depends on the stages of capitalist development.

Federalism

Federalism is a dynamic idea of constructing a country and a state. The approach focuses mostly on institutionalised political collaboration and group coexistence. Federalism is, in other words, a comprehensive plan for "living together" within the framework of what Daniel Elazar termed "self-rule plus shared rule." According to Rasheeduddin Khan, it is characterised by "unity of polity and plurality of society." Federalism, as a philosophy of nation-building, aims to establish state-society ties in a way that permits social groups' autonomy of identity to develop in the institutional and political space that is protected and required by the constitution. The specific cultural rights of persons, particularly minorities, are recognised by the federal constitution. The niceties of federalism lie in its fundamental stress on institutionalising diversity and facilitating sociopolitical cooperation between two sets of identities through various structural mechanisms of 'shared rule,' so in this sense it is very similar to the theory of multiculturalism but different. Federalism is a state-building theory that focuses on three key elements:

(i) The establishment of states and territorialization of federal-local administration to foster closer ties between citizens and the federal government;

(ii) The decentralisation of the distribution of federal powers; and

(iii) The development of shared rule institutions.

The building of the institutions for "self-rule" is essentially what the first, component entails. At the macro level, self-rule relates to the establishment of states, while at the

micro level, it refers to the institutions of local self-governance. States or regional administrative divisions are often created based on the degree of geographical interrelationship between people, culture, and land that is continuous or discontinuous. In other words, this suggests that states are formed according to the “homogeneity with viability” idea. To address the unique cultural and administrative needs of those residing in geo-ethnic enclaves, the state system may contain various substate formations, such as regional councils or district councils. The second element is the division of federal authorities and functions on a largely independent basis, where each body has enough legislative capability, executive power, and financial resources to successfully carry out its task in the designated sector.

Federalism, as proposed by Neumann in 1955, aims to curb the evil use of power by dividing citizens into competing power units. Federal states are subject to two jurisdictions: the Federal Government and the state. However, some argue that federalism diffuses political power, overlooking the pluralist structure of society and the multi-party or two-party system. Federalism is not identical with social pluralism, and neither the two parties nor the multi-party system is the product of the federal state or its functioning. Livingston in 1952 argues that federalism is a solution to a specific kind of political organization, rather than an institutional or constitutional structure. Federal governments and constitutions arise in response to a set of stimuli, and federalism is a function of societies rather than constitutions. Federalism is not an absolute term, but rather a relative term, with no specific point at which a society ceases to be unified and becomes diversified. Federalism has been a universal answer to overcomingproblems of diversity and disparity in the interest of harmony and unity.

Federalism is a form of government in which the sovereign authority of political power is divided between the various units. This form of government is also called a “federation” or a “federal state” in the common parlance. These units are centre, state and panchayats or the municipalities. The centre also is called union. The component units of the union are called variously as states (in the United States of America), Cantolls (in Switzerland), Prouinee (in Canada). Republics (in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic). Literally, the word ‘federal’ means contractual. A federal union is a contractual union. A federal state is a state brought into being through a contractual union of sovereign states. The union of states by conquest cannot be called a federal union.

A federation is formed through a contract, where sovereign units, such as states or local units, form a voluntary agreement. This type of union is only possible in a democratic framework and is limited in extent. Contracting parties never surrender their complete authority, and when two or more sovereign states unite voluntarily, they retain their internal autonomy and unite on matters of common interest. James Bryce defined a federal state as a political contrivance aiming to reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of state rights. Federalism embraces diversity on multiple issues, and state boundaries may not be sufficient to mark areas where opinions differ on all possible questions. Federal organization is not perfect, but components of a federation exist due to significant diversity that only a federal organization can offer sufficient protection. However, not all federal states are born through unions of sovereign states, and many are products of devolution of powers by a centralized authority, such as the Indian federation.

How did federalism origin?

Federalism has evolved over time, contributing to the survival and rise of states and now being part of the *'raison d'etre-state idea'*. In the 18^{th} and 19^{th} centuries, federalism was based on dualistic qualities, with federal and state governments pursuing virtually independent courses of action during periods when governments were minimal. This dual polity or *dual federalism* allowed the powers of the general government and the state to exist within the same territorial limits, acting separately and independently within their respective spheres. However, the dualistic nature of the federal polity was a geographical necessity, as involved units in the federation were reluctant to abandon their rights and freedoms before the Federation.. The legal theory of divided sovereignty and the two distinct spheres was well-suited to the time, but the economic philosophy on which this dualistic federalism was based has now become outmoded.

Modern states cannot avoid extensive state intervention, and the performance of functions in services is the key note of modern government. Cooperation, interdependence, and interpretation of national and state agencies are inevitable in this era of active public service.In the mid-20^{th} century, *cooperative federalism* emerged as a complement to dualistic freedom in the 18^{th}-19^{th} century. This approach emphasized interdependence between units in a federation, allowing for social contacts of diverse backgrounds. States and national governments collaborate to perform various functions, with the national



Figure 26 Stages of Federalism

government supplementing state functions. The 20th century saw a division of power between general and regional authorities, each coordinating with others and acting directly on the people through its own administrative agencies. Modern federalism focuses on functions rather than powers, with the two sets of government viewed as equal partners. Cooperative federalism is geographically expressive, with more spatial interaction between units and the federal government and unit government, resulting in a spatial configuration of social contacts.



Figure 27 : Example of cooperative feredalism under the context of our break of violence in Manipur, 2023

States-rights sentiment is present in almost every federal state, but the rivalry between states and the central government has changed significantly. The main rivalry now lies between states themselves, with the centralized regulator playing a fundamental role. Different regions view themselves as rivals, just as small nations do within a common market. *Organic federalism*, or *integrated federalism*, marks a *new phase in federalism* development, but its concept remains ill-defined. Inorganic or integrated federalism has extensive powers and a strong lead to state governments in important areas of individual and cooperative activity.

This type of federalism dominates every aspect of policy, with regional autonomy within the limits of the region. The values inherent in such autonomy are protected by the constitutional structure and political patterns.Cooperative federations can originate from mutual interests within a political community or compromises between participating peoples. Indian federalism, initially merged due to compromise, now relies on the mutual interest of the political community involved. It involves spatial interdependence and interaction between political communities, resisting centrifugal tendencies. Some federations have been established against the majority's consent, often created by a powerful minority, colonial power, or outside agency. *Imprisoned federations* often originate from the desire of an interest group to maintain their privileged status. Federations that have arisen and collapsed after the end of World War II including Mali, Central African, West Indies, and Pakistan.

Figure 28 Countries with federal political system

Federations that were imposed in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries were not geographically expressive due to their lack of regional claims. This led to their collapse, as they lacked spatial interdependence and interaction between political communities. The current trend is towards confederation, such as the European Union, where a central authority over all member states is subject to individual national government control.

Geography and federalism

In 1982, Dikshit argued that geography can explain political phenomena through the concept of federalism, which is based on territorial grouped diversity. Federalism is a process that reconciles social solidarity with local identity, resulting in a dual political organization and regional autonomy. This interdependence between the federal government and state units indicates the interdependence of the society within a single area. Federalism is a logical expression of spatial configuration of socio-political contacts within a single area. It is characterized by its geographical expressiveness, as every society is closely integrated based on its unique historical, cultural, economic, and political determinants.

These diverse elements can be distributed among members of a society in a way that leads to certain attitudes in specific territorial areas or scattered throughout the entire society. Coherence in a society depends on the devolution of functions appropriate to the diversities represented by these groups. Federalism can take the form of federalism or federal government, but it has been organized on a territorial basis. Geographical diversities do not always follow the boundaries of component units, but in many countries, particularly the United States, the federal system exhibits patterns of diversity associated with regions or groups of the state rather than individual states. Regionalism is a valid manifestation of the Federal principle, confirming that diversity is in society grouped territorially. Regionalism in the politics of a federal country is made possible only by the federal allocation of functions to the state itself. The importance of states as basic units of the federal system does not detract from the fact that several states within a large region are dominated by similar opinions.

Federalism is essential for a functioning federal society, as it reflects functional differences based on territorially grouped diversities. These differences provide a reason for

and demand for a federal polity. Social diversities, such as economic interest, religion, race, nationality, language, size, separation by great distances, historical habitation, and previous existence as separate colonies or states, can create a situation where the particular interests and qualities of the larger community must be recognized. However, these differences may not be too great, and the community may break up into independent groups. Federalism cannot create unity out of diversity, as it enables the two to coexist. The relative weights of these factors are largely incommensurable, and the results of federalism cannot be estimated without considering the underlying factors. Here geography helps in analysis spatial variation, areal differentiation and causal affects.

India as a federation

Federalism in India shares similarities with the United States, as both countries have dual polities for the Central Indian Union government and the state government. However, there are two main differences: in the USA, a person has dual citizenship for their state, while in India, an Indian citizen has only one citizenship. Each state has its own constitution, but these are loosely interrelated. India is described as a "Union of states" for Indian federalism, as the federation was not a result of an agreement between different states to join a Federation. The pattern of division of power under the Constitution renders it a federal character, given by the framers for two reasons:



Figure 29 Features of federalism

1) A federal state is more effective than a unitary one when the size of its territory is as large as India, and

2) A federal state is more effective than a unitary one when diverse groups of its population live in a discrete territorial concentration.

The Indian Constitution is written and relatively rigorous. Several parts of the Constitution may only be changed with the approval of a majority of the state's legislatures. The Union and the states are given equal power under the Constitution. The Supreme Court of India has original jurisdiction to hear cases involving:

a) The Union and one or more states or groups of states

b) One state and another state or a group of states; and

c) One group of states and another group of states.

The USAis an "indestructible union of indestructible states," meaning states cannot be split, merged, or altered in size. However, in India, boundaries of states can be altered by a law enacted by parliament. In 2024, India has 28 states and 8 Union territories. According to Article 3 of the Constitution of India, Parliament has the power to separate territories, merge states, split states, and unite parts of states and Union territories. The views of state legislatures must be taken beforehand but not necessarily respected.

The union and states have separate governments, with the president at the centre and the governors appointed by the president. Both the president and governors are advised by their councils of ministers. In India, there is no strict division of public services, as both the union and state officials administer both union and state laws simultaneously. The Indian judiciary is integrated, headed by the supreme court of India, which is also the federal court. The seventh schedule to the Indian constitution establishes a detailed separation of legislative functions between the union and state governments. union and state governments' executive powers coexist alongside their legislative powers. The union and state governments' powers are divided into three lists: the union list, the state list, and the concurrent list. The functions of the union governments are described in list I, the union list; it covers 97 subjects; and in list II, the state list, 61 issues are



Figure 30 (Source: https://www.civilsdaily.com/)

mentioned on which state legislatures would pass legislation. The powers to be exercised concurrently by the Union and the state governments are listed in List III, the concurrent List, and 47 subjects are mentioned in this.

The Union owns the residual powers that are not included in any of these lists. This split, however, is subject to three conditions:

I) If the union and a state's laws clash on a concurrent list issue, the union law takes precedence.

2) If the council of states, or Rajya Sabha, decides by a majority of two-thirds of its members that a particular issue on the state list is of national interest, the parliament will be allowed to act on it.

3) When an emergency proclamation is in effect, parliament may legislate on any state matter. The force of such legislation will expire six months after the proclamation expires.

The union controls various subjects such as defence, security, external affairs, communication, currency, banking, insurance, inter-state trade, commerce, major industries, oilfields, mines, census, and national institutions. The state controls public order, police, prisons, local communication, land, agriculture, public health, and mines. The union and state have concurrent jurisdiction over criminal law, preventive detention, education, forests, inland shipping, factories, boilers, electricity, newspapers, books, printing presses, weights, measures, and price control.

Core-periphery concept

Core literally means centre and often has highest values of density or centre phenomena. A "core region" in economic geography is a national or global zone of concentrated economic power, wealth, innovation, and sophisticated technology. In political geography, the heartland (nucleus/center) of a state has its most developed territory, biggest riches, densest population, and most distinct national identity (this decreases as one moves away from the core). The world-systems analysis reveals that capitalism originated and expanded through the international division of labour, dividing the world economy into four economic zones: core, periphery, semi-periphery, and external areas. This stratification

reflects Marxian and Weberian analysis of class, which focuses on ownership and non-owner ship of means of production and forces of production. The core, semi-periphery, and peripheral zones hold distinct economic and class positions, allowing them to gain advantages or suffer from disadvantages and exploitation.

Core countries

The core is made up of the world's most powerful and dominant countries, both economically and militarily. The core nations are heavily industrialised, possess manufacturing equipment, and conduct highly skilled production work. Indeed, their high degree of industrialization and technological progress draws competent people from other economic zones. Rather than raw materials, the core nations generate manufactured commodities. They are at the forefront of all technical advancements and industrial progress. These are the nations that have benefited the most from the capitalist system by focusing on capital-intensive industry. They have a locally powerful dominating bourgeoisie class that allows them to gain control of international trade and take capital surpluses from it for their own profit. The core countries wield considerable power over non-core countries. They by controlling and exploiting the peripheral countries, have often gained considerable benefits. They are markets for raw materials and low-wage labour from the periphery. They profit from the peripheral countries by exporting their manufactured goods, products and commodities at a premium cost. Furthermore, they make huge profits via making capital investments in peripheral nations, which causes the latter to suffer, become dependent and vulnerable. The history of the global capitalist economy demonstrates that there has been a battle among key country groupings to achieve dominance over peripheral countries due to a lack of resources and a desire for economic growth dominance. There have been instances when a single core country has been able to establish its superiority over others. The dominance of Holland and later the United Kingdom in the history of the foundations of the international capitalist economy as a part of commercial capitalism amply demonstrates the argument. Wallerstein,, went on to say that a core nation may build domination over others by dominating manufacturing, commerce, and financial/banking activities. Superiority in these three areas helps a core country achieve military superiority. Superior military and armed power, however, have not been the basis of a core country's economic supremacy in the history of the international capitalist system; rather, military expansion has led to loss of economic primacy.

Figure 31Countries identified as core, semi periphery and periphery
(Source: https://www.thoughtco.com/)

Periphery Countries

Periphery countries are the world's economically and militarily disadvantaged and exploited countries. They are the least industrialised, with extremely few of the world's means of production, and a large pool of unskilled labourers. Periphery nations are mostly agricultural economies and cash crop producers with a large peasant population. They lack strong central governments and are major raw material exporters to the core nations. They engage in labour-intensive industry and must rely on repressive labour practises, which are frequently imposed by the governments of the core nations. They are vulnerable to multi-national and transnational firms from core nations, which expropriate a large portion of the surplus created through uneven trade. Periphery nations have a high level of socioeconomic inequality. They have a small bourgeoisie class that serves its vested interests by establishing relationships with global and transnational enterprises. The history of the capitalist system is filled with examples of core nations seeking to create a monopoly over a periphery country in order to maximise their revenues and advantages from it. Wallerstein's notions of trade concentration and investment concentration, in which periphery nations trade with and receive investments from a few core countries (or just one), become essential in this

setting. A large concentration of trade and investment exacerbates the periphery country's vulnerability. If the core nation decides to discontinue trade and investment dealings with it, the peripheral countries would suffer economically. The situation of Latin America, a peripheral nation with a high concentration of commerce and investment from the United States, exemplifies this concept.

Semi-periphery Countries

Semi-peripheral countries are those that are halfway between the core and the periphery. These are nations that must avoid sliding into the category of peripheral status while also attempting to advance to the category of core status. In other words, semi-peripheries might emerge from decreasing core nations and developing peripheral countries. These are industrialising and emerging countries with more diverse economies. Semi-peripheral nations have more developed and diverse economies than peripheral ones. They are not, however, as dominant in international commerce as the core countries. They have trade agreements with periphery and core nations, respectively. According to Wallerstein, the existence of semi-peripheries is critical for the stability of the global system. The semi-peripheries serve as buffers between the competing economic zones of the cores and peripheries. They deflect and alleviate political pressures, tensions, and objections from various groups in peripheral areas that may threaten the dominance of core-states.

Core-periphery imbalances and regional disparities are significant issues in sociology, international relations, and economics, as they significantly impact economic and social development worldwide. The core-periphery model focuses on the tendency of economic activities to concentrate around pivotal points, highlighting the role of horizontal and vertical relations between various entities. This model suggests that socioeconomic development is usually uneven in spatial dimensions, with the "core" regions being advanced in various areas, while the "periphery" regions serve as social, economic, and political backstages, backyards, and supply sources. The level of development has a negative correlation with distance from the core, with the economies of states that have gone through various stages of development at the earliest and with the fastest pace becoming wealthy core regions and growth poles. Countries and regions that have experienced slower development processes become poor periphery. The core-periphery model raises the critical question of the results and outcomes of the disproportions and asymmetry of the relationship and value of various indicators related to the level of

regional development. Peripherality is perceived negatively, and peripheral areas may generate challenges for the core and require political interventions from time to time. Peripheries are associated with distance, difference, dependence on external aid, and marginalization and deprivation. There are no uniform, or standardized development patterns that could solve the development gap between underdeveloped and developing countries and regions. Various theories and policy papers have tried to explain spatial determinants of development, with the core-periphery model being attributed to Raul Prebisch (1950), John Friedmann's human geography approach in regional studies (1966), Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory (1974), and Paul Robin Krugman's recent contributions to mainstream economics.

The Core-Periphery Model of Regional Development by John Friedmann (1966)

The core-periphery model, developed by John Friedmann in 1966, focuses on spatially diversified development and the tendency of competitive entities to locate their manufacturing and service activities in the most developed regions. Economic centers (cores) dominate over peripheral areas not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and cultural fields. Cores typically have a high potential for innovation and growth, shaping the geographic diffusion of innovations. However, peripheral regions experience lagging growth or stagnation and may rely on growth driven mainly by the core area's demands for resources. Friedmann's version is divided into "upward transition regions" (advanced or early), "downward transition regions," and "resource frontier regions." Upward transition regions are areas of growth that spread over small centers rather than at the core, while downward transition regions are characterized by depleted resources, low agricultural productivity, or outdated industry. Resource frontier regions are newly colonized areas brought into production networks for the first time. Less accessible inner-city areas may experience a backwash effect with

Figure 1John Friedmann

limited investment, especially when the inner city is close to the newly developing central business district, concentrating a major poverty wealth gap in relatively tight space. The core-periphery model is sometimes described similarly to the “three-sector model” (or “Petty’s Law”) proposed in economics by Allan Fisher, Colin Clark, Jean Fourastie, and Daniel Bell. It covers the following stages: pre-industrial, transitional, industrial, and post-industrial. In the pre-industrial stage, economic activities are limited to a small area and small-scale settlement structures with small units. Each aspect of pre-industrial society is relatively isolated, with small units staying dispersed and economic entities such as population and traders having low mobility. In the transitional stage, capital accumulation and industrial growth foster an increasing concentration of the economy in the core, leading to increased trade and mobility. The periphery is subordinated to the centre of political and economic dominance, and the labour force’s space of daily existence remains local due to personal mobility limitations. In the industrial stage, manufacturing (the secondary sector)



Figure 33 Model of core periphery concept

grows with increasing employment of people migrating from rural areas to urban areas, resulting in a shift from using the human workforce to mechanization and automation of production. This change is also used to describe changes in labour markets and labour economics. The fourth stage, post-industrial, realizes a growing demand for workforce in-services (the tertiary sector). The spatial integration of the economy and the achievement of equilibrium lead to the urban system becoming fully integrated, reducing inequalities significantly. The distribution of economic activities is focused on establishing specializations and a division of labour linked with strong flows along transport corridors. Friedmann believed that the allocation of economic activities should reach optimum balance and stability, but this does not mean that trade and mobility of the population should decrease. An integrated model foresees cyclical population movement caused mostly by age factors, such as youth studying in big cities, families settling in suburbs, and older adults searching for competitive and peaceful rural environments.

Core-Periphery Hierarchy in World-Systems Theory by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974)

The core-periphery model, proposed by Wallerstein in the 1970s, explains the genesis and functioning of capitalism and globalization. It assumes that the world-system is a specific spatial and temporal entity, including various political and cultural units. The core-periphery hierarchy is an essential element of this theory, where discrepancies in interests and inequalities result from the domination of the vibrant centre over the weak periphery. This theory is similar to Prebisch and Friedmann's approaches, but it is inextricably linked in material and sociocultural terms. Wallerstein demonstrates that core regions are innovative, active in international trade, export capital, generate high incomes, and have high productivity and stability of the political system. Peripheral areas are less innovative, have low incomes and productivity, dependent on capital import, have a smaller role in international trade, and are politically unstable. In this approach, peripheries are more dependent on the centres and disadvantaged by unequal terms of trade. Wallerstein distinguishes semi-peripheries as a buffer between the centre and the



Figure 35Immanuel Wallerstein

periphery, with their promotion to the status of a core region decided primarily by international or governmental interventions. Some semi peripheries were previously central areas, while some have advanced from the periphery. In Wallerstein's opinion, countries of the periphery and semi-peripheries that build for a comparative advantage on cheap labour stand to lose the investment they attract due to labour costs increasing on a global scale due to the depletion of rural resources.



Figure 34 Schematic representation of core periphery hierarchy (Source: medium.com)

UNIT 4: POLITICO-ECONOMIC BLOCS: SAARC, EU AND BRICS

Political-economic blocs, also known as regional integration organizations or regional blocs, are groups of countries that come together to foster closer economic and political cooperation. These blocs are formed with the aim of promoting trade, economic growth, and regional stability among member nations. Here are some notable political-economic blocs from different regions of the world: European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), African Union (AU), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and many more.

SAARC:

Fundamental changes are taking place both globally and regionally in the modern world. There is no doubting that efficient regional and global integration has become a crucial feature in today's world in promoting peace and prosperity. The ability of a state to foster commercial contacts, investments, and economic integration both within the area and worldwide is now used to gauge a state's strength and growth rather than its military and defensive capabilities.

At the inaugural summit of the Heads of State or Government of South Asian nations in December 1985 in Dhaka, the SAARC was formally established. After the late president of Bangladesh, Zia-ur-Rahman, took the initiative for such an organisation in May 1980, seven South Asian nations — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — started talking about regional cooperation. It is also said that king Birendra of Nepal was one among those who had the concept. The formation of SAARC was discussed previously in at least three conferences—the Colombo Powers Conference in April 1954, the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, and the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947— the aim was of South Asian unification. The foundation of the South Asian grouping known as SAARC was facilitated by the abundance of human and material resources along with other shared characteristics including geographic closeness, historical origins, and similarity of social and political development standards. The development of political, economic, and social

contact, as well as a shared vision for using the region's potential and interdependence to confront challenges, were the primary motivations for the founding of SAARC. The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was not established until 1985 due to a number of factors, including the lingering effects of South Asia's colonial past, unchecked migration across fragile, porous, and unsettled borders, ethnic and religious differences, intraregional economic disparities, and the ensuing bilateral disputes.

The governments of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have ratified its charter, which calls for friendship and cooperation with other developing nations as well as the promotion of social, economic, and cultural development in the South Asian area. Bhutan, India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh were among its seven original members. Afghanistan joined the group in 2007. The United States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Mauritius, Iran, and the European Union are among the observer states. Foreign secretaries meet twice a year, and meetings of heads of state often occur once a year.

Figure 36 First meeting of SAARC countries

Targets and Goals: The SAARC Charter (adopted in December 1985) states that the organization's primary goals are to advance the welfare of South Asians and improve their quality of life, accelerate regional economic growth, social progress, and cultural development, strengthen collective self-reliance among South Asian nations, and foster mutual trust, understanding, and appreciation of one another's problems.Its charter ruled out "bilateral and contentious issues" from its agenda as a protective clause



Figure 37 Logo and member nations of SAARC

1. To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life;
2. To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials;
3. To promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia;
4. To contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems;
5. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields;
6. To strengthen cooperation with other developing countries;
7. To strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and
8. To cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.

The areas of cooperation that SAARC members have agreed upon are:

- (HRT): Human Resource Development and Tourism,
- (ARD): Agriculture and Rural Development,
- (ENB): Environment, Natural Disasters and Biotechnology,

- (ETF): Economic, Trade and Finance,
- (SA): Social Affairs,
- (IPA): Information and Poverty Alleviation,
- (ETS): Energy, Transport, Science and Technology,
- (ESC): Education, Security and Culture.

Functions and Structure

i) A Heads of State or Government Meeting: The top policy-making body, the SAARC Summit, typically meets once a year. SAARC summits have previously taken place in Male (1990), Bangalore (1986), Kathmandu (1987), Islamabad (1988), Dhaka (1993), Kolkata (1991), Dhaka (1993), New Delhi (1995), Male (1997), Colombo (1998), Kathmandu (2002), Islamabad (2004). The detailed list is given in Figure____. There was no summit conference in 1989, 1992, or 1994. The Foreign Ministers of the member States make up the Council of Ministers

List of SAARC Summits

- **1′ Saarc Summit (Dhaka, December 8, 1985)**
- **2′ Saarc Summit (Bangalore, November 17, 1986)**
- **3′ Saarc Summit (Katmandu, November 4, 1987)**
- **4′ Saarc Summit (Islamabad, December 31, 1988)**
- **5′ Saarc Summit (Male', November 23, 1990)**
- **6′ Saarc Summit (Colombo, December 21, 1991)**
- **7′ Saarc Summit (Dhaka, April 11, 1993)**
- **8′ Saarc Summit (New Delhi, May 4, 1995)**
- **9′ Saarc Summit (Male', May 14, 1997)**
- **10′ Saarc Summit (Colombo, July 31, 1998)**
- **11′ Saarc Summit (Katmandu, January 6, 2002)**
- **12′ Saarc Summit (Islamabad, January 6, 2004)**
- **13′ Saarc Summit (Dhaka, November 13, 2005)**
- **14′ Saarc Summit (New Delhi, April 3-4, 2007)**
- **15′ Saarc Summit (Colombo, July 27 - August 4, 2008)**
- **16′ Saarc Summit (Thimpu, 28 April - 29 April, 2010)**
- **17′ Saarc Summit (Maldives, Nov. 10 - Nov. 11, 2011)**
- **18′ Saarc Summit (Katmandu, Nov. 26 - Nov. 27, 2014)**
- **19′ Saarc Summit (Pakistan, December 8, 1985)**

Figure 38 List of Saarc summits

ii) It meets typically twice a year and discusses issues such as the review of the cooperation programme and the design of policies.

iii) The standing committee, which is made up of the foreign secretaries of the member nations, is in charge of resource mobilisation, new areas of cooperation identification, and general monitoring and cooperation.

iv) Implementation, coordination, and monitoring of the programmes in their particular fields of cooperation are the responsibilities of technical committees made up of representatives of member states. the standing committee receives their reports on a regular basis.

v) The standing committee may establish action committees. They are made up of member states that are charged with carrying out projects.

vi) The Secretariat, which was founded in 1987, is made up of a Secretary-General and other staff members who are responsible for overseeing the direction and execution of programmes as well as providing support for meetings of the SAARC organs.



Figure 39 SAARC Secretariat Organogram (HRT): Human Resource Development and Tourism, (ARD): Agriculture andRural Development, (ENB): Environment, Natural Disasters and Biotechnology, (ETF): Economic, Trade and Finance, (SA): Social Affairs, (IPA): Information and Poverty Alleviation, (ETS): Energy, Transport, Science and Technology, (ESC): Education, Security and Culture.

Apex and Recognized Bodies: SAARC has constituted some apex bodies for the better functioning of economic, political and social behaviours in South Asia. SAARC has six Apex Bodies. These are written below:

- SAARC Chamber of Commerce & Industry (SCCI),
- South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Law (SAARCLAW)
- South Asian Federation of Accountants (SAFA),
- South Asia Foundation (SAF),
- South Asia Initiative to End Violence Against Children (SAIEVAC),
- Foundation of SAARC Writers and Literature (FOSWAL)

Achievements and Opportunities for the future: Even though SAARC has been around for 38 years, it has not been as successful as it could have been, like other regional organisations. The broad consensus topics on the SAARC agenda have advanced at an extremely sluggish and unacceptable pace. It has not been able to significantly affect how the SAARC's goals and objectives are being implemented in terms of collaboration and coordination. The causes of this situation are not difficult to find. Ethnic conflicts including the Tamil-Sinhala conflict, Assamese-Bangladeshi tensions, and Hindu-Muslim conflicts plague the area. India, is implicated in all of these ethnic tensions. Additionally, there is widespread historical mistrust, misunderstanding, and misinterpretation among its member states. It's commonly known that there is a constant struggle between India and Pakistan. Other sources of friction include the Tamil issue between India and Sri Lanka and Nepal's accusations about Indian meddling in her domestic affairs. In addition, because India is the largest nation in the area, other nations are secretly afraid of Indian dominance. Although there are no external security threats to South Asia at the moment, the issue of terrorists moving across the border from Pakistan to India, first in Wab and then in Kashmir, has security concerns that prevent genuine regional cooperation. This problem has led to ongoing tension, skirmishes, military alert, and low-level proxy war. In spite of these issues, SAARC has been progressively increasing cooperation. A significant accomplishment was made during the seventh Summit in Dhaka in April 1993. In order to liberate commerce in the region, it was decided to establish the South Asian Preferential Commerce Agreement (SAPTA). In January 1996, the SAPTA went into existence. However, intra-regional commerce under SAPTA had not gained traction as of September 1996 because of a lack of infrastructure, a lack of knowledge, and the predominance of high tariff walls among its members. The initiatives to open the borders for interstate trade have run into difficulties since businesspeople in Pakistan and Bangladesh have expressed concerns

about the impact of increased competition on their business. However, it has made some success in regional cooperation within the current limitations. It is important to emphasise its Visa Exemption Endorsement Facility. As part of this facility, Supreme Court Judges, members of National Parliaments, leaders of National Academic Institutions, and their wives and dependent children have been free from the requirement for a visa since March 1, 1992. This is done in an effort to encourage intercultural exchange. They may now travel inside the SAARC area without a visa thanks to this provision.

Realising the significance of regional cooperation and development in recent years, SAARC members now promote the organization's revival by moving beyond the issuance of declarations to the actual implementation of the plans and policies to transform this underdeveloped region into one that is potentially developed.

The creation and launch of several forums and programmes for mutual benefit are examples of this cooperation.

- South Asian University, New Delhi
- SAARC International College, Bangladesh
- Agreement on Judicial cooperation on Counter-Terrorism
- Establishment of Food Bank
- Establishment of Development Funds
- Telemedicine Network
- SAARC Writers and Literature Foundation
- South Asia Foundation
- South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme
- South Asia Centre for Policy Studies
- South Asia Women's Centre
- South Asia Olympic Council (South Asian Games)

According to the SAFTA, a tariff reduction plan was developed in the economic and trade sectors. Since 2006, this reduction has been implemented in two phases, with Pakistan and India promising to lower all tariffs on goods to 20% within two years and all other countries to 30% within three. During the second phase, Pakistan and India

committed to reduce products' tariffs to 0–5 percent within five years, and other organisation members to do so within seven. The member nations are moving forward with their goals to enhance regional prosperity and cooperation, despite the fact that the steps launched to promote free trade in the area have run into several obstacles. A programme of well-connected South Asia has been attempted by SAARC, and that is achievable when people work closely together, as evidenced by efforts such as

- SAARC chairs, Fellowship and Scholarship Schemes
- SAARC Youth Volunteer Programme
- SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme
- SAARC Audio-Visual Exchange Programme
- South Asian Festivals
- Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians
- SAARC Law (Association of legal communities of the member countries)
- Cooperation of Non-Governmental Organizations
- SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organized Tourism
- SAARC Documentation Centre

The SAARC Convention on suppression of Terrorism was signed in 1987, After significant discussion and debate over the definition of terrorism, the Additional Protocol on Terrorism was approved in 2005.

- SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD), Colombo,
- Sri Lanka SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD), Colombo, Sri Lanka

EU:

Many efforts were undertaken before and during World War II to build institutional unity among European States. The idea of a trading area in Europe was originally

introduced in 1950. It began with the formation of European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS), the six founding nations of which were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Through the Treaty of Rome, a single market was created in 1957 where the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were also founded expanding the common market for coal and steel to the majority of other economic sectors in the member states. The main goal of these agreements was to create a European Common Market over time with ultimate unfettered trade in commodities, services, and money between member nations. In 1968, customs fees were removed. Standard policies were implemented, notably in commerce and agriculture. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were joined to the ECSC in 1973. The European Monetary Cooperation Constitution was ratified in 1973. The European Union, unifies international trade and monetary policy. In 1979, it established its first Parliament. Spain and Portugal joined in

Figure 1 Logo of EU



ource: https://europa.eu/learning-corner/eu-timeline/overview_en

Figure 41 Timeline of EU events

1986 after Greece did so in 1981. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) and the Single European Act (1986) were significant turning points in the history of the EU. The European Union's common market was founded in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty. A shared or single currency at the earliest by 1 January 1997 or the latest by 1 January 1999, a single European Central Bank, a common foreign and security policy, common internal security standards, and European citizenship were all part of the ambitious agenda which were put into action by the Maastricht Treaty. The Euro is the unified currency used by eleven of the EU's member states, and all national border controls for persons, capital, and products were eliminated between member nations in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty's most significant component might be seen as the introduction of Union (European) citizenship.

The ability to live, study, and enjoy retirement in any Member State is granted to Union citizens. The right to freedom was once solely available to workers, but it is now available to everyone. Citizens of the Union are eligible to vote and run for office in municipal elections in the Member State in which they reside. It has far-reaching effects. In order to make it feasible, certain member states had to modify their constitutions. It should be



Figure 42 Members of EU joining and leaving through the timeline

underlined that the Union coexists with national citizenship so that people can continue to identify as citizens of their respective countries. However, it must be recognised that one of the changes brought about by the Treaty, the Union citizenship, demonstrates how the EU is progressively transitioning from an economic community to a political union. The European Monetary System began to function in 1999.Austria, Sweden, and Finland were joined to the EU two years later. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia were among the twelve new members who joined in 2004. In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined. The Lisbon Treaty expanded the European Parliament's authority in 2009.The European Union has 28 members as of 2018; all are European nations. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom and Sweden were the nations that made up the European Union.Its job was to unite the Member States into a single Economic Community, encompassing all areas of the Economy, including the Free Movement of Capital and Payments, Free Movement of Goods and Workers, Freedom of Establishment and Services, Environmental Policy, Industrial Policy, research and Technology Policy, and Economic and Monetary Policy. But with Britain's planned exit from the EU in 2019, there will only be 27 nations left.

Schengen Region: The Schengen Area was formed for citizens of certain nations, including several non-EU nations, to provide unrestricted travel between nations. In addition to non-EU nations Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland, the Schengen Area includes the following nations: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden. Additionally, authorization to enter the Schengen Area is still waiting for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. Passage to and from these nations for citizens is simpler because they do not need visas or to present their passports. The EU now has the legitimacy to negotiate and ratify foreign agreements. It expanded the EU's authority over immigration, border control, civil and criminal justice, and police cooperation. The notion of a European Constitution was dropped. International treaties continue to be the foundation of European law. It does away with all intermember border restrictions. With the exception of sporadic spot

Figure 43 Schengen Region

inspections for crime and narcotics, the open border permits the unfettered passage of commodities and people. Any item produced in one EU member state may be sold to any other EU member state duty-free.The majority of professions, including law, medicine, tourism, finance, and insurance, are practised by professionals who can work in any member nation.As a result, it is often less expensive to fly, use the internet, and make phone calls abroad than it is in the United States.

Unsurprisingly, the European Union primarily uses the euro as currency, which is reportedly the second most-used currency in the world, under the U.S. Dollar. Once established, the euro has replaced many of Europe's leading currencies, including French and Italian currencies like the franc and lira, to name a few. In fact, according to the EU's website, more than 340 million EU citizens in 19 countries use the euro as their currency. However, not all countries have adopted the euro - with Britain famously holding onto the pound. The euro, despite being so commonly held, has a fluctuating value - which exchange traders daily determine in comparison to the U.S. Dollar as a standard.

Aims of EU: The major goals of the European Union are to advance peace, uphold EU ideals, and enhance national prosperity. The European Parliament and other organisations oversee the accomplishment of these goals. The primary goals are:

- Unified, borderless Europe: The goal is to establish an open, secure, and peaceful Europe without any internal boundaries. The residents of the area are entitled to the rights provided by the European Union.
- Internal market: Ensuring efficient and seamless trade within Europe is the goal. There is open and fair competition amongst businesses.
- Development that is steady and sustainable: The goal is to make sure that Europe develops steadily and sustainably. It denotes steady pricing and a balanced rate of economic growth.The European Union aspires to establish a vibrant market economy that considers the demands of society and the well-being of its citizens. Environmental protection is a critical concern. The environment is protected, and any harm done is repaired.
- Scientific and technical development: The European Union promotes research and development in these fields and makes educational investments. A competent workforce and a high level of technical output are other goals.

The main thrust of the EU, like other trade organizations, has been trade. Labour standards were never fully integrated into the core agenda of the EU. Even the more underdeveloped members, like Spain, Portugal, and Greece, are generally affluent, have robust labour unions, and offer respectable worker rights. Furthermore, the majority of EU nations, including major economic players like France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, are governed by political parties with origins in the working-class struggle, whether they call themselves “socialist,” “social democratic,” or “labour.”

Even if this connection has grown farther apart in recent years, the EU still serves as a sort of trade-liberation utopia from the standpoint of the labour movement. But the findings should serve as a warning. Like other trade organisations, the EU has focused primarily on commerce. The EU’s central aim never completely included labour standards. The “Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers,” sometimes known as the “Social Charter,” was ratified by 11 of the then-12 member states of the European Union in 1989. (Only the UK steadfastly resisted signing.) Many hoped that the “Social Charter,”

which was described in public communications as “a political instrument containing ‘moral obligations,’ “ would serve as the foundation for “upward harmonisation,” which would put pressure on European countries with laxer labour laws to raise their standards to match those of member countries with stricter regulations. European business leaders have prevented “Social Europe” from getting any traction by simply ignoring it since trade openness was never directly connected to social and labour norms and the “Social Charter” never required specific measures from firms.

The European Union makes significant efforts to reduce social isolation. It aims to stop people from leaving the labour force and society. Poverty is an issue that is being addressed. The Union promotes equity. Rights of minorities are safeguarded. Social security has been enhanced. Equal treatment of men and women is required. Children must have a joyful upbringing and their rights must be upheld. Elderly persons need to be respected and cared for. Solidarity (unity) is emphasised in the areas of the economy, social equality, and regional development. The member nations must have mutual loyalty. It implies that states must accept accountability for one another and have mutual respect.

- Respect for languages and cultures: The European Union values each nation’s unique languages and cultures. Both individual national cultures and the shared European culture are valued and strengthened.
- Common foreign and security policy: The European Union works to advance peace around the world, not only in its own backyard. It works to protect the peace and security of the people of Europe. The European Union seeks to protect the environment and ensure that the world’s resources are used responsibly through its shared foreign policy. Respect for other nations and countries is another goal of the European Union. It seeks to end poverty and promote free and fair commerce. All around the world, human rights are significant. The European Union upholdsthe UN Charter and emphasises the significance of universally accepted international law.

How does it work? The EU Council, EU Parliament, and EU Commission are the three primary institutions that oversee the European Union, as was already noted. The Council works under a different EU president every six months, and its primary responsibility is to develop and recommend new laws and policies for the European Union. The proposed legislation by the Council is then discussed and approved by the Parliament, whose

members are chosen every five years. The Commission also oversees and implements legislation for the European Union. The European Central Bank also handles the financial requirements of the EU and controls things like inflation and foreign exchange reserves. The European Union's Council, which serves as the principal decision-making body. Ministers from the 15 Member States make up this group. Depending on the agenda, several Ministers may attend Council sessions. Regulations, orders, and decisions are chosen by the union. It regulates intergovernmental cooperation and makes decisions that are enforceable across the whole EU area. Every six months, a different Member State takes the Council's helm. There are 626 members of the European Parliament (EP), all of whom were chosen directly for five-year periods beginning in 1979. Instead of national organisations, EP members (MEPs) create political groups.



Figure 44 Operation and functioning of EU

The EP serves as the public platform for the EU, discussing matters of public concern and posing inquiries to the Council and the Commission. It can change the EU budget or reject it. When the Treaty to combine the executives went into effect in July 1967, a single

Commission was established for all three Communities (the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom). In January 1995, the number of commissioners were raised to 20. The Commission makes policy and legislative recommendations and oversees the appropriate execution of institution decisions as well as treaty clauses. The Court of Justice explains EU law, and its decisions are enforceable. Court has 15 justices and 9 Advocates General on staff. A Court of First Instance, which has authority to hear matters in certain regions, supports it. The Economic and Social Committee has 222 members, the Committee of the Regions has 222 members, and the Court of Auditors has 15 members. The second organisation represents municipal and regional governments, as well as employers, workers, and many organisations including farmers and consumers.

Role and its Future in Global Politics Over the past forty years, the EU has grown to become the greatest trade union and economic powerhouse in the world. With its total population and GDP equal to those of the US and the USSR, two former superpowers, it has drawn in new members (the applications of Poland and Hungary for EU membership have been waiting since April 1994). Federalism and deeper European integration are being steadily advanced. In time, it may develop into a United States of Europe. It is a potential Super Power that may fill the void left by the collapse of the USSR, the only other Super Power since 1945. In the current scenario of international politics, its beneficial function could help to restore the balance of power.

BRICS:

Brazil, Russia, India, and China are collectively referred to by the moniker BRIC, which was initially proposed in 2001. In a report, Goldman Sachs developed the concept as part of an economic modelling exercise to predict future trends in the world economy. The key conclusion was that the BRICs will play a bigger part in the world economy. Taking the primary conclusion further, it predicted how the global economy will change over the following years. The results of the articles were shocking and maybe surprising for the greater international society. Another 2003 report by Goldman Sachs anticipated that, the BRIC economies might become a significant factor in the global economy. The two groundbreaking studies were built on the knowledge that, during the previous 50 years, the global economy had undergone tremendous transformation. It should be emphasised

that at the time Goldman Sachs came up with the concept of the BRICs, significant structural changes were already occurring in the BRIC nations, which may have had a significant impact on the projections made by Goldman Sachs. In order to combat hyperinflation and increase privatisation, Brazil implemented a dramatic economic stabilisation plan in the late 1980s. In contrast, India launched significant economic reforms in the early 1990s. However, China had survived the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s unharmed, and the rebuilding and restoration of Russia's lost economic position had already begun.The predictions assumed that the structural reform processes initiated by these countries would be sustained and that the BRIC countries would maintain policies and develop institutions that supported growth, despite the difficulties faced by these countries, particularly in areas relating to economic and political instability. In the years between 2001 and 2008, the BRIC nations achieved a few significant milestones as a result of their economic reform initiatives, strengthened by recently rising confidence. Some of the most significant milestones reached during this time include China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and beginning a process of modernising its industries and services; Brazil beginning an unprecedented period of economic prosperity in 2003; China passing Germany as the third-largest economy; and Brazil joining China and the Persian Gulf states by becoming a global creditor for the first time.

Figure 45 BRICS Summit 2015

The inaugural meeting of the BRIC foreign ministers, which took place as a side event to the 61st UN General Assembly in New York in September 2006, was a step towards the

group's formalisation. There were numerous more meetings subsequently. Foreign ministers convened in New York in September 2007 and 2008 as a side event to the 62nd UN General Assembly. The second and third sessions of foreign ministers were held in Russia. The BRIC heads of State and Government conference in July 2008 and the finance ministers' meeting in November 2008 were among the additional gatherings. It was discussed in the third meeting of foreign ministers to increase cooperation between the four nations in a variety of ways and on a variety of fronts.

1989 Brazil emerges from military rule and puts in place a drastic economic stabilisation plan to reverse hyperinflation and boost privatisation;

1991 India introduces sweeping economic reforms, ending the licence raj and setting conditions for sustained economic reforms in the following periods;

1998 China emerges from the Asian crisis unscathed;

1999 (December): After the Russian economy meltdown in 1998, Russia puts in place a strategy to rebuild and regain its lost economic status;

2001 Goldman Sachs predicts the rapid rise of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) in the next 50 years;

2001 (December): China joins the WTO, and opens up the process of modernisation of its industries and services;

2003 (January): Brazil kicks off a period of unprecedented economic prosperity;

2006 (June): The Dow Jones introduces the BRIC 50 Index, a basket of the 50-biggest companies listed on the stock exchanges of Brazil, Russia, India and China;

2006 (September): The BRIC foreign ministers hold an informal meeting in New York as a sideline to the UN 61st General Assembly. They meet again in 2007 to bolster and deepen relationships;

2007 (December): China overtakes Germany as the world's third-largest economy;

2008 (January): Brazil joins China and the Persian Gulf states and becomes a creditor for the first time, and introduces a sovereign wealth fund to invest excess capital;

2009 BRIC continues to maintain its economic growth even during the global financial crisis; India achieves a growth of over 9%;

2009 (June): BRIC leaders hold their first summit in Russia, calling for a more democratic and multipolar world based on the rule of international law, equality, mutual respect, co-operation, co-ordinated action, and collective decision making of all states;

2009 (September): BRIC achieves a major milestone when developed countries agree to redistribute quota and vote shares at the IMF and the World Bank; the G-20 (which has members from BRIC) becomes a premier economic forum, replacing the G-8;

2009 (December): Co-operation among the BRIC members is further enhanced during the UNCCC at Copenhagen, when the group objects to stringent carbon emissions pushed by developed countries, especially the EU;

2010 (April): At the second summit, BRIC calls for UN reforms;

2010 (July): China overtakes Japan as the second-largest economy. Nine years after the Goldman Sachs prediction, BRIC constitutes about one-quarter of global economic activities and one-third of GDP growth;

2010 (December): BRIC invites South Africa to join the group; BRIC becomes BRICS.

Projection

2018 BRICS economies overtake the US economy, as predicted by Goldman Sachs.

Source: Foreign Policy, March/April 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/22/brics_a_short_history?page=0,0.

Figure 46 Timeline of BRICS events

Objectives

Building a more democratic international order based on multilateral diplomacy and the rule of law was the overarching goal. However, the immediate priority was to reduce the burden of the skyrocketing global food costs. The BRIC nations also agreed to cooperate with one another and with other nations to advance global security and stability. The BRICS agenda has a wide range of topics covered. The agenda initially focused on the 2008–2009 global economic slowdown, but it gradually expanded to include other issues such as climate change and sustainable development, food and energy security, health, the global trading order, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), reforms in international economic and financial institutions, and global and regional political developments.

The general objectives of BRICS can be summarized as follows:

- **Economic Cooperation:** BRICS aims to promote economic growth, trade, and investment among its member countries. It seeks to enhance economic cooperation through initiatives such as trade facilitation, infrastructure development, financial cooperation, and increased market access.
- **Financial Cooperation:** BRICS focuses on strengthening financial cooperation among its member countries. This includes initiatives like the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to provide financial support and stability during times of economic volatility.
- **Political Dialogue:** BRICS facilitates political dialogue and cooperation among its member countries on global issues, including international peace and security, sustainable development, climate change, and the reform of global governance institutions. It serves as a platform for member countries to coordinate their positions and advocate for shared interests on these matters.
- **People-to-People Exchanges:** BRICS promotes cultural, educational, and people-to-people exchanges to enhance understanding and friendship among its member countries. This includes initiatives like academic exchanges, youth summits, cultural festivals, and tourism promotion.
- **South-South Cooperation:** BRICS seeks to enhance cooperation and collaboration among developing countries beyond its member states. It aims to promote South-

South cooperation, exchange of best practices, and mutual support in areas such as development assistance, technology transfer, and capacity building.

Overall, the objectives of BRICS are focused on promoting cooperation, economic growth, and mutual benefits among its member countries, as well as contributing to global development and governance.

Structure and Functions

Although it is not a formal organisation, the BRICS summit brings together the five countries' heads of state every year. According to the alphabet B-R-I-C-S, the forum chairmanship is cycled among the members each year.

Over the last ten years, BRICS cooperation has grown to encompass a yearly schedule of more than 100 sectoral meetings.

The main reason for co-operation to start among the BRICs nation was the financial crises of 2008. The crises raised doubts over sustainability of the dollar-dominated monetary system. The BRICs called for the "the reform of multilateral institutions in order that they reflect the structural changes in the world economy and the increasingly central role that emerging markets now play". BRICs managed to push for institutional reform which led to International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform in 2010. Thus, the financial crises had momentarily reduced western legitimacy and briefly let the BRICs countries become "agenda setters" in multilateral institutions.

New Development Bank: Shanghai has the headquarters of NDB.The prospect of establishing a New Development Bank to raise funds for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in the BRICS and other rising economies, as well as in underdeveloped nations, was discussed at the Fourth BRICS Summit in New Delhi (2012).The presidents of the BRICS countries signed the agreement creating the New Development Bank (NDB) at the sixth BRICS summit in Fortaleza in 2014. The Fortaleza Declaration emphasised that the NDB will enhance BRICS cooperation and support international and regional financial institutions' efforts to promote global development, therefore promoting sustainable and balanced growth.Clean energy, transit infrastructure, irrigation, sustainable urban development, and economic cooperation among the member nations are the NDB's main operational areas. The BRICS members' consultation framework underlies how the NDB operates with all of the member nations having equal rights.

Temporary Reserve Agreement: The BRICS countries signed the Fortaleza Declaration during the sixth BRICS meeting in 2014, taking into account the rising frequency of global financial crises. The BRICS CRA (Contingent Reserve Arrangement) seeks to mitigate the Balance of Payment crisis scenario and further promote financial stability by offering short-term liquidity support to the members through currency swaps. One hundred billion dollars of the United States of America (USD 100 billion) will be the CRA's initial total committed resources. Additionally, it would enhance the current international agreements and add to the global financial safety net.

Eight summit meetings have been held during the past ten years, with the first summit taking place in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009, and the eighth summit taking place in Goa, India in October 2016. The First Summit primarily concentrated on economic and financial challenges resulting from the 2008 financial crisis, international financial institution reform, sustainable development, and climate change mitigation measures. The Second Summit (Brasilia, Brazil, 2010) incorporated input from civil society and was centred on finding intra-BRIC collaboration ideas. The BRICS's voting quotas inside the IMF were increased, and more participation in choosing the (IMF) International Monetary Fund and World Bank's presidents was encouraged, according to the joint declaration following the meeting. The third Summit strengthened the geographical presence of the BRICs by including South Africa, which allowed for a fresh venture into the African continent. An Action Plan was developed to strengthen areas of cooperation in diverse fields like health, science and technology, renewable energy, peaceful use of nuclear energy, eradication of hunger and poverty, as well as reinforcing the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), in addition to discussing UN reform, combating terrorism in accordance with the UN, and economic cooperation. The foundation of the BRICS Bank to finance the infrastructure requirements and sustainable development projects of the BRICS and other developing nations at the Fourth Summit (New Delhi, India, 2012) was notable for enunciating financial cooperation with third countries. The Agreement was also inked in order to speed up the approval of loans in local currencies for developing and bolstering the economies of BRICS nations. The Fifth Summit (Durban, South Africa, 2013) laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Contingence Reserve Arrangement with an initial sum of USD $ 100 billion, the adoption of the feasibility report for the establishment of the BRICS Development Bank, and the establishment of two key centres, namely the

BRICS Business Council and the BRICS Think Tanks Council for improved coordination and cooperation among member countries. Projects to finance infrastructure and sustainable development in developing economies were signed at the Sixth Summit (Fortaleza, Brazil, 2014). Additionally, a sum of USD$ 100 billion was designated under the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to prevent short-term Balance of Payments constraints. The New Development Bank (NDB), which was approved during the Sixth Summit, started off with a capitalization of $50 billion, eventually rising to $100 billion. Each of the founding members—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—made an initial contribution to the fund of USD$ 10 billion each, with Pretoria, South Africa serving as the hub and being designated as the “New Development Bank Africa Regional Centre.” The fund’s primary goal is to lend money for infrastructure projects, with an estimated lending volume of up to USD$ 34 billion annually. The New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement’s founding agreements were ratified at the seventh BRICS Summit in Ufa, Russia, in 2015. Contingent Reserve Arrangements became fully active with the approval of the Bank’s Council of Governors and Board of Directors, offering a clear road map for bolstering, diversifying, and enhancing trade and investment among the five BRICS nations. Member nations firmly denounced terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations, including assaults on its members, during the ninth Summit (Goa, India, 2016). The BRICS Agricultural Research Platform, the Mutual Cooperation between Diplomatic Academies, and the Customs Cooperation Committee Regulations were all agreed upon.To further bolster the global governance architecture, the summit discussed the potential creation of an independent BRICS Rating Agency based on market-oriented principles. The meeting also created a new link between the BRIC countries and the BIMSTEC countries, which include Bhutan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar.

In 2016 in Goa, India, the summit emphasized enhancing people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges among member countries. Discussions included boosting intra-BRICS trade, promoting renewable energy, and enhancing cooperation in areas such as tourism, agriculture, and sports. During 2017 in Xiamen, China, the leaders discussed deepening pragmatic cooperation and promoting sustainable development. Topics included strengthening economic ties, enhancing trade facilitation, combating terrorism, and enhancing global governance.

In Johannesburg, South Africa, 2018 the summit highlighted the theme of “BRICS in Africa: Collaboration for Inclusive Growth and Shared Prosperity”. Discussions focused on advancing economic cooperation, innovation, and technology, as well as promoting sustainable development in Africa.

The summit in 2019: Brasília, Brazil emphasized strengthening economic ties, innovation, and digital economy. Topics included enhancing cooperation in sectors such as science and technology, energy, and tourism, as well as advancing the BRICS partnership in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In the year 2020: Virtual Summit (Originally planned to be held in St. Petersburg, Russia) due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the summit was conducted virtually.

Discussions cantered around global cooperation in response to the pandemic, economic recovery, and cooperation in areas such as healthcare, vaccines, and digital transformation.

2021: Virtual Summit (Originally planned to be held in New Delhi, India). The virtual summit focused on cooperation in the areas of health, trade, innovation, and digital economy.

Discussions included collaboration in vaccine production, economic recovery, and enhancing intra-BRICS trade and investment.

Challenges

To achieve their main objectives as a group, the BRICS economies must address some domestic and socioeconomic challenges that are common to all of them, including inequality (economic, social, and political), corruption, advancements in healthcare and education, and human rights. Another association of “democracies,” the IBSA, was founded in June 2003 and is named after its constituent nations: South Africa, Brazil, and India. A significant difficulty for BRICS is to effectively manage the overlap in mandates that can occur in such circumstances given the parallel groupings that are currently in place. The BRICS’ ultimate (and feasible) goal should be to assume a leading position in revamping international financial and political institutions without abolishing current organisations. Another significant problem is fostering better communication among the member nations. The Big Three’s pronounced dominance. The BRICS face a challenge as they advance from Russia, China, and India. BRICS must expand to include all of the world’s major developing markets in order to really represent them. More nations from

different continents and areas must join it. For the BRICS to become more significant in the world system, they will need to broaden their agenda. At the moment, the topic is dominated by infrastructure development and climate change. The founding ideals of BRICS, such as respect for sovereign equality and pluralism in global governance, are likely to be put to the test as the five member nations pursue their respective national agendas as the organisation goes forward. The BRICS members' foolish belief that a cordial political relationship is always feasible has been decisively disproved by the military stalemate between China and India. Conflict among the BRICS members, particularly between China and India, might result from China's attempts to include nation states—which are essential to its Belt—into a larger political framework.

UNIT-5: CONCEPT OF GEOPOLITICS; GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DISPUTES: INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES; GEOPOLITICS OF PETROLEUM

Friedrich Ratzel, a prominent figure in the field of geography, published *PolitischeGeographie* in 1897. His concept of *lebensraum* or "living space" theorized He theorized the state as an organism that needed to expand and grow to maintain itself. To understand the genre of classical geopolitics, let us consider the similarities between visions of these thinkers. Their conceptions are conceived from a particular point of view (that of a state, seeking to survive), and this position shapes how the world is represented. They assume a natural connection between the environment, territory, and power, often in a formulation in which power demands control over the environment and expansion of territory. The unit of geopolitical analysis is the state. To explore this, let us think about logics embedded in the classical geopolitics explored earlier. The term 'geopolitics' entered the scientific language in 1899, thanks to the work of the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen. The omission of geography and politics in the word 'geopolitics' was a valuable way for Kjellen to indicate the geographical foundation of the state, particularly its natural endowment and resources. The two concise definitions of geopolitics in the current edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (2007) reveal a lot about the term's intellectual history. It is both "the influence of geography on the political character of states" and "a pseudo-science developed in National Socialist [Nazi] Germany." Both definitions have disturbing overtones, the former because of its deterministic view of geography, and the latter because of its association with fascist. Thus, geopolitics was defined as the impact of natural geographical elements on the state as a living organism. According to Kjellen, the physical topography of a state represented its power potential. Environmental determinism and scientific racism are closely linked, with Semple's observations on Appalachia suggesting that the rugged nature of the environment had led to a slowing of social and cultural development. Semple's worldview is compatible with ideas such as essentialism, which assumes that a population can be understood through one or two essential characteristics shared by all members, and a connection to the place in which people reside. This kind of

thinking is also compatible with Social Darwinism, the “survival of the fittest” idea that those who rule are by nature superior, and the Eugenicist thinking of Thomas Malthus, who believed that overpopulation was one of the world’s greatest dangers and that poor people were naturally inferior and incapable of stemming their own reproduction. Environmental determinism was a widespread theory in the early twentieth century, and today, critically minded geographers understand it to be tied to the kinds of racialization that upheld imperialism. These logics were embedded in the classical geopolitics. geopolitical writers have often incorrectly cast nature as an active force in human affairs, drawing heavily on the logic of environmental determinism, which assumes that cultural, political, or racial behaviour is the result of natural causes, such as climate or terrain. This crude formula has prevented a detailed understanding of how geographical factors actually play into political agendas and decision-making. They believed that geography is merely the natural condition of the world and that it shapes or determines human action. This dangerous potential of this kind of eugenicist thinking came to dark fruit in World War II Germany, where ideas of another of Ratzel’s students, Karl Haushofer, became influential in German strategy. Between the first and second world wars, these principles influenced Germany’s General Karl Haushofer’s thought. Haushofer and others were seeking for a ‘scientific’ explanation for how Germany could recoup its World War I losses. Viewing the state as an organism that needed to grow in

Figure 47 Concentration camp for jews in World War :II

Figure 48 Devastated Genbaku dome after Hiroshima Atom Bomb blast, now known as Hiroshima Peace Memorial

order to exist matched perfectly with Nazi objectives for territorial expansion, however whether these concepts actually inspired Hitler is questionable. As a result, the phrase geopolitics became synonymous with the Nazis. The Nazi philosophy of ethnic cleansing began with eugenic laws targeting those with genetic illness, children of miscegenation, and other supposedly undesirable characteristics, and then came to focus on Germany's Jewish population. The German study of geopolitik sought to centre ideas of progress and civilization upon the notion of an expanded German homeland, which intensified after Germany's World War I defeat. The horror of World War II, both the violent white nationalism of the Holocaust and the massacre of six million Jews, as well as the darkly transformative turn in understandings of progress after the use of nuclear bombs and devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, led to profound changes and shifts in how scholars theorized the world. Geopolitical scholarship lay dormant immediately following the war, as the extensions of geopolitical logic to their most extreme versions led to reluctance to continue engaging in such theorization. Geopolitics, a field of study that has been around since the late 19th century, has been influenced by various factors such as geographical location, size, and population. It has been a concern for British and American writers since the turn of the last century, with examples from US Admiral Alfred T. Mahan in the 1890s and Halford Mackinder in 1904. These writers argued that a state's geographical location, size, and population influenced its ability to become a major sea power. In the United States, geopolitical thinking along these lines fell out of favour in mainstream political circles until the 1970s, when similar geo-graphing to that of Mackinder and Bowman began to emerge and thrive in the cold war mapping of the world into mutually-antagonistic spheres of US and Soviet interests. A different and revitalized geopolitics emerged in the 1990s as critical geopolitics.

Halford Mackinder, was Oxford University's first Professor of Geography, who sought to strengthen the position of the discipline by proving its worth, while also being firmly embedded in the British context and invested in Britain's imperial success. Mackinder served in government positions, and advocated for Britain to take a strong position as a bulwark against a possible Russian-German alliance. He had what Painter and Jeffrey (2009, p.202) describe as a "geopolitical gaze," that is, "the self-confidence to assert a particular model of interstate relations on a global scale." Across the Atlantic, in the United States, Alfred Mahon wrote on military strategy and physical geography, arguing that sea

power is the determining force in world history. This set the stage for Mackinder's famous 1904 paper, *"The Geographical Pivot of History,"* which laid out an ambitious vision of the world telling a sweeping story of the world in three stages based on military strategy. In the first, pre-Columbian era, land power had been the most important form of military might. After Columbus, Mackinder argued, there had been an era in which sea power became the most crucial form of military might. However, in his vision of the present and future, the post-Columbian era would mark a shift in which land power – or the power to travel overland – would return to being the most important strategic tactic. Mackinder and other scholars of what would later be called geopolitics blurred the boundaries between academic life and political life. Isaiah Bowman, like Mackinder, moved between academic and policy-oriented circles, advising US President Woodrow Wilson and later the US State Department but also serving as Director of the American Geographical Society and President of Johns Hopkins University. Nicholas Spykman, political scientist at Yale during this period, also perceived Central Asia as a pivot point, but contrary to Mackinder, Spykman believed in the continued importance of sea power. Carl Schmitt, a law professor in Berlin, expoundedpragmatic theories of realpolitik, particularly in relation to sovereignty. He focused on the role of the ruler, or sovereign, as decision maker and in the ways that sovereignty was manifested in the right of the ruler to, at times, defy the law. For Schmitt, the prevention of conflict justified that the ruler might deviate from the law.

The map of world politics that emerges from a realist rendering of international politics is both particular and simplistic. The problems of discourse and presentation are secondary to how geography is boiled down in geopolitical thinking. The fundamental question in geopolitics is exactly how geography affects politics. Writers like Mahan and Mackinder saw the world from the perspective of imperialism, where natural advantage gave rise to national advantage. A country's relative position, access to the sea, climate, and terrain were indicators of its geopolitical potential, a means of dealing with threats and opportunities. Contemporary geopolitical visions are dependent on apparent geographical causes, as seen in Jeffrey Sachs's popular take on global poverty as resulting from a disadvantageous location rather than imperial legacy. The uneven distribution of oil reserves and ethnicity has become the new catchall for explaining social conflict based on the assumption that cultural differences cannot coexist in the same space. International politics does not play out on a featureless, frictionless surface; the location, resources, population, and borders

of a state do matter but how they matter is as much a function of political interpretation and will than any determinant fact of nature. International politics is rendered in terms that are wholly state centric, failing to recognize the significance of regionalist movements, transnational civil society, and the transformative effects of economic globalization. In our technologically advanced and interconnected world, oil, water, and food are globalized commodities that move across borders. Although the geographical facts of nature play an important role in the uneven distribution of these resources, their uneven production and distribution is also a function of a world that humans have made. For example, neocolonial trade practices mean that natural resource endowments provide greater utility to states in Western Europe than to the community from which they are extracted in the developing world. Such facts remind us that although the use of the natural world is of human invention, it is no less geographical. Geopolitics is the study of the relationship between geographical features and international politics, and it is a matter of debate whether these features are natural or constructed, and whether the former influences the latter or vice versa. Since the late nineteenth century, geopolitics has encompassed several traditions or schools of thought, including one closely associated with the Nazis.

Geopolitical concepts so include a plethora of metaphors for space, such as heartlands and rims, cores and peripheries, buffers and barriers. Geopolitical phrases are so prevalent that we sometimes take them for granted, but each one expresses a distinct perspective about how the world is or should be organised. It is the responsibility ofpolitical geographers to analyse the development of these concepts and how they mirror dominant power relations. This language connected to a larger European school of political geography that was gaining importance and prestige at the time. Kjellen believed that the elision of geography and politics in the term “geopolitics” was a useful means of indicating the geographical base of the state, particularly its natural endowment and resources. In Kjellen’s thought, the physical geography of the state reflected its power potential. This language tapped into a wider European school of political geography that was growing in influence and stature at this time. Three points can be made regarding this early scholarship: first, Kjellen’swork draws attention to the centrality of the state to geopolitical analysis. Second, early geopoliticians were interested in the threats and opportunities facing states, emphasizing the dominance of the state as the primary unit of political territory at the end of the nineteenth century. This focus on the threats and opportunities faced states should

be understood as a specific response to growing anxieties in Western Europe at the end of anera of territorial expansion through colonization. The growing uncertainty over the future relationships between states in Western Europe promoted scholarly study of the nature of international relations. Third, while interested in the nature of states, early geopolitical texts exhibited an ambitious commitment to theorizing at a global scale. These early texts sought to reject the subjective and particular and instead develop a science of international relations. These three aspects of the classical foundations of geopolitics are evident in the work of three scholars from the early twentieth century: Sir Halford Mackinder (1861–1947), Karl Haushofer (1869–1948), and Isaiah Bowman (1878–1950).

Sir Halford Mackinder

Sir Halford Mackinder, a prominent figure in the institutionalization of geography in the UK and the history of geopolitics, was the first dedicated scholar of geography at a UK university. His published work focused on mapping the opportunities and threats facing Britain in the post-Columbian era, a reference to the end of European exploration and expansion. Mackinder saw geographical knowledge as a powerful tool in maintaining Britain's pre-eminent role in the world. His heartland thesis, published in 1904 as 'The geographical pivot of history,' argued that the world could be divided into three regions based on their differential power potential: the pivot area (renamed 'the heartland'), the inner crescent, and the outer or insular crescent. Mackinder initially identified the Eurasian landmass as the 'geographical pivot', an area that was inaccessible to the British Empire's naval might and posed a threat to its pre-eminence. The potential of the pivot/heartland lay in its resources, which once covered by a network of railways, Mackinder felt would wield unparalleled military and economic power. This vision posed a clear warning to powerful

Figure 49 The Geographical Pivot after Sir Halford Mackinder

states and empires of the early twentieth century, such as Britain. Mackinder's heartland thesis reflected many aspects of the geopolitics pioneered by Kjellen, such as interstate competition, the environmental capacity of states, and the desire to construct a grand narrative of human potential based on geographical factors. Although critics can criticize his predictive power or imperialistic motivations, his work had profound influence on British foreign policy and the geographical discipline. Mackinder's work provides an early example of the nature of the geopolitical gaze, the self-confidence to assert a particular model of interstate relations on a global scale.

Karl Haushofer

German scholar Karl Haushofer developed Geopolitik, a body of work that incorporated the works of Kjellen, Ratzel, and Mackinder. After the First World War, he became a professor at Munich University and established the *Zeitschrift fürGeopolitik* (Journal of Geopolitics) in 1924. Haushofer's work was influenced by the Versailles Peace Treaty, which reduced Germany's territory and allowed for the confiscation of overseas colonies and reorganization of national boundaries. He used Ratzel's theorizations of the state as a living organism and Mackinder's ideas of state territorial strategy to justify expanding borders into smaller and less populous states. Haushofer's Geopolitik tapped into popular imagination of Germany's territorial loss and was influenced by Rudolf Hess, the future deputy to Adolf Hitler. Hess served just over seven months in Landsberg prison (1923-24) while Hitler was writing Mein Kampf. This connection between geopolitics and German expansionism has provoked numerous 'hysterical and paranoid' readings of Haushofer's influence over German expansionism. However, it is important to avoid overstating the role of Haushofer on geography in the violent crimes enacted by the Nazi regime. Geopolitics's entanglement in the violence of Nazi philosophies suggests that the discipline retreated from normative theorizations following World War II towards more rational and scientific approaches that used positivist approaches.

Isaiah Bowman

Isaiah Bowman, a key figure in the institutionalization of geography in the USA during the early part of the twentieth century, was a key figure in the field. He served as the President of the American Geographical Society and as President of Johns Hopkins University (1933–48). Bowman was not only an academic but also involved in practical politics, being an important member of Woodrow Wilson's Inquiry, an early example of a

foreign policy think-tank established prior to the Versailles Peace Treaty. Bowman was trained in geomorphology by Mark Jefferson, a student of the renowned physical geographer William Morris Davis. Bowman became interested in human development, particularly the role of economic relations with the USA on the development of South American states. He shifted his thinking away from environmental determinism and towards a more grounded and empirically verifiable approach. He was influenced by the work of Ratzel and argued for US economic lebensraum, referring to the need to look beyond previous colonial forms of territorial expansion and focus instead on the development of economic relations that advanced US national interest. This adoption of Ratzel's terminology extended to his work in the inquiry, where he lobbied for the creation of strong states in East and Central Europe at the Versailles negotiations. Bowman capitalized on his experience in Versailles through the publication of The New World in 1921, which encapsulated an era of American internationalism, developing and expanding the geographical and diplomatic strategy that Wilson had introduced through the Versailles negotiations to provide a sweeping review of the nature of the political, economic, and social geography of the world. He studiously avoided attaching the label 'geopolitics' to his own work, a consequence of the association of this perspective with Nazi Germany's expansionism. Bowman's scholarship and diplomacy were closely bound to the interests of the US state, despite claims of the universal benefit of its outcomes or the scientific nature of its approach. For example, Bowman stated that his motivations in South America were 'cultural exchange, trade and general economic improvement'. However, his cartography served US corporate interests and did not improve the economic outcomes for the region's rubber producers. Bowman makes a case for the objectivity of his own world view while criticizing the subjectivity of others. His world vision is situated and partial, reflecting the practice of knowledge production as it was shaped by the personal and collective interests within which it was embedded.

Critical geopolitics

Geopolitics has been a subject of debate and debate since its inception in the late 19th century. Political geographers, following the Second World War, sought to shift away from theorizing and offering a political perspective by focusing on quantitative and technical studies. This led to the decline of geopolitics as a field of knowledge in imperial politics, which was linked to militaristic and undemocratic practices. However, by the 1980s, a new approach called critical geopolitics emerged, aiming to refute and question the classical foundations of geopolitics. Critical geopolitics focuses on the power of the geopolitician

to describe and divide the world in particular ways. It rejects geography as a descriptive enterprise of an external world and instead sees it as earth writing, or geo-graphing. This perspective draws on the work of French social theorist Michel Foucault, who argued that power and knowledge are inextricably connected. Postcolonial theorist Edward Said has also contributed to understanding the discursive production of geopolitical ideas. He critiqued Western literary representations of the Middle East, arguing that they presented an imaginative geography of the Orient as a site of threat and danger to Western culture. Said's work highlights the distinction between'self' and 'other' in geopolitical texts, which has been a key reference point for critical geopolitics scholars. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, a leading figure in the study of critical geopolitics, uses the insights of Foucault and Said to highlight the irony behind geopolitics. He argues that geopolitics has functioned through the suppression of geography and politics, with two manoeuvres within the operation of classical geopolitics. The first involves the systematic erasure of geography, where places are labelled and categorized within a homogeneous world of objects, attributes, and patterns. This process depoliticizes political processes by presenting interstate conflict as an inevitable and eternal process of nature. Critical geopolitics offers a toolkit to analyze various geopolitical practices and illuminate how they have erased geography and served to depoliticize conflict. Scholars have identified three sites of geopolitical knowledge production: formal geopolitics, practical geopolitics, and popular geopolitics.

Formal geopolitics

The term "formal geopolitics" refers to the production of geopolitical theory by self-identified geopoliticians, such as Mackinder, Kjellen, and Haushofer. Contemporary examples include Thomas Barnett's "Pentagon's New Map" and political geographer Virginie Mamadouh's neoclassical geopolitics. Both classical and neoclassical approaches can be grouped under the formal banner, but Mamadouh identifies the neoclassical approach as a single person, using phrases like "national interest" and "national security" to strategize the state.

Practical geopolitics

Geopolitics is the communication of geopolitical ideas through the popular culture of the state, including cinema, cartoons, books, and magazines. This concept is not limited to elite intellectuals or politicians but is formulated and transmitted through everyday cultural

practices. Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony highlights the importance of popular culture in understanding society's workings due to its everydayness and seemingly nonconflictual nature. Critical studies of popular geopolitics have explored the role of various cultural practices in shaping public perceptions of political events. For example, Jason Dittmer examines the communication of US national identity and security post-9/11 through Captain America comic books, which connects political projects of American nationalism, internal order, and foreign policy with the individual's scale. Films, such as James Bond, have also been a productive terrain for critical analysis, addressing contemporary geopolitical anxieties of Western states. As grand theoretical schemes and political speeches can conjure geopolitical ideas, instruments of popular culture can be working to build commonsense understandings of the geography of world politics.

Figure 50 Poster of James Bond movie

Geopolitical approaches

Global strategic views have been presented in various forms and with various objectives, linking the world as a dynamically interrelated system where change in one part produces and may be caused by, change in other parts. The study of international relations has been primarily ethnocentric, focusing on the nation-state. However, there is a need for geocentric approaches that take the world as a center of perspective and evaluation. Geopolitics, a translation of the German Geopolitik, has been subjected to vastly different interpretations, producing probably the most widely read and discussed geographical paper of all times. The term geopolitics has its inviting and repellent aspects, with some writers arguing that it is essentially a body of thought developed in a given territory that seeks the maximization of its own ends. The core of this discipline is power, and the quest for power provides the guide to method. Geopolitics is considered to include studies of dynamic political processes operating at levels broader than that of the individual state and within a global perspective. In 1904, Halford Mackinder presented a geopolitical view of the

world to the Royal Geographical Society, which continues to stimulate geographical debate. He claimed to have recognized a ‘geographical pivot of history’, the Heartland, which was divided between a ‘pivot area’ and an ‘inner crescent’. Mackinder believed that the historical confrontation between the pivot area and marginal crescent need not end here, and that transcontinental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-power. Mackinder also asked if the pivot region of the world’s politics was the vast area of Euro-Asia which was inaccessible to ships, but in antiquity lay open to the horse-riding nomads and is now about to be covered with a network of railways. He considered that under the prevailing balance of power Russia was not equivalent to the peripheral states but warned of an alliance between Germany and Russia that would allow the use of vast continental resources for fleet building, and the empire of the world would be in sight. A conquest of the Russian Empire by China might constitute a yellow peril to the world’s freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent, an advantage as yet denied to the Russian tenant of the pivot area.

In 1919, Mackinder revisited his ideas on the pivot area, which he later expanded to include the Baltic and Black Seas. He believed that the Germans had attempted to secure



Figure 51 Spykman’s Rimland and Hearland concept represented through a map

Eastern Europe as a preliminary to the capture of the Heartland and that the Heartland could be invaded through the East European steppes. He urged peacemakers to produce a lasting settlement of affairs between Germany and Russia, with the introduction of a cordon sanitaire of nation states to separate the Germans and the Heartland, securing their independence and providing a balance of power. Mackinder's ideas have been refuted and systematically dismantled, only to rise Phoenix-like for further punishment and stimulate geopoliticians to present their own revisions. The concept has been vulnerable from various directions, with overestimation of seapower's ability to penetrate and control rivers and consistently negating both the might of the USA as a world power and the effectiveness of air power. The strategical railways that Mackinder invoked to endow his theory with overtones of urgency never materialized, while since 1928 the power of the Heartland has come to lie not in its immunity from attack but in its industrial strength. The economic basis of Russian power has been discussed by East and Hooson, and by 1943, was realized by Mackinder. The Heartland is vulnerable to attack by a variety of land and sea-based missiles, and is regularly photographed in detail by US spy satellites using both conventional and infra-red methods. The economic basis of Russian power has been discussed by East and Hooson, and by 1943, it was realized by Mackinder. Mackinder's work has a lasting value in its emphasis on the functional unity of the world. His aim to exhibit human history as part of the life of the world organism and his statement that "From the present time forth, in the post-Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, and none the less that it will be one of world-wide scope" have a continuing relevance and encapsulate the spirit of acceptable geopolitics. Since the 1930s, geopolitics has been under a dark shadow of academic reaction against the activities of geopoliticians in Nazi Germany. However, interest in the subject has been kept alive in the work of several writers who have attempted to reinterpret the Heartland or describe new geopolitical regions. Spykman recognized that Mackinder had seen the potential world domination by the Heartland as dependent upon its organization in conjunction with a great power of the marginal crescent, but it was to the latter region, redefined as the Rimland, that he gave priority. He demonstrated that historical alignments, rather than expressing a basic opposition between land and sea power, had frequently involved an alliance between the Heartland and a Rimland power, or Britain against an expansion plagued Rimland power. Meinig's approach in his Empire theory derives most from objective reality and allows flexibility by drawing the least upon geographical determinism, emphasizing instead the volitional

aspects of state behaviour. It constitutes the least unacceptable statement of a Heartland concept. De Seversky presented an alternative geopolitical approach, replacing the traditionally favoured Mercator projection with an azimuthal equidistant projection centred on the North Pole. This resulted in a startlingly different view of the world, with the spheres of air dominance of each superpower being shown to overlap to produce an 'area of decision'. De Seversky advocated a policy of American air supremacy at the expense of all other forms of defence, and considered that land forces need only be deployed to defend the Arctic fringes of the continent in the region of the Bering Straits. The geopolitical approach has a continuity from Mahan and Mackinder to Meinig and Cohen. Its uniqueness is not due to the desire to influence government policy, but rather the demonstration of global unity and interaction. This approach contrasts with the tendency to define regions and study them in isolation and base political conclusions on subjectively selected evidence. This has led to doubts about the academic acceptability of the geopolitical approach. Geopoliticians often interpret past and future history in terms of a perceived master variable, inflating its importance disproportionately at the expense of other relevant variables. However, excessive subjectivity is not inherent in the global approach to the world, and balanced world-based analyses will be valued.

Geopolitical significance of international water disputes: India and its neighbouring countries

Water is a fundamental resource that has been mentioned in various religions, including Hinduism, the Quran, and the Bible. The earth is described as the "Blue Planet," with water covering 70.9% of its surface. However, only 3.5% of this water is fresh or potable for human consumption, while 24% is frozen and locked in glaciers, snow, ice, and permafrost. The remaining freshwater found in rivers, lakes, ponds, and other water bodies is non-frozen, salt free, and accessible for human consumption. This is the "visible water" that society interacts with for drinking, agriculture, domestic, and industrial needs. Precipitation and rainfall also add to the freshwater stock. Water resources are fundamentally challenged by increasing population and consumption patterns. It is estimated that two out of every three people in the world will live in water-stressed conditions by 2030. In the 20th century, the world population tripled and the consumption of water increased six

times. By 2030, the demand for water will be 40% more than it is currently and 50% higher in the most rapidly developing countries, including India and China. According to UN 2015 estimates, by 2030, the world population is projected to reach 8.5 billion, with the bulk of the population increase being in countries already experiencing water shortages. Water commons means that water is no one's property; it rightfully belongs to all of humanity and to the earth itself. It is our duty to protect the quality and availability of water for everyone around the planet. This ethic should be the foundation of all decisions made about use of this life-giving resource. Rivers are the most visible form of freshwater and represent basic values like equity, transparency, accountability, sustainability, and participation in water policy processes. They are crucial to economic development and form an important part of national policies. New sets of knowledge today give us a holistic understanding of rivers, not only determined in terms of volumes but also as integrated systems that include flood plains, watersheds, and deltas.Ecological flow refers to the quantity, timing, and quality of water flows required to sustain freshwater and estuarine ecosystems, as well as human livelihood and wellbeing. River waters are essential for agriculture, industry, and domestic use, as well as for river ecology. The relationship between river flows and ecology is crucial, as rivers move from source to mouth, undergoing continuous changes. Indian water expert Ramaswamy Iyer emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between instream flows for different purposes. Flows are necessary for maintaining the river regime, purifying itself, sustaining aquatic life and vegetation, recharging groundwater, supporting livelihoods, navigation, preserving estuarine conditions, preventing salinity incursion, and enabling the river to play its role in cultural and spiritual lives.



Figure 52 Availability of water across the Globe

The Indus, Ganga, and Brahmaputra are three major subcontinental rivers that originate from the Hindu Kush Himalaya and the trans-Himalaya or the Tibetan plateau. The Indus originates in Tibet and flows through Ladakh, joining the Zaskar and Shyok rivers before entering Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). The Ganga, which originates in the Tibetan plateau, forms part of the Ganga-Brahmaputra Meghna (GBM) basin. The Brahmaputra originates from glaciers and alpine lakes in the Tibetan plateau. These rivers provide freshwater for irrigation, drinking, and fishing in densely populated parts of South Asia, providing freshwater for irrigation, drinking, and fishing. As they empty into the seas, they form the world's largest river deltas, such as the Sundarbans. The transboundary rivers cascade from the Himalayas, presenting enormous hydro-potential, particularly in Nepal, Bhutan, Kashmir, and Northeast India. South Asia faces a growing demand for energy and low-carbon energy, with countries like Nepal and Bhutan investing in sustainable hydropower. India has the world's fifth largest hydropower capacity. Climate change assessments indicate an increase in melt-flow resulting in regular flooding, and construction of facilities to store excess water during dry periods presents challenges and opportunities. Glaciers contribute to about 10% of flow in the Brahmaputra and the Ganges, while it accounts for almost 45% in the Indus. The hydrology of the region is tied not only to economic development but also to security. The construction of dams and water storage facilities for economic development is crucial, but also raises concerns about fear and misperception among lower riparian countries.

Water resources play a crucial role in the security discourse, as they can lead to disputes and potentially hostile situations, affecting political-diplomatic relations and relations between provinces within states or intra-state. There are two main schools of thought on water crises: one that focuses on water as a source of conflict within countries and an impetus for scientists and political leaders to use modern science and advanced technology to create new solutions and suitable alternatives. The other school argues that water as a source of dispute or conflict will be increasingly inter-state in nature and examines water-related conflicts. South Asia faces growing water challenges, with a stable supply of water being critical to the country's political, social, and economic stability. The political framing of water issues is inextricably linked with broader contextual issues, particularly energy, food, and wealth generation. Internal or domestic water challenges will greatly impact transboundary water relations. Water as a security issue allows for a broad-

based participation of actors, allowing greater participation of the 'epistemic community' in the policymaking process. However, both the traditional security community and the development community are wary of linking water issues with security. The former argue that water issues are primarily welfare and development concerns, while the latter believes that positioning water issues into the security agenda will only reinforce the state-centric apparatus. Water has impacted state relations in South Asia during the colonial period with Nepal, the partition in 1947 when the state of Pakistan was created, and later in 1971 when Bangladesh became independent. The primary security concern was over water sharing and distribution, which could create acrimonious relations. Consequently, South Asia has seen several bilateral water treaties



Figure 53 International River boundaries



Figure 54 Characteristics of 1960's Indus Treaty

since the signing of the Sarada Treaty with Nepal in 1920. Water relations can never be permanently settled due to seasonal variations and usage, particularly non-consumptive river water. Interventions and diversions on rivers impact flow, and political relations can be impacted by changes in the quantitative and qualitative nature of the river. Legal norms of ‘equitable utilization’, ‘no-harm rule’, and ‘restricted sovereignty’ are accepted legal norms that riparian states work through, and these norms have been reflected in many of the water treaties in South Asia. Lastly, water resources play a significant role in the security discourse, with water being a crucial factor in determining political and diplomatic relations.

Water treaties between South Asian countries are based on two types of water: ‘big water’ and ‘small water’. Big water, which concerns the production of food and energy, is crucial for economic development and includes water for irrigation and hydroelectricity production. These treaties serve as a measure of cooperation and offer states a structure to coordinate actions. The basis for river water treaties is to find an equitable approach for meeting vital human needs. Water treaties in South Asia are time-specific and area translations of a political will at a particular time, and cannot be viewed in terms of finality. As the lives and livelihoods of people exponentially grow around the river basin, so does the demand for and consumption of water. The efficacy of treaties between riparian will always be tested, if not completely severed or abrogated. In South Asia, river water treaties are both rights-based and needs-based, with the former dominant during the course of negotiations and the latter more needs-based in the post-treaty period. Both the upper and lower riparian have stakes in the continuation of a treaty, with the upper riparian often being a strong military power. Lower riparian use non-water linkages to pressure the upper riparian, such as in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Dispute resolution mechanisms play a critical role in existing water treaties and are an important element of future water cooperation. When the rate of change within a river basin exceeds the institutional capacity to absorb the change, the likelihood of disputes is high. The Permanent Indus Commission, established in India and Bangladesh in 1972, discusses the framework for the sharing of rivers between India and Bangladesh. The Joint Rivers Commission, headed by Water Resources Ministers of both countries, has been successful in the Ganga Treaty in 1996. However, such mechanisms will need strengthening with new hydrological knowledge. With the growing importance of ‘river

watershed management' approaches and the easy availability of new monitoring technology, an entirely new set of enforcement mechanisms can be structured and infused into the treaty with lasting value.

Indus Waters Treaty

Water is a delicate topic in India-Pakistan relations. The Indus Basin was split following partition in 1947, and the Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 between India and Pakistanafter several years of talks. The World Bank served as a third party in the negotiations. The World Bank's success is credited to (a) US backing and (b) the World Bank's ability to generate funding for the Indus Basin water development project. The pact established a framework for sharing water resources in the Indus River basin. It separated the Indus Basin's six rivers. The treaty terms granted India exclusive rights over the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) with an average annual flow of 33.8 Million Acre Feet



Figure 55 The indus water commission's story

(MAF). Pakistan maintains sole control over the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab), which have an annual discharge of 135.6 MAF. The treaty establishes distinct procedures for resolving issues raised by the Permanent Indus Commission: "questions" are handled by the Commission, "differences" are resolved by a Neutral Expert, and "disputes" are referred to a seven-member arbitral tribunal known as the "Court of Arbitration." The Treaty contains no exit clause. Article XII, on the other hand, allows for the revision of treaty terms by a "duly ratified treaty," which will replace the current one with the restriction that it cannot be repealed unilaterally. Article VII, which underlines "Future Cooperation," is the most essential element of the Treaty. It recognises the two nations' "common interest" in "the optimum development of the Rivers," and states that they would "cooperate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest extent possible" to that goal. India is entitled to utilise the waters of Western rivers for the following purposes: (a)



Figure 56 Uri attack annd the Indus water treaty

residential use, (b) non-consumptive usage, (c) agricultural use, and (d) hydroelectric power generation. India is also allowed to build up to 3.6 million acre feet (MAF) of water storage on Western Rivers for different reasons stated in the Treaty. Both India and Pakistan agreed to create a permanent position of Commissioner for Indus Waters. The Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) is made up of two Commissioners. Unless one Government decides to take up any particular subject directly with the other Government, each Commissioner will be the Government's representative in all matters arising from this Treaty. The Commission is supposed to convene at least once a year, alternating in India and the United States. The Commission is expected to convene at least once a year, alternately in India and Pakistan, and whenever any Commissioner requests it. The Commission is also required to conduct inspection tours of the Rivers and Works in order to ascertain the facts associated with various developments and works on the Rivers. In order for Pakistan to be satisfied that India's planned projects are in accordance with the Treaty provisions, India is required to communicate to Pakistan, in writing, the information specified in the Treaty. Pakistan can submit complaints within three months of receipt, which are then handled under Article IX. Article XII states that the Treaty's terms would remain in effect unless terminated by a legally approved treaty between the two governments. In the following six decades, the Treaty has weathered two wars (1965 and 1971) and the Kargil conflict in 1999.There were no reported strategic decisions by either country to attack or disable the other's hydraulic systems. There is occasionally outrage about Pakistan's cross-border terrorism. In reaction, there is a call in India to repeal the Treaty as an instrument of retribution. There have been several occasions the Indian Parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai terror attack in 2008, the recent terrorist attacks in Uri in 2016 and the 2019 Pulwama attack that could easily have prompted India to withdraw from the IWT under the interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, based on its cost-benefit analyses, India opted not to abandon the treaty on each occasion. What is under dispute on the IWT today is not water sharing, which is covered by the Treaty, but whether Indian water projects on western rivers, particularly the Jhelum and Chenab, as claimed by Pakistan, comply with technical requirements. River storage does, in fact, generate Lower riparian states are concerned. However, India, as an upper riparian, has taken Pakistan's water supply issues into account and continues to do so to interact with Pakistan through the Permanent Indus Commission. It should be emphasised that India has not built a single storage dam on the despite the fact that the IWT provides for

storage entitlements of up to 3.6-million-acre feet (MAF). Since 2016, the current NDA government has been in power. This is being corrected. Pakistan's objections to the western river projects have been pragmatic rather than technical. Its primary goal has been to stymie any water development initiatives in Kashmir. A rich and flourishing Kashmir is anathema to the rulers of Pakistan. Not surprise, Pakistan utilises water difficulties to incite fear of Indian regional hegemony, and its propaganda machine works nonstop. Pakistan has effectively leveraged its lower riparian situation to gain international sympathy while masking its internal inability. The country gets 67% of foreign waters, making it a lower-riparian country not just with India but also with Afghanistan via the Kabul River. The leadership expresses its weakness and victimisation by referring to water as a "lifeline," implying that the sharing of the waters with India is still unfinished business. Given its feudal and industrial background, a section of Pakistan's political-military leadership believes that water issues will not only divert attention away from Pakistan's inefficient water management policies and inter-provincial water dispute between Punjab and Sindh, but will also provide a "back door" for international involvement in the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

In India, there has been discussion about: (a) the necessity to replace the IWT with a better treaty, (b) repealing it, and (c) implementing the treaty's terms. Those who advocate revision argue that the Treaty is out of date because it does not take into account new realities and grounds for cooperation (proper survey of basins for better exploitation of water resources, reconsideration of the interests of Kashmiris whose interests were overlooked, and new technologies being used for dam construction, de-siltation, and ecological issues, among other things), and thus requires revision. The J&K state assembly issued a resolution in March 2003 requesting the Indian government to examine and reform IWT to fit the interests of the state's people. Abrogation supporters claim that the Treaty unfairly granted Pakistan more waterways than it deserved and has not assured amicable behaviour from Pakistan. Furthermore, it has abused the Treaty's pertinent terms to halt and postpone hydropower and navigational projects in Jammu and Kashmir, harming the people's interests. As a result of Pakistan's reckless and aggressive attitude, India should unilaterally terminate the deal. The third viewpoint focuses on improving the Treaty's provisions. In light of the third point, enough attention must be made to capturing as much water as possible from these rivers through multifunctional projects. Current NDA-

government projects include the Ujh (storage capacity of 0.82 MAF), Shahpurkandi Dam (0.012 MAF), and the 2nd Ravi Vyas Link. Projects that might capture water freely pouring across the border into Pakistan but were on the verge of failure have become a national priority. On the western side the “permissible storage capacity” of rivers has been reduced under the Treaty requirements. In India, no substantial attention has been devoted. One of the projects proposed for The Bursar Multipurpose Project on the Marusudar River serves as a storage facility.A (Major Chenab tributary) in Kashmir’s Kishtwar district. It will save about 1 MAF, generate 800 MW of power, and irrigate approximately 100,000 acres hectares. The Detailed Project Report (DPR) is being written. Gyspaon Bhaga River (Chenab Main) in Himachal Pradesh’s Lahul &Spiti District is the second multipurpose project in the works. It is designed to store water (0.74 MAF), generate 300 MW of power, and irrigate 50,000 hectares of land. In 2017, the DPR was completed. These two initiatives must be conducted with adequate public awareness of the importance of such efforts, as well as well-planned restoration and compensation procedures. State governments must play an active role in this respect. In fact, all power projects (33 under construction and 8 in planning and implementation, such as Sawlakote and Ratle) should be prioritised. Only 3034 MW of the entire capacity of 11406 MW to be harnessed from the three western rivers has been installed. With the addition of another 2500 MW of generating capacity, forthcoming projects such as Pakaldal (1000 MW) and Kiru (624 MW). The Prime Minister’s budget of INR 34 billion has been approved. Since 2015, a development package has been in place to enhance transmission and distribution. Jammu & Kashmir’s distribution systems. The Tulbul Navigation Project, which is now blocked, must also be completed. Despite Pakistan’s protests, the project was completed. Pakistan, as previously said, this navigation project has been labelled a breach of the IWT, and the rationale of improving connection through river has been questioned.

Ganga Treaty

The Ganga is one of 54 rivers shared by India and Bangladesh. These are referred to as common rivers.The GBM Basin includes all of these rivers. The higher riparian is India, while the lower riparian is Bangladesh. The Ganga Treaty, signed in 1996, settled long-standing water-sharing concerns and has served as a model for the two nations’ cooperation

on other sharedrivers. Water disputes existed between India and Bangladesh prior to the signing of the Ganga Treaty. Three big water difficulties arose. The diversion of surface water from the Ganga was critical for India in order to flush the Calcutta (Kolkata) port and provide drinking water to Calcutta. Bangladesh claimed a legal portion of the water. The disagreement centred on how much water is deemed 'legitimate,' particularly during the lean season when water becomes limited. Another point of controversy was the Farakka Barrage, which was erected in 1975 to redirect water to India. The Farakka Barrage, erected by India on the Ganga, is located in Farakka, some 400 kilometres north of Calcutta, on the Bengal-Bihar border. The fundamental aim for the construction of this barrage was to preserve and maintain the Calcutta port as well as the navigability of the Bhagirathi-Hooghly. Calcutta's port has been rescued by the construction of the barrage, but the diversion of water for the port has become a source of international dispute and misunderstanding. With the establishment of Bangladesh in 1971, water became an immediate political and emotional concern. In order to reconcile disagreements and misinformation, the two nations formed the Joint Rivers Commission

Figure 58Farakka Barrage(Source: https://www.orfonline.org/)

Figure 57Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of Bengal played a significant role along with Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh in Ganga Treaty meet(Source: Dhaka Tribune)

(JRC) in 1972.Both nations signed a short-term agreement (49 days) on April 21, 1975, allowing the Farraka Barrage to be commissioned on an 'experimental basis' and defining the amount of water to be shared during the lean season.With Bangladesh's shifting political and military administrations, no long-term agreement could be reached between the two nations. Political and diplomatic relations between the two countries remained strained. The democratically elected government of India was suspicious of the military governments in Dacca (Dhaka). To put pressure on India, Bangladesh internationalised the Farakka Barrage and associated water concerns at different venues, including the UN, the NAM summit in Colombo, and the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Istanbul in 1976. The worldwide consensus was that the problem should be resolved bilaterally. Following that, two interim short-term agreements (with a guarantee provision of 80% share for Bangladesh) were signed in 1977.Later, in 1982, a memorandum of agreement was reached (with no guarantee clause).Then, in 1985, an agreement was reached that included a "burden sharing clause if the water level falls below 75% of the standard flow". Although many agreements were reached to control Ganga water and handle the Farakka barrage issue, the ultimate deal was reached between the two administrations in 1996. The two countries agreed to a long-term Ganga Treaty. The Ganga Treaty recognised the river's changing character and



Figure 59 Current Status of Ganga Treaty

the decline in flow. According to the treaty, 90 percent of Bangladesh's share would be released based on the availability of waterdownstream of the Farakka Barrage The administration of Sheikh Hasina concluded a 30-year pact with India to share Ganga waters. India was represented by Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda. The key aspect of this Treaty addressing Ganga water sharing at Farraka is that Ganga water at Farraka would be decided by 15 10-day blocs from January 1 to May 3 every year.

The dispute resolution procedure was to be bilateral, with no consideration given to international arbitration, as was the case with the Indus Waters Treaty. The Treaty will be in effect for 30 years and will be renewed by mutual agreement. A Joint Committee was formed to oversee and execute the Treaty. The signing of a water treaty does not guarantee that no issues will emerge. Water-sharing and distribution disputes will continue to be a feature of inter-state interactions. With the Ganga Treaty framework in place, efforts are currently underway to share the waters of the Teesta and Feni rivers, as well as six more common rivers: Manu, Muhri, Khowai, Gumti, Jaldhaka, and Torsa. The Treaty includes a system for transmitting flood forecasting data on key rivers such as the Ganga, Teesta, Bramhaputra, and Barak from India to Bangladesh during the monsoon season. "The dissemination of flood predicting information during the monsoon season has enabled civil and military officials in Bangladesh to relocate flood-affected residents to safer areas.

A mutually agreed upon desire for optimal utilisation of water resources and mutual advantages in the sectors of flood management, irrigation, and hydropower generation was expressed as follows:

- To establish a fair and just solution without harming either country's rights and entitlements. Article I refer to the amount of water that India has pledged to transfer to Bangladesh at Farakka. Every year, a water-sharing formula is agreed upon for ten-day intervals ranging from January 1st to May 31st. This is quantified in the Treaty's Annexures I and II.
- If flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any 10-day period, the two governments will have rapid meetings to make emergency changes.
- A Joint Committee appointed in equal numbers by the two governments to observe and record daily flows below Farakka Barrage, in the Feeder Canal, at the Navigation Lock, and at the Hardinge Bridge. The two countries recognise the

need to collaborate in finding a solution to the long-term problem of augmenting Ganga/Ganges flows during the dry season. ‘The most contentious issue between India and Bangladesh is the sharing of Ganga resources. This issue is mostly over water sharing during the lean season, January to May, notably mid-March to mid-May, when the flow of the Ganga drops to a minimum of 55, 000 cusecs. The essence of the issue is that if India withdraws 40,000 cusecs, the basic minimum necessary to flush the Hooghly and save Calcutta port, Bangladesh receives just 15,000 cusecs, which is far insufficient to satisfy its demands. The extraction of this bigger volume of water by India causes a slew of issues in Bangladesh.

Geopolitics of petroleum

Geopolitics and oil have long been closely intertwined, as oil is essential for modern economies and military organizations and is only found in certain areas of the world. For over a century, major powers have sought to ensure an adequate supply of oil to meet national requirements and deny it to their adversaries during times of crisis and conflict. This has led to a fierce struggle for dominance in the oil-producing areas, known as the geopolitics of oil. The geopolitics of oil has retained its features from World War I, when petroleum became crucial to warfare with the introduction of oil-powered tanks, airplanes, and warships. Since then, oil geopolitics has emphasized efforts by major oil-consuming nations to gain and retain positions of influence in the major oil regions. Additionally, oil geopolitics has emphasized control over transit routes used to transport oil, such as the



Figure 60 Availability of oil across the globe

vital Suez Canal. However, some aspects of oil geopolitics have changed over the years. Before and after World War I, the major pivots of oil geopolitics were Romania, the upper Persian Gulf (now Iran and Iraq), and the Baku area (now Azerbaijan). Later, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) were added to the mix. These areas attracted substantial interest from major powers in the interwar years (1918-1939) and were key strategic targets during World War II. Some areas, such as the Gulf area and Azerbaijan, continue to attract geopolitical interest, while others, like Romania and Indonesia, have become less important as oil producers. New producers have emerged and gained prominence, including several in Africa and the Caspian Sea region. The depletion of many existing oil reservoirs and impressive advances in extractive technology have increased the impetus to drilling in areas once considered inaccessible, such as far-offshore waters and the Arctic. As a result, the global map of oil geopolitics is undergoing a dramatic transformation. The emergence of powerful new players has also altered the geopolitics of oil. Up until World War II, the key actors in this contest were the European powers and the USA, joined in the 1930s by Japan. After World War II, the Europeans declined in importance while the USA and the Soviet Union reigned supreme. Now, new players, including China and India, have come to the fore, and Russia has emerged as a major player in its own right. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, first understood the geopolitical significance of oil. In 1912, he ordered the conversion of British warships from coal to oil propulsion to give them an advantage over Germany's coal-powered ships in the event of war. Great Britain did not possess domestic oil reserves of its own at that time, and Parliament voted in 1914 to nationalize APOC (Anglo-Persian Oil Company) and bring the Persian concession under British government control. From that point onward, the protection of APOC's concession

Figure 61 Cartoon depicting oil exploration in the name of war on terror by the west

area and British supply lines to the Persian Gulf (especially the Suez Canal) were viewed as matters of vital national security by the British government. Oil-powered weapons played a significant role during World War I, making it vitally important for the major powers to gain ensured access to prolific supplies of petroleum. Control over foreign oil deposits became a first-class war aim. As the war drew to a close, Britain and other victorious powers sought to redraw the postwar political landscape in such a way as to enhance their access to overseas oil supplies. Much of this effort focused on the fate of the Ottoman Empire, which was thought to possess significant oil deposits in areas of Mesopotamia (later Iraq). Both Britain and France sought control over these areas, whose postwar destiny was a major issue in Franco-British relations during this period. The strategic aspect of the international competition for sources of energy continued to play a significant role in international relations throughout the period between World Wars I and II. The major European powers, possessing few domestic oil reserves of their own, focused much of their geopolitical efforts on gaining or expanding a foothold in the oil-bearing areas of the Persian Gulf basin. Great Britain sought to extend its sway over an ever-greater swath of this region, while Japan harboured imperial ambitions over the Dutch East Indies, then the major producer in Asia. As World War II progressed, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his



Figure 63 The Carter Doctrine

senior advisers became deeply concerned that the heavy wartime extraction of domestic oil was rapidly depleting US reserves, erasing America's capacity to sustain another full-scale war on the scale of World War II. Accordingly, Roosevelt ordered the State and Commerce Departments to seek a reliable foreign source of oil to supplement American reserves in the event of a major future conflict. After considering various possibilities, government experts became convinced that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia constituted the best candidate to serve in this capacity. In 1943, Roosevelt decided to anoint Saudi Arabia as America's chosen foreign supplier of oil and be brought under American military protection. To cement this arrangement,

Roosevelt met with Abdul Aziz on February 14, 1945, and forged an agreement with him under which the USA received privileged access to Saudi oil in return for a US pledge to protect the monarchy against all enemies, foreign and domestic. From this point onward, it was American policy to prevent any hostile power from invading Saudi Arabia or otherwise impeding US access to the oil supplies of the Persian Gulf area. The Carter Doctrine, a geopolitical concept that emphasized the importance of maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf region, was first introduced by

President Jimmy Carter in his January 1980 State of the Union address. This doctrine aimed to prevent Soviet inroads into the region and was responsible for one of the formative episodes of the early Cold War era, a clash between Moscow and Washington over Soviet efforts to establish a pro-Soviet state in northern Iran, the short-lived Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. This conflict and US concern over Soviet inroads in the Middle East provided the backdrop for several major US policy statements of the Cold War era, including the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Despite the perceived importance of ensuring access to Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf oil producers, American policymakers were largely content to allow Great Britain to shoulder responsibility for maintaining stability in the Gulf area during this period. Later, when London announced in 1968 that it would withdraw most British forces from "East of Suez" by the end of 1971, Washington again sought a friendly power to carry the burden of regional security, choosing to rely on the Iranian regime of Shah Reza Mohammed Pahlavi, whom the Americans and British had helped install as absolute monarch through a CIA-orchestrated coup in 1953. From 1971 to 1978, the Shah was the leading foreign recipient of US arms aid and technical support, including a wide array of advanced military

equipment. In early 1979, however, the Shah was driven from power by rebellious Shiite clergy, once again raising alarm in Washington over the safety of America's access to vital Persian Gulf oil supplies. In December 1979, the Soviet Union commenced its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, further jolting the security equation in the Gulf. In response, President Jimmy Carter and his top advisers determined that US interests in the Gulf had become too great to be entrusted into the hands of surrogates and so would have to come under the direct protection of American forces. This proposition, known as the Carter Doctrine, was spelled out in the president's January 1980 State of the Union address. Carter provided a geopolitical explanation for the expansion of American military power, stating that the region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: it contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. As a result, "the Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil." President Reagan established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) to implement this policy, deploying additional warships in the Gulf and acquiring new bases in the surrounding region. He also began a policy of "pre-positioning" US military materiel in the Gulf area, allowing for the rapid reinforcement of US forces already deployed there. Over time, CENTCOM (United States Central Command) was reconfigured to face threats emanating from states within the region, particularly Iran and Iraq. American officials have repeatedly reaffirmed the basic precept embodied in Carter's January, 1980 address, with Iraqi forces invading Kuwait and Iraq becoming a de facto belligerent in the war. President Obama has opted for tough sanctions to pressurize Tehran, but has not backed off from demands that the Iranians abandon their nuclear arms ambitions and ensure the safety of Persian Gulf oil supplies. US efforts ensured access to overseas sources of oil remain centred on the Persian Gulf area, but in recent years, this policy has been extended to other regions, including the Caspian Sea basin and West Africa. This is the result of dedicated efforts by Washington to "diversify" America's foreign sources of oil, minimizing its reliance on any single area that could be susceptible to periodic supply interruptions. A key US strategic goal, as affirmed in 2002, is to strengthen energy security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working with allies, trading partners, and energy producers, to expand the sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the

Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. The first US president to stress this approach was Bill Clinton, who crafted an “extended Carter Doctrine” and applied it to the Caspian Sea region in the late 1990s. Carter viewed the Caspian basin as a promising new source of oil and as a welcome alternative to the ever-turbulent Middle East. At that time, the newly-independent states of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were eager to sell their petroleum riches to the West, but lackedan autonomous conduit for exports, as all existing pipelines from the Caspian Sea basin passed through Russia. Clinton agreed to assist in the construction of a new oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, bypassing Russia. Because this new conduit, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, passed through or near several areas of ethnic unrest, Clinton also agreed to help these states bolster their military capabilities. Just as President Clinton extended the Carter Doctrine to the Caspian Sea basin, President George W. Bush extended it to Africa, which is seen by American officials as a valuable source of oil and an alternative to reliance on the Persian Gulf. Africa’s potential role in satisfying US oil needs was first highlighted in the Bush Administration’s National Energy Policy of May 2001, with Sub-Saharan Africa holding 7% of world oil reserves and comprising 11% of world oil production. This perception of Africa’s growing strategic importance has led to an increase in US military assistance. Within Africa, particular emphasis has been placed on Nigeria, the leading sub-Saharan producer and one of America’s principal foreign suppliers. The State Department noted in its Fiscal Year 2006 request for economic and military assistance to Nigeria that the USA should help bolster Nigeria’s internal security forces and protect its vital oil installations, especially in the vulnerable oil-producing Niger Delta region.



Figure 64 Pipleline system distributing oil across Europe (Source: Miylyiev, 2017)

China has become a significant player in the pursuit of geopolitical advantage in oil-producing areas around the world, with its reliance on imported oil increasing and its diplomatic and military interaction with major foreign producers. In 2009, China consumed 8.6 million barrels of oil per day and produced 3.8 million b/d (barrels/ day), forcing it to import 4.8 million b/d. This growth is driven by rising demand, which is largely driven by exploding automobile ownership and stagnant domestic production. In 2035, according to predictions by the US Department of Energy, China will remain number two in consumption after the USA (16.9 to 22.1 million b/d) but will overtake the USA to be the world's leading oil importer, requiring foreign supplies of 12.1 million b/ d, compared to 10.7 million b/d for the USA. The limited number of foreign oil producers that can satisfy the import requirements of China and the USA are destined to be entwined in a desperate struggle for access and influence in the oil-producing regions. Chinese leaders have been making vigorous efforts to establish close ties with favoured producers in the major oil-producing regions. As part of this drive, Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and other top officials have made numerous trips to Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Caspian region to negotiate major oil purchases and promote the involvement in joint ventures of state-controlled firms, including the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). China has also employed military means in its effort to cement ties with its foreign oil suppliers. The militarization of China's foreign energy ties is especially evident in Africa and Central Asia. China first became involved in the delivery of arms and military services to African oil providers in 1996 when it acquired a majority stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operation Company, Sudan's leading producer. When rebuffed by Western powers, the Khartoum regime turned to Beijing, which proved far more accommodating. Eager to ensure the safety of its recently-acquired oil assets in southern Sudan, China provided a wide array of modern



Figure 65 Oil exploration potential and availability in Africa

arms, which were then used to drive the rebels out of the oil producing region in what many observers termed a “scorched-earth campaign.” As China has increased its reliance on other African suppliers, it has increased its military ties with them as well. For example, when Chinese oil firms made their first significant bids for oil assets in Nigeria in 2005, Beijing agreed to provide the Nigerian government with jet aircraft and naval patrol boats. The Chinese are also supplying arms and ammunition to a number of other African oil suppliers and, like the USA, are supplementing these deliveries with training programs, joint combat exercises, and intelligence-sharing activities. In the Caspian region and Central Asia, China has been reluctant to play an overly conspicuous role as an arms provider in its own right, but has channelled such aid through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the regional organization it helped launch in 1996. As China has become more reliant on the Central Asian countries for supplies of oil and natural gas, it has increased the importance given to the SCO in its foreign policy and the resources devoted to the organization’s growth. This has led to an accelerated tempo of joint military exercises and to the delivery of Chinese arms to the Central Asian republics. However, there is growing evidence that China is expanding its capacity to employ military force in ensuring access to overseas supplies of oil and other vital resources. The US Department of Defence observed that China lacks the capacity to use force in ensuring access to its foreign sources of energy. However, China’s leaders may seek to close this gap by acquiring a broad spectrum of “extended-range power projection” capabilities, including aircraft carriers and associated support vessels, long-range missiles, expeditionary forces, and overseas bases.



Figure 67Monthly oil Imports (Source: US Energy Information Administration)

Russian leaders believe they have a natural right to exercise dominance over the Caspian basin and control the flow of oil and natural gas from the basin to Europe. They

use intensive diplomacy and military instruments, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), to gain influence in



Figure 69Military bases of Russia(source: https:// www.americansecurityproject.org/russian-arctic-military-bases/)

the region. Moscow maintains military bases in some countries and engages in regular military exercises with theirarmed forces. The geopolitical struggle among China, Russia, and the USA has accelerated the flow of arms, advisers, and military capabilities into oil-producing regions, posing a risk of outside involvement in local conflicts. For example, a future war between South Sudan and North Sudan could result in indirect involvement by the USA and China, with Washington supporting the South and Beijing the North. Similar scenarios can be drawn up in the Caspian region, with Russia as an added participant. Although the likelihood of these scenarios unfolding may be low, history suggests that clashes of this nature become more likely when states engage in intense geopolitical competition involving the transfer of arms and military personnel. Although

Figure 68 Deepwater Horizon disaster

the area north of the Arctic Circle encompasses only about 6% of the earth's surface, the USGS noted that it is thought to harbour approximately 22% of the world's undiscovered hydrocarbon resources, including an estimated 1,689 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (30% of the world's undiscovered supply) and 90 billion barrels of oil (13% of the undiscovered supply). Drilling in the Arctic poses enormous technological and environmental challenges, some of which could be lessened by the gradual warming of the earth's atmosphere due to climate change. However, boundary disputes and competitive ambitions could prove an obstacle. The five Arctic nations – Canada, Denmark (representing Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the USA – have yet to agree on a regime for dividing the polar region, and all are parties to disputes over their respective offshore boundaries in various Arctic Ocean extensions, such as the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Although all five countries have declared their intention to avoid the use of force in resolving these disputes, several have bolstered their military capabilities in the region and stated their intent to defend their Arctic interests by any means necessary.

Geopolitical competition has become increasingly significant in recent years, particularly in the oil and gas sectors. The expansion of drilling into deep-sea areas and the Arctic region has attracted enormous interest due to the potential for untapped oil and natural gas to lie in these areas. As the global thirst for petroleum grows, this competition is extending to additional areas, many never exposed to such contestation before. Drilling in deep-offshore areas poses technological and environmental challenges, as demonstrated by the Deepwater Horizon disaster in the US Gulf of Mexico. It also poses geological risks in areas where offshore borders are not fully demarcated. This is especially true in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia, where the presence of many island chains complicates the task of determining maritime boundaries. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides ambiguous criteria for determining the outer boundaries of coastal states, and there is no international court empowered or equipped to adjudicate such disputes. The most important and worrisome disputes in the Western Pacific region are those in the East and South China Seas, which are relatively large bodies of waters separated from the Pacific proper by a string of islands: Japan and Taiwan in the north; the Philippines in the south. Both areas are believed to sit above large oil and natural gas deposits: the East China Sea is believed to sit atop a large natural gas field off eastern China; the SouthChina Sea possesses valuable oil fields in areas off the Spratly Islands,

Figure 70 Oil carrying pipelines and fields in the South China Sea (Source: https:// worldview.stratfor.com/article/drilling-technology-south-china-sea)

situated between China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Because so many countries have advanced claims to allow part of these areas – China, Japan, and Taiwan in the East China Sea; Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam in the South China Sea – it has proven nearly impossible to establish firm offshore boundaries and award production licenses to interested energy firms. Beijing's assertion that the greater part of both seas falls within its national territory and its stated unwillingness to compromise on these claims due to issues of national pride and sovereignty has compounded the problem. To remove any uncertainty about their resolve in this matter, Chinese officials have regularly deployed naval forces in the disputed areas and, on

occasion, employed force to seize and hold small islands also claimed by other countries. The East China Sea is believed to be especially rich in natural gas, with a large field called Chunxiao by the Chinese and Shirakaba by the Japanese discovered in waters approximately midway between the two countries. However, ownership of the field is contested: the Chinese claim that it lies on their outer continental shelf, and so is theirs alone to exploit; the Japanese say that it falls within their 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, and so belongs to them. Both sides cite provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to justify their claims, but because these provisions contradict one another, and because there is no formal process for resolving such disputes, each insists on an exclusive right to exploit the field. Complicating the dispute is the presence of powerful nationalistic sentiments on each side. Many Chinese resent Japan's invasion and occupation of China during World War II and oppose territorial concessions to Tokyo, while many Japanese are fearful of China's rise and oppose any territorial concessions to Beijing. To demonstrate support for their respective claims in the East China Sea, both China and Japan have regularly deployed air and naval forces in the area, sometimes deploying in close proximity of one another. On at least one occasion, this has led to an

Figure 71Millitary bases of China in South China Sea(Source: https://solidarity.net.au/)

Figure 72Air bases operated by USA in south china sea (Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/)

outpouring of nationalistic fervour in each country, resulting in mass demonstrations of anti-Chinese or anti-Japanese sentiment. In an effort to calm matters and ensure the steady flow of bilateral trade, officials from the two countries have met several times to find a solution to the impasse. At one meeting, in June 2008, they agreed to a formula whereby Japanese firms would participate in a Chinese drive to exploit the undersea field. However, neither side has surrendered its claim to the disputed area, and both continue to station warships in the general area. There is every risk that some future incident at sea – accidental or otherwise – could lead to something far more serious. Large hydrocarbon deposits are believed to lie beneath a contested body of water, with China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei each claiming all or part of the region. China has placed small military garrisons on some of the small islands that dot the area and used military force to drive away ships belonging to the other claimants, in some cases, producing human casualties. The Obama Administration has offered to support the other parties to this dispute in their efforts to reach a compromise solution with Beijing, but Chinese officials have warned the USA to stay out of the matter, saying it is an internal affair. Geopolitical competition is also spreading to the Arctic region, although it has not yet produced the same degree of

Figure 73 Timeline of Ukraine War

friction as that witnessed in the East and South China Seas. The region's hydrocarbon potential was first revealed in a 2008 study by the US Geological Survey (USGS).

In general, energy is critical to the global economy, and oil and natural gas are two of the most important sources of energy. Three primary energy sources in the entire globe currently and in the recent past the clear winner is oil. It is the most essential source of energy when it comes to consuming. It is critical for the transportation industry. Therefore, it is necessary for the petrochemicals industry, as well as for manufacture of high-quality plastics very much present in daily life. This means that each and every country's government all around the world, they will make every effort to assure security of its oil and gas reserves since it is a really strategic concern.The two oil shocks in the 1970s, well-known Gulf War, the US sanctions on Iran sanctions, including oil and gas sanctions are some geopolitical issues.

UNIT 6: CONCEPT OF ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY, APPROACHES TO STUDY ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY, SPATIAL AND ETHNIC BEHAVIOURAL APPROACHES

Electoral geography is the study of geographical aspects of the organization, conduct, and results of elections, focusing on the spatial voting patterns, behaviours, and distribution of political phenomena. Voting analysis is particularly appealing to geographers as it allows for a better understanding of attitudes, perceptions, and biases. The task of political geographers is to explain or account for the variations over space of voting decisions, which can be challenging due to difficulty in explainingbehaviour. Electoral geography has been a success story in modern political geography, with hundreds of studies conducted over the last two decades. The role of electoral geography in political geography ranges from arguing that it is the core of political geography to recognizing that it does not belong to the problem with political geography. In the political geography of a state, elections play a key role in channelling conflicts safely into constitutional arenas. The five major areas of study within electoral geography include the spatial organization of elections, spatial variation in voting patterns, the influence of environment, special factors on voting decisions, special patterns of representation, spatial variations in power and policy implementation. The study of these areas was advanced during the 1960s as part of the adoption of a positivist approach in human geography. Elections and their organization are fundamental to democratic societies and profoundly affect their social and political geography. Voting gives people, a voice, but the way constituency's at all spatial scales-local, regional, national, and even supranational-are critical in deciding how their voices will be heard and acted upon. Elections are the one real opportunity for people to call to account the executive that normally rules their lives.



Figure 74 (Source: The Independent)

Other factors that influence elections include who is eligible to vote, the voting system used, the frequency with which elections are held, and the size and shape of the constituencies. Even small demographic shifts can significantly impact the distribution of political power. The voting system used can significantly influence the eventual outcome. The most commonly used system is the straightforward one person, one vote across a jigsaw of constituencies. However, this system has limitations, such as ignoring the wishes of the majority of voters and ignoring local constituency affairs. The Single Transferable Vote system ensures that voter wishes match who is eventually elected, but it has its disadvantages, such as encouraging voters to rank candidates even though they may know very little about what some of them stand for. A list system is another approach to addressing potential conflict between national and local party loyalties. The number of candidates elected for a particular party is determined by the proportion of the votes cast for that party. In some instances, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, there are national lists covering the whole country, while in others, like the European Parliament elections, there are constituency lists. However, elections as measures of public opinion have limitations, such as low levels of participation or inherent unfairness of the voting system used. They provide unparalleled insights into the changing society, as people are moving more frequently within and between countries, and demographic factors such as birth and death rates and household formation also affect what people want from society and the way they vote. Mission of elections, such as where exactly boundaries are drawn and which segments of the population are included or not included within constituencies, can materially influence who is elected.

Approaches to Study Electoral Geography

The field of electoral geography has evolved over the past half-century, with different approaches to studying political choice and party preference. Pelling 1967 distinguishes between the ecological approach, which relates political behaviour to the voter's environment and social life patterns, and the sociological approach, which relates the relationship

Electoral System	Constituency Representation	Party Representation
Single-Member Plurality	• Maintains traditional link between representative and constituents • Representatives often elected on a minority of total votes (wasted vote thesis)	• Distortion of votes/seats ratio • Minor parties disadvantaged unless support is regionally concentrated • Discourages multiplication of parties; tendency to two-party system: one party: dominant party system
Single-Member Majoritarian (a) Alternative Vote (AV) (b) Second Ballot	• Both maintain traditional link between representative and constituents • In both cases representatives usually elected by a majority	• Distortion of votes/seats ratio • "Wasted vote" thesis does not apply; small parties survive even if unsuccessful • Tendency toward multi-party system
Proportional Representation (PR) (a) Party List (b) Single Transferable Vote (STV)	• Individual representatives usually owe election more to party than to voters • Representatives forced to compete for "first preference" votes	• Approximate congruence between vote shares and seat allocations • Minor parties usually gain "fair" representation; easy entry for new parties • Tendency toward multi-party systems
Mixed Plurality/PR = Mixed Member Proportionality	• Maintains traditional link between representative and constituents	• Approximate congruence between vote shares and seat allocation • Minor parties usually gain "fair" representation

Source: Jackson and Jackson, 1997.

Figure 75 Types of Electoral system

between political behaviour and a voter's social class, occupation, and ethnicity. There are some approaches used by geographers to study elections: Aggregate Data analysis approach or Areal approach, and Behavioural approach. Aggregate data analysis approach focuses on aggregated election data, with two main streams: Areal structural approach, which focuses on the spatial pattern of voting, and areal ecological approach, which compares voting maps with maps of other variables, such as physical and socioeconomic variables. The use of statistical techniques, such as multiple regression analysis, factor analysis, principal component analysis, and co-efficient of correlation analysis, has become popular since the 1960s. Cox and Reynolds' behavioural approach, which focuses on the individual voter and their location in their environment, suggests that a spatial approach is needed to study elections. They assume that any change in voting patterns is due to changes in the information flow network or relocation of voters. The behavioural approach has been successfully used to discover new dimensions in voting. Lastly, the field of electoral geography has evolved over the past half-century, with different approaches to studying political choice and party preference. The ecological and behavioural approaches have been widely used in the field, but the aggregate data analysis approach has not allowed for significant differences or predictions about individual behaviour. The behavioural model

assumes that aggregate data, such as votes and socio-economic conditions, does not allow for any distinction or prediction about individual behaviour. It focuses on the interpretation of voting behaviour of electors and their regional variations. Voting behaviour is directly influenced by constituencies, socio-economic conditions, and the programs and policies of different political parties. Cox's article "Voting Decisions in a Spatial Context" made an invaluable contribution to applied electoral geography. The behavioural approach consists of four primary processes that can create local influence on voting behaviour: Candidate Voting, Issue Voting, Campaign Effects, and Neighbourhood Effect.

Figure 1 Process of studying electoral geography through behavioural approach

Candidate Voting is common in American, Japanese, Irish, and New Zealand elections, where voters prefer local candidates.

Issue Voting occurs when the election involves a particular topic of choice that is of greater importance to some regions than to other regions.

Campaign Effects reflect the various impacts of the campaign, including specific targeting.

Neighbourhood Effect is the most studied geographic effect, attempting to explain why parties perform better than expected in their strongest areas.

Behavioural models in electoral geography rely mostly on survey analysis, which involves the complexity of questionnaires and interviews with a sample of voters. It involves intensive field work, but sometimes researchers find difficulties due to illiterate voters who are more attracted to their caste/communal and political allegiance. Behavioural models are becoming increasingly important in geographic research and electoral studies. The aggregate data analysis approach closes from the spatial science paradigm in geography, with areal structural and areal-ecological streams. The structural approach only identifies the spatial pattern of voting, while the ecological approach tries to explain the evolution of the pattern. Initially, a number of works were conducted to understand the relationship between aggregate data and individual behaviour, but these approaches have evolved over time. Initially, works used areal structural approaches, but now only areal ecological approaches are used in electoral analysis. Behavioural geography emerged in the 1960s, focusing on spatial patterns as a product of individual behaviour and their perceived environment. This approach developed into the wider field of geography, reflecting both spatial science paradigms and behavioural approaches to the subject of geography. Electoral geographers have adopted this approach to better understand individual behaviour and their impact on the environment.

Spatial and ethnic behavioural approaches

Voting behaviour varies across different places and individuals, depending on various factors that affect the person. Regional stability in voting habits is evident in various parts of the world, such as the state of Tennessee, where the pattern of voting established in 1861 has lasted until today. The pattern was established by the distribution of slave ownership, with the two regions of Tennessee that voted against

Assembly	Election Year	Speaker	Chief Minister	Party
Legislative Assembly under the Government of India Act, 1935				
8th Assembly	1977 election	S. A. M. Habibullah	Jyoti Basu	Communist Party of India (Marxist) (Left Front)
9th Assembly	1982 election	Hashim Abdul Halim		
10th Assembly	1987 election			
11th Assembly	1991 election			
12th Assembly	1996 election		Buddhadeb Bhattacharya	
13th Assembly	2001 election			
14th Assembly	2006 election			
15th Assembly	2011 election	Biman Banerjee	Mamata Banerjee	All India Trinamool Congress
16th Assembly	2016 election			
17th Assembly	2021 election			

Figure 77 West Bengal's State Assembly elections

secession becoming areas of Republican stronghold and the two groups of secessionist counties becoming Democratic strength. The South was known for many years as a stronghold for Democrats, and the South became synonymous with putting Democrats. When American westward expansion began after the Civil War, people moved to their voting habits with them, establishing voting patterns that have remained for well over 100 years. The north-south settlement of Oklahoma brought Dixie Democrats to the southern parts of the state and the Midwestern Republicans to the northern part. Parties and patterns in Oklahoma are maintained by the pattern of parties and attitudes. However, in nearly every state in the USA, regions in which people consistently vote for one political party do not necessarily support candidates for that party. In West Bengal, India, voters invest in the Left Front, with the Left Front winning an overwhelming majority in five successive elections held in 1977, 1982, 87, 92, and 96. This pattern continued until 2011, when the Trinamool Congress took over Bengal, which has maintained a stable voting pattern for the last 10 years. In West Bengal, voters have always expressed their loyalty to the Congress party, and regional stability in regional voting patterns has been observed in West Bengal and Maharashtra. However, there is hardly new work on this aspect of electoral geography in India. Overall, regional stability in voting patterns in West Bengal and Maharashtra is remarkable, despite other changes that have taken place.

Urban, rural conflicts.

Urban and rural conflicts are a significant aspect of regional stability, as they involve the conflict between urban and rural interests. People in urban centres have different voting habits than those in rural areas due to various factors, such as income sources, voting age, education levels, income, and communication facilities. These differences cause differences in attitudes and voting behaviour. Rural urban conflicts have been stable since the city's first development, as cities dominate rural areas by containing more people and outvoting them, and by influencing rural voters. The urban influence on voting is similar to the diffusion process, with ideas and attitudes being formulated in the city diffuse outward more easily along transport routes than elsewhere. The barrier effect of voting habits changes at the boundary, but increased interaction can enhance attitudes in adjacent areas and thus voting more similar than expected. This condition exists where cities are located adjacent to each other but are in different states. The voting tradition is the single most important determinant for regional stability. Over 70% of Bengali voters recently voted for

the franchise right, and investment in the Communist Party of India Marxist as their parents. Attitudes and perceptions are inherited, not political philosophy. Once behavioural patterns are established, they tend to remain constant. An area must have some underlying community in its resources or production capability, and the similarity factor in the economics of an area attracts people with similar interests, attitudes, and goals. Regional stability depends on the homogeneity of the area, the inherited vote, committed voters, and the common interests of the people of the area. Major realignments in partisan attitudes are rare, but these are the exceptions to the rule. Most regions tend to remain loyal to one political philosophy for a long time. Once a region is established as a homogeneous voting area, people migrating into it will not necessarily change its political make up. The political philosophy of the area is absorbed by the migrants rather than the migrants changing the area. Migrants change their attitudes to confirm to those prevalent in the new region because they are constantly coming in contact with ideas and concepts that may be opposite to those in the area from which they migrated. The political homogeneity of a region can be stronger than the inherited vote of the individual. Realignment of the individual world does not occur when they move to areas with people with political attitudes similar to their own. However, large groups of people with similar attitudes moving into an area can cause realignment of the area. Regional stability in voting is mostly in a biparty system, where a multiparty system is not common. Lastly, regional stability in voting is influenced by factors such as the voting tradition, the inherited vote, committed voters, and the common interests of the people of the region.



Figure 78 Voting pattern differences in rural and urban constituencies (Source: State Election Commission)

Regional realignments.

Regional realignments are a common electoral phenomenon in peripheral countries, such as India. They occur due to factors such as migration, conflicting political philosophies, class and linguistic cleavages, and groups not confined to a particular region. The effectiveness of pre-electoral advertising can be guessed, but the increase in sales volume does not necessarily correlate with the effectiveness of advertising. Regional realignment is a result of various factors, such as changes in political perceptions, political majority, neighbourhood effect, and economics. The first regional level realignment in voting habits occurred in 1967 when people voted non-Congress parties to power in several states. Since then, change has become more common in the electoral scenario in India. The first realignment occurred in 1977 when people voted the Janta Party to power, but the change was more common in the Hindi belt region. Most states in the Hindi-speaking region have experienced recurrent changes in their voting habits due to communal consciousness and casteism and communalism. The realignment investment goal in 1977 set a trend that is still continuing and is rapidly giving way to stability. In 1989 to 1993, three realignments occurred in India, with the first occurring in 1989 when the centrist party, Janta Dal,



Figure 79 Spatio temporal changes in performance of political parties in UP Loksabha elections

collapsed. The second realignment occurred in 1991 when voters favoured the Bhartiya Janta party again in 1993. The SP BSP Coalition was voted to power by the Andhra Pradesh Electors, but the state was under the President's rule, and the BSP BJP coalition collapsed in early 1995. Fresh Assembly elections bring about new realignment in various constituencies across India.

Localism.

Localism is a crucial aspect of political voting, particularly for third party candidates and state elections. Third party candidates often find their strongest support in areas close to their homes, known as friends and neighbours or localism voting. This type of support is transient and is classified as a type of regional realignment. In the 1989 elections, the BJP candidate was chosen due to his proximity to the BJP's residence, indicating a strong distance decay in popularity away from the BJP candidate's place of residence. In recent years, the Muslims have switched their loyalty to the Muslim-dominated Congress party, which has had a significant impact on regions predominantly inhabited by Muslims. This realignment has affected regions mostly inhabited by Muslims, where the Congress party has performed poorly. The 1991 midterm election saw caste Hindus in the Hindi heartland express their loyalty to the Bahujan Samaj Party, rather than the Congress party, which has recently cleaned up their support. Large-scale Muslim immigration to Northeast Bihar has also impacted voting habits in the region, as they expressed their loyalty to the political party that did not oppose their immigration. Kashmiri Hindu immigrants in the Delhi region have also caused realignment in voting habits, but their loyalty to the party is not entirely fair. Individual migrants tend to change their attitudes to confirm their new areas, but when a large number



Figure 80 Changes in voting behaviour (Source: The Hindu)

of people with similar political perceptions move into an area, they can overwhelm the political attitudes. While regional alignment can be caused by migration, it is essential to consider the unique circumstances such as isolation, discrimination, or the movement of a large number of people into previously uninhabited areas.

Urban suburban conflicts.

Urban and suburban conflicts can be a potential factor causing regional realignment in voting habits and patterns, particularly in urban regions of coal countries. The exodus from American central cities has led to a mass movement of people to suburbs, which have changed voting patterns. Suburbs have grown at a faster rate than central cities, with a net decrease in population in 13 of the 20 largest cities in the United States during 1960 to 1970. This rearrangement of urban spatial structure created a special dichotomy in urban voting patterns, with people being situated based on age, ethnic background, and lifestyle. Political conflicts arise due to divergent interests rooted in economic differences. Wealthier and rich people in the EU prefer to live in suburbs because of better housing facilities, while relatively fewer wealthy people continue to live in central cities. The pattern of voting in American cities has been for Republicans in suburbs and Democrats in central cities. In India, urban suburban conflicts are confined to major metropolitan regions due to the persistent nature of fast-growing social economic cleavages. Rapid industrialization and mass exodus from rural areas into suburban areas have led to some rural influence in suburban voting patterns. Residents of central cities usually stick to traditional political parties like Congress, while suburban areas with rural perceptions and backgrounds favour newer political parties. The first significant regional realignment in voting habits occurred in the newly emerged state of Kerela in the 1950s due to the political delusion with Congress culture. The major regional realignment took place when the average middle class Bengali people enthusiastically identified themselves with Marxian philosophy and expressed solidarity with it. This realization had an impact on voting habits of the people of the states, leading to realignment. Regional alignment is more common in multiethnic multinational states where political parties identify themselves with dominant ethnic or national groups. These states usually have a multiparty system, which contributes to the frequent realignment in voting habits.

UNIT 7: SCOPE AND CONTENT OF HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND HISTOGRAPHY

Geography is known as the discipline which deals into the study of an area which has acquired its present state as a result of various processes and events that is occurred over the past and those that are still occurring. weather, it studies the evolution of landforms or the evolution of a cultural landscape. History place and indispensable role in studying geography. the concept of spatio temporal variation in the studies of various phenomena is an integral part of both systematic and regional geography. hence historic studies are intertwined in geography. this has given rise to the branch of study namely historical geography.

historical geography can we describe as the study of human, physical, environment, spatial characteristics of the past. The term historical geography grew into prominence post 1950, when it started to be used in various geographical text and by 1975 the first journal of historical geography was published, the scope of historical geography is quite vast, because it takes both theology and the chronological aspect of studying space. historical geography emphasizes within itself the evolution of society, class, cast structure, the evolution of economic activities, demographic conditions, transformation of landscapes because of natural and anthropological causes, concepts and theories such as environmental determinism, feminism, Marxism, post structuralism. At present, though historical geography is not studied as a separate branch of geography, but it is intricately women in the studies of any branch of geography take for example geomorphology, hydrology, urban geography, demography, political geography, economic geography and so on, because without knowing or understanding the past processes, it is difficult to understand the present and even more erroneous to make future predictions. Also result historical facts, data, maps, documents have significant role to play even in artificial intelligence, machine learning, in geoinformatics and weather prediction models. The context of historical geography can be broadly classified into mainly three broad categories following the concepts of Darwinism:

a) Space

b) Time and

c) Process

In studying space as a historical object especially in physical geography the work of exogenic erosional agents and endogenic forces through time leads to the evolution of landforms. the role of geological history has eventually led to the formation of the mighty Himalayas, or the works of the glaciers which gorged out the Great Lakes of North America. In the fields of Human Geography, the factors such as climate, soil, vegetation, relief seemed to have played a major role in the origin of agricultural gene centres in the fertile crescent of the middle east. As the knowledge of agriculture spread out across continents the vast forest of Europe and the Gangetic plains transform into an agrarian landscape. Thus, the geosyncline theory by James Hall or the theory of the normal cycle of erosion by William Morris Davis and the theory of agricultural gene centre by Zhukovsky in 1968,all required and historical approach. Even in the geopolitical studies and that of the geographical spaces historical manuscripts are often taken into consideration to understand the past scenarios.For example, the name of Delhi was Hastinapur in Mahabharat, the Palk Strait was referred to as Ram Setu in the Ramayana. The spaces change characteristic with time and so does the social interactions. The cultural landscape and the anthropological interaction of Pre-British India and the post-independence India are vastly contradictory and agrarian belt has been transformed to urban Metropolis now.

Figure 81 Hastinapur , whose location in vedic texts (Source: Quora)

Historical Geography and Historiography

While dealing with the concepts of historical geography, often certain confusion arise in describing whether it is a geographical discipline or historical discipline.In order to explain geographical approaches are put to use in historiography and often historical aspects are overemphasized to the extent that Geography becomescompletely ignored. The problem arises because the linkage between space and time are present both in historical geography as well as in historiography. Kucera, 2008 write that, “in order for historical geography to be distinguishable from historiography, it should place a greater emphasis on space than on time as well as on the contemporaneity of the expression

being studied". He also added, "historical geography is primarily a science of the geographical organisation of the landscape where, in the chosen time period, the assigned is not dealing with the chronological description of the development of a certain phenomenon. Historiography, with its emphasis on linear development in time and chronology have grown. Historical geography have emphasized on place and chronology of historical events.

UNIT 8: ANCIENT PERIOD TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION OF JANAPADAS IN INDIA

The development of the socio-cultural milieu of India and its evolution to the present state requires an understanding of the geographical location of the Janapadas of Ancient India. From the Puranas a detailed description of the Janapadas have been derived. The study of Janapadas give an overview of the political situation during those ages and the Vedic, Buddhist and Jain texts help in the understanding.Often their existence is thought

Figure 82 Location of Mahajanapadas (Source: The Hindu Equilibrium: India C.1500 B.C. - 2000 A.D., Oxford University Press

to be mythical but various archaeological remains have proved otherwise. 16 Mahajanpadas have been listed down in the Buddhist and Jain texts. They are as follows:

1. Kashi/ Kasi

2. Koshala
3. Anga
4. Magadh
5. Vaji
6. Malla
7. Chetiya
8. Vatsa
9. Kuru
10. Panchala
11. Matsya
12. Shura Sena
13. Asha ka
14. Avanti
15. Gandhara
16. Kamboj

The contribution of Alexander Cunningham an archaeologist who became the first director general of Archaeological Survey of India in 1871 is indispensable. His role in identifying the states of the Janapadas mentioned in various ancient scriptures has been vital. He through various extensive field surveys and archaeological commission found that the demarcation of Arnos, Takshila, Sangla, AhiChhatra, Sankisa, Srughna and many more cities. The Mahajanpadas in various text were found to be divided into monarchies or Rajyasand non-monarchicalstatescalled Ganas or Sangharsh. The relation between these states were dynamic throughout the history of India because of war and alliance. The most popular of these states where Magadha, Koshala, Vatsaand Avanti.

Kashi: Kashi Mahajanpada was bordered by the Varuna and Asi River on the North and South respectively. Varanasi and presently called Kashi are situated along the banks of the river Ganga which was once the capital of one of the most ancient Janapadas. Spread of the territory was till the Ganga- Gomati Doab Forestin the south. From the

jatakas the high aspirations of the kings of Kashi can now be known. There was constant rivalry among Kashi, Koshala and Anga. In later feuds Kashi was captured by Koshala.

Koshala: the KoshalaJanapada was encompassed by the Gandak river on the east, Gomti on the west, Sai River on the south and the Himalayas of current Nepal region towards the north. Some text refers to it being located in the Sarju-Rapti doab. Ayodhya, Saravasti, Saketa and Kushavati werecapitals of this kingdom at different periods of time. Till the reign of Bimbisara of Magadha, Koshala had a friendly relationship with Magadha. which deteriorated in the later periods. Saravasti can be currently located at Sahe Maheth along the boundary of Gonda and Bahraich districts.

Figure 83Maheth is a popular Buddhist shrine located in Sravasti of 5th century BCE

Anga: The existence of Anga as a Janapada came to be known from Atharva Veda. This region was considered to be dwelled by the first group of Aryan settlers. Anga coincides with the area of present-day Bhagalpur and Manghyr district of Bihar. Ganga borders the north. Champa river flowed between Anga and Magadha and it was one of the most important trade centres of 6th century BC.Champa the capital of Anga can be traced back to be located at the confluence of Ganga and Champa Riverwhere the modern Champanagar or Champa para neighbouring Bhagalpur is located, conquered by Bimbisara and included later in Magadh Janapada.

Figure 84Sonbhadra Caves, built between 300-600 BCE

Magadh: Magadh is the most influential and prosperous Janapadas located on the convergencepoint of 4 rivers namely Ganga, Son, Punpun and Gandhak. The region is situated currently in the area neighbouring Patna and Gaya. The capital of Magadh was known as Girivraja, or Raja Griha presently called Rajgir. The fertile alluvial soil of the

flood plains and the iron ore mines made this Janapada rich in both agriculture production and weaponry. In the latter years Patliputra became the capital of Magadh.

Figure 85 Ruins of Nalanda, built in 5th century BCE

Vaaji: The Janapada of Vaaji also known as Vriji is considered by many historians as a union of 9 Clans. the important Clans of this union where the Vajiis, Videhas, Lichchavies and Jantrikas. The other clans were Ugras, Bhogas, Kauravas and Ashwakas. In modern Basarh of North Bihar capital of Licchavies known as Vaishali. Though they were allies of Koshalas and the Mallas but they were entangled in conflict with the Magadhas. The Videha clan had their capital Janakpur of Nepal which they called Mithila. Lord Mahavira belongs to the Jantrika Clan.

Figure 86 Vaishali Vihar, Kolhua built in 3rd century

Malla: The Malla Janapada was situated on the western side of the Vajis and their main centre for commerce and trade were located at Kushinara and Pawa. Khushinara is the place which is currently located near Kasiya village situated in the Western Uttar Pradesh. Malas and Waris had friendly ties and rare conflicts among them.

Chetiya: The Janapadaof Chedi was located in the central parts of India, predominantly in the Eastern parts of Bundelkhand region. As mentioned in the Mahabharata the capital of this Janapada was provablySukti Mati or Shakti SabhayaorSotthiVati Nagara.

Figure 87Kausambi cast copper coin 1st century BCE inscribed "Kosabi"

Varma / Vatsa: This Janapada was situated on the southern banks of the Ganges and now identified as the Kesam village on the right banks of the river Yamuna. The capital of Vamsam was Kaushambi and the region was famous for its cotton textile.

Kuru: As per the Buddhist text, the kings of the Kuru Kingdom belonged to the family of Yudhishthira and their capital was known as Indapatta or Indraprastha. The kingdom initially emerged at the hinterland ofdoab on the western bank of Yamuna bordered by the Ghaggarriver in the west, Ganga in the east and forest ranges on the northern and southern boundaries. Other than Indraprastha, Hastinapur was also a well-known commercial centre of this Mahajanpada, which exist even in the current days.

Panchala: The Panchala Janapadaencompass the Rohilkhand areas and Ganga dividing it in part in the doab region. It was surrounded by Ganga in its western flank andSarju River on the eastern side. There were two capitals of this, the capital of the Uttara that is the north was known as Ahichchhatra. Presently the area is known as Ramnagar in Bareilly district of Uttar Pradesh. The Dakshina or the southern Panchala was called Kampilya, which a settlement currently recognised as Kampil in Farrukhabad district in Uttar Pradesh has been identified. The very well-known city of Kanya Kubja also known as Kannauj was located within the earth while territory of the Panchalas. In Arthshastra, it has been mentioned that Panchala kingdom in its later years had shifted to oligarchic form of governance from that of monarchy.

Matsya: In the western part of India leads the principality named Matsya. Its area included the districts of Jaipur, Alwar and Bharatpur of recent times. The capital of this Janapada was named Virat Nagar, after its founder's name Virat and his presently known as Barait.

Figure 88 Buddhist Monastery remains at Beejak ki Pahari, Bairat

Shurasenas: The Buddhist texts refer about a Mahajanapada named Shurasenas. It is mentioned that it was situated along the river Yamuna, and its capital was called a Madura, which is currently known as Mathura. King Avanti Putra a disciple of Buddha has his mentions in the Buddhist texts. Mahabharata and the Puranas also refer about Mathura where the Yadav used to dwell.

Aska or Ashmaka: To the southern part of India and also known as Dakshinapatha, Mahajanapada was located on the banks of river Godavari. Ancient texts such as Ashthadhyayi, MarkandeyPurana, Brihat Samhita refer about the former location,but various accounts by Greeks on the other hand suggest that Aska mahajanapada was located in the North Western part of India. Near modern Bodhan, was situated it's then capital Potana or Podhana or Potali. In Mahabharat this place corresponds to Paudamya. The analytics of KautilyasArthshastra describe Asmaka as corresponding to present Maharashtra along the river Godavari. From some Jataka stories it can be figured out that in some point in history it had come under the influence of Kashi and achieved victory over Kalinga.

Avanti: Avanti is also one of the four powerful and renowned mahajanapadas of India besides Kosala, Vatsa and Magadh. It was located in the Malwa plateau of central India with theVindhyas splitting the territory in the middle into northern and southern halves. Ancient texts record that Mahishmati, currently known as Maheshwar and Ujjaini, now Ujjain were the capitals of thisJanapada in different points of time in history. These towns laid on the trade route connecting north and western coast of the country. It was also an important centre for Buddhist pilgrimage and studies. The name of king Pradyuta is often found being mentioned in ancient scriptures, texts or manuscripts as he had been involved inwars with the Kingdoms of Vatsa, Magadh and Koshala.Avanti in later years became part of Magadh Empire after its ruler Nandi Vardhana was defeated by king Shishunaga.

Figure 89The Great Stupa at Sanchi, Raisen district, MP

Gandhara: The mahajanapada of Gandhara existed in the areas of modern Peshawar and Rawalpindi district of Pakistan and extended up till the Kashmir Valley. It's capital Takshashila or Takshila was worldrenowned town as it was a centre for culmination of art, academics and trade.

Figure 90Taxila, Pakistan: Dharmarajika stupa

Mentions of king Pukku Sathi or Pushkarasarin during the sixth century BCE are seen in various ancient manuscript. the Behistun inscription of the Achaemenid emperorDarwis talks about Gandhara in conquered by the Persians.

Kamboja: Kambuja was situated on the northern mountain zone of the Indus basin at the valley of Kunar River. Kamboj and Gandhara are often associated together in ancient texts. Its territory can be traced back to Rajouri and Hazara districts of Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan and spread up to Kafiristan. Puranas does not mention about Kamboja and Arthashastra refers it as a Sangha and not as a kingdom.

UNIT 9: AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, TRADE AND URBANIZATION UNDER THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

Post the rule of different emperors in the Mahajanapadas and Alexander's invasion of India, the rule of the Maurya dynasty followed by the Gupta dynasty over pan India continued. In the South Indian kingdoms from 600 to 1293 AD the role of the Pallavas, ChalukyaRashtrakutas and the Cholas continued successively through the conflicts and alliances. Again, after the visit of Marco Polo in India, the history shows the dominance of various kingdoms in fragments. The Pala dynasty ruled Bengal and Bihar,

Figure 91 Expansion of Mughal empire through centuries, (Source: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/mughal-empire/)

theChandelasruled Bundelkhand, the Chauhan's ruled Rajasthan. Between 712 AD to 1280 the Arabs were frequently invading India along its western boundaries especially by Mohammad Ghori and Mahmood ofGhazni. The rule of the Delhi Sultanate began as QutubUddinAibak became the emperor. The slave dynasty ruled till the late 1200 for almost a century facing several Mongol invasions by Genghis Khan. Later the power shifted to the Khilji dynasty. During this time Alauddin Khilji invaded the western regions of Gujarat, Malwa, Ujjain and many more regions. He also attacked southern parts of India under the leadership of Mallikafur. Once the rule of the Khilji were over, theTughlaqs ruled large part of India from 1320 to 1398 AD.

Later the Lodhi's in Delhi, Farooqis in Khandesh, and many more dynasty's ruled different parts of the country. The Mughal rule began in 1526 by Babur and continued till 1857. The Empire extended over 95% of the present Indian territory. By 1530 it included parts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Balochistan, Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Ayodhya,Bihar, the entire Ganga Yamuna Doab region,Marwar and the Rajputana provinces. By1605 as can be seen from the map in figure 53, therewas expansion of the territory in all directions northern, eastern western parts which included Bengal, Orissa, Nepal, Ladakh, Gondwana, Malwa, Kutch, Berar and Khandesh. Allthese expansions were done during the reign of Akbar and also during the rule of Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb where parts of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra as well as Chhattisgarh came under the rule of Mughal Kingdom.

Agriculture

During the Mughal reign India flourished in several fields, itseconomy, art and craft, traderelations, manufacturing units developed. But detailed account of such growth is missing Except for those mentioned *Ai-ni-Akbari*. This book recorded in it all data related to the administrative system, the number of people involved in administration, military and warfare personals, their income and postings, revenues collected from cultivated land and manufacturing units, population during the time of Akbar and the land uses, the area of cultivated land, cultivable waste, land under habitation, tanks, canals used for irrigation, trade etc. Recent data were used to extrapolate and estimate the population, agriculture, production and revenues collected during the Mughal Era for which data were not

available. Many historians have attempted to estimate the population and the cultivable area based on the estimates of the 1900. According to them the Mughal period had witnessed a population of less than 60% of that of the 1900s and as a result they thought that the man to land ratio was much higher in the 1600s as expanding agricultural land and ownership was very high. They estimated that the cultivated land was 60% of the estimates of the 1900s. Ashok V. Desai in his research paper estimated that 64.9 to around 88.3 million must have been the population, whereas according to Shireen Mousni, the population during Akbar's rule was 108.4 million.*Ain-i-Akbari* wrote down the number of *zamindars*, cavalry and infantry based on the estimated population. The grandeur of the Mughal Kingdom and its army was maintained by revenues collected from the population who were mostly dependent on agriculture for their livelihood. In the form of share of agricultural produce, land revenue was collected. In some places the cultivators had to give one third of their agriculture produce where is another place it was half. *Zamindars*



Figure 92 A photograph of Ain-i-Akhbari, (Source: Royal Ontario Museum)



Figure 93 Farming in Mughal Painting (Source:christies.com)

and *Jagirdars*were allocated territories or *jagirs* from where they collected the revenues like that of tax collectors of present day. The extortion was ruthless, the farmers had to even buy their own produce at a much higher price as most of their production had to be compensated as revenues and there was hardly any left for their own subsistence. There was another system in practice which was known as the *zabt* system. The situation was worst as the poor farmers were cultivating course food grains and the effluent farmers were cultivating commercial cash crops. These commercial crops mostly included orchards of fruit that were consumed by the elite and were mostly imported from Central Asia and Iran and the new World Islands. The farmers and agriculture labourers were literally compelled to cultivate as a part of the legal obligation and they had to pay revenues in the form of produce. As a result, they have to borrow money from money lenders. Irrigation facility was not good and hence large tracks of fertile land remained uncultivated. *Zamindars* and *Jagirdars* also held hereditary rights by royal order and hence the level of extortion increased tremendously. Non-payment of revenue was often treated as an act of rebellion which led to expropriation, andenslavement and even death sentence. Towards the latter years of the Mughal rule, oftenagrarian community revolted and revenues had to be collected by force. The part of the surplus in agricultural production that were extracted

from farming community went is payment to the huge army of skilled servants and craftsman. They were paid will above their subsistence level. Administrative staff became reach elites or middle classes. The economy kept moving as these middle classes weregood earners.

The farmers tilled the ground and processed the crops indistinguishably different from other nations. They utilised wooden ploughs similar to the ‘foot ploughs’ employed at the time in England, and there was just one small iron tooth in the ploughshare, or none at all, it was because the ‘light grounds’ did not require the hefty iron coulter. Furthermore, the peasant used the seed-drill, a latecomer in European agriculture, and, in the case of some crops like cotton, even dibbling was practiced. Unfortunately, very little information on peasant fertiliser knowledge and use is available with us. Fish was utilised as manure around the coastlines.The ancient wisdom regarding crop rotation provided the peasant with a crucial tool for preserving soil fertility.



Cf. Irfan Habib, ‘Technology and Barriers to Social Change in Mughal India’, *Indian Historical review*, Vol. V, Nos.1-2, 1978-79, p.155.

Figure 94 Irrigation technologies available during Mughal period

The major sources of irrigation were wells and tanks. Water was lifted from wells into field canals using various techniques. The most basic instrument was the wooden scoop or *dhenkit*, which worked on the lever principle and was useful where water was near to the surface. The second most frequent method was *charas*, which included lifting water in a leather bucket linked to a rope dragged over a pulley wheel by an ox. The Persian wheel, to historians of technology, was the most advanced contraption.

Figure 95Nahr-i-Faiz in Chandni Chowk (Source: https://historyofolddelhi.blogspot.com/)

However, the machine's cost was probably out of reach of the poorer farmers. According to official figures from the year 1660 from Pargana Merta (Rajasthan), just 1.7% of the wells in that area had Persian wheels built over them. On the other hand, because the water-table was much closer to the surface in the seventeenth century, the number of wells per farmed area was probably much high. Tanks or reservoirs were key irrigation supplies in central India, the Deccan, and southern India. Archaeological artefacts witnessed the size of dams and the clever design of sluices for releasing water. The Madag Lake was no exception, nor was such elaborate irrigation lake development restricted to southern India. The Dhebar lake, 36 miles in circumference in Mewar, is described in the *A'in-iA.kbari* as supporting wheat growing in the surrounding

Figure 96A Persian dictionary, the Miftahu-l-Fuzala, describes the wooden hoe or digging stick (Ranba, Kuraz) as used in medieval India

land. Udaisagar and Rajsagarwere also similar examples.But often peasants too built their own reservoirs. In the 1650s, the Mughal administration proposed to cultivators in Khandesh and a section of Berar an advance of Rs. 40 to 50,000 for the purpose of creating bands or dams to provide irrigation. Numerous canals were cut from rivers in the northern plains, mainly in the Upper Gangetic and Indus basins, to provide irrigation. Shahjahan's *Nahr-i Faiz* was nearly 15 miles long, beginning at the Yamuna River's exit from the hills and meandering south-west, then south-east, to join the parent river at Delhi. Another canal, just under 100 miles long, diverged from the Ravi River and rejoined it near Lahore. Other canal remnants can be traced all the way down to the delta on the Indus plains.The Mughal canals, were weak in numerous ways: they did not usually extend above the surrounding plain, thus the water available for irrigation was restricted to what could be pulled out of them. The shift in the relative importance of canals may be measured by the fact that the *A'in-i Akbari* depicts agriculture in the subba of Lahore as being dependent on wells and makes no mention of canals in spite of their presence.An enormous range of food and non-food crops cultivated by Indian peasants was an important element of Indian agriculture.The *A'in-i Akbari* provides revenue rates for sixteen agricultural products of the rabi' (spring) harvest, and twenty-five crops of the kharif (autumn) harvest cultivated in all. According to a *khasra* (revenue record) of a hamlet in eastern Rajasthan from 1796, 9 out of 38 peasants cultivated more than five crops on their plots during the kharif season. Not only did the Indian peasant raise a variety of crops, but theywere also eager to accept new variety of crops. Tobacco and maize were introduced and expanded during the seventeenth century. They were both new world immigrants. Tobacco's quick spread was spectacular. Cultivation began on thewestern coast shortly after 1600, but by 1650, it had spread to practically every section of the Mughal empire.In a similar manner there are grounds to assume that sericulture, which was absent in Bengal before to the fourteenth century, expanded dramatically during the seventeenth century, transforming Bengal into one of the world's major silk-producing regions. Capsicum or chilli was introduced around the eighteenth century, because the poor did not previously have this inexpensive method of spicing their basic diet. Because the long and spherical pepper was so valuable, it could only have been utilised by the wealthy. Coffee had most likely just recently begun to be cultivated in southern Maharashtra; and tea was unknown. Sweet and regular potatoes were also introduced subsequently. The Mughal era saw some significant advancements in horticulture as well. The art of grafting stirred the curiosity of the aristocracy, and its usage

improved the quality of citrus crops and brought the sweet cherry to Kashmir. Although the Portuguese were successful in creating the well-known Alphonso grafted variety of mango, the practise of mango grafting doesn't appear to have spread to northern India until the seventeenth century. Three new fruits—the cashew nut, papaya, and pineapple—came from the New World. The guava arrived later.

Mughal India was able to clear a bigger tract of land than its successor because of its likely larger herd of cattle. The fact that Abu'l Fazl states that four bullocks, two cows, and one buffalo are the maximum number of tax-free livestock that may be kept per plough is important.

Figure 97A Scene of Seed Broadcasting from Baburnama

The economic stratification of the Indian peasantry resulted in significant disparities in the size of holdings, product gathered, and resources of the peasants within the same communities. There were the large peasants, or headmen, who "organised (cultivation under their own management)" on the one hand and on the other hand they used labourers as their employees and assign them agricultural duties.They gave them their predetermined salary, either in cash or grain, while claiming the gross harvest for themselves. They made the labourers plough, sow, reap, and bring water from the well. On the other end were the minor peasants, who, according to a document released by Aurangzeb, participated in agriculture but were "wholly dependent upon borrowing for their subsistence and for seed and cattle."



Figure 98Water lifting Device (Charasa) Scenes from Shahnamah

The cultivation of various crops was affected by the differences in the size of the peasants' holdings and his finances. Commercial or cash crops, like cotton, sugar cane,

indigo, betel leaf, opium, and, to a lesser extent, wheat, required frequent ploughing and watering, which necessitated a greater investment in cattle and wells, in addition to crop-specific infrastructure like sugar cane presses, boilers, indigo-vats, etc. This indicated that only the larger peasants (or small zamindars) could farm these crops. Compared to foodgrains, these crops had substantially larger returns. The extremely high rates of revenue per bigha that have been attributed to them reflect this.The geographic boundaries of the rice and wheat zone were still established by the climate and the magnitude of seasonal floods, suggesting that the geographical distribution of food crops had rarely changed. However, Bengal did practise some wheat farming.Cotton and indigo had to be grown practically everywhere in Mughal India since the transportation infrastructure prevented local specialisation. When one examines the whole amount of production of each crop after taking into account the geographical distribution of crops, there is essentially barely any data available. The only items for which some necessary quantitative information is accessible are indigo and silk.According to Tavernier's estimate (1640–1666), the yearly supply of silk in Bengal's main market, Qasimbazar, was between 2.4 and 3.1 million lb. Kashmir produced silk as well; it could be said that India produced 3 to 4 million pounds of silk annually.

Indian agriculture is infamously dependent on the monsoon season. The mortality in each severe famine, which was sometimes followed by plague, was terrible because there were inadequate ways for delivering grain in quantity. There are estimates that 3 million people succumbed in Gujarat during the famine of 1630–1632.5.2 million Deccan residents starved to death from famine during the years 1702–3 and 1703–4.

It could be plausible to rule out any dramatic expansion in the area under cultivation during the Mughal dynasty given the famines that frequently hampered agricultural productivity and the Mughal agrarian exploitation that put persistent pressure on the peasantry. It is evident that certain places, like the Terai or eastern Bengal, were recovered from waste or forest, but such reclamation did not stop the concurrent process of depopulation in other areas.

The monarch was frequently referred to as the "owner" of all land in India by European visitors throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because he explicitly gained what appeared to be the "rent" of the soil.*Mal* as it was known basically reflected the state's claim to a portion of the real harvest. Rent played a significant role in the Indian

economy; the Mughal tax was not technically rent or even a land tax. It amounted to a crop tax. Here, the harvested grain was simply divided, with one portion going to the revenue payer and the other set reserve for the state or its designee. *Kankut* appeared first. Here, the yield per unit of area during the current harvest was calculated and multiplied by the total area under the specific crop in order to determine the overall production of the crop, as opposed to actually dividing by the grain (*kan*). The amount of tax claimed might then be set in accordance with how much of the produce the tax was expected to cover. Akbar's regime attempted to make the rates reasonable, either by adjusting the local yield per unit area, getting around it at local costs, or using both methods, such that the *dasturu'l 'amals* start to exhibit significant local differences from 1565–66. Akbar conducted a number of significant actions in 1574–1575, including a fresh attempt to calculate revenue rates. For each place, data on yields, prices, and the area planted was compiled over a number of years, from 1570-1 through 1579-80. The provinces of Lahore, Multan, Ajmer, Delhi, Agra, Malwa, Allahabad, and Awadh were split up into revenue circles, with each having a unique schedule of cash revenue-rates *(dasturu'l 'amals)* for different crops.When one maps a crop's revenue rates across different revenue circles, they frequently reveal a geographic pattern that differs from both the administrative divisions and the patterns created by the revenue rates of other crops. Such disparity shows that the payment rates were determined after inquiries into the yields and pricing of each crop in the various areas, rather than by simple "rules of thumb." The *zabt* system nearly encompassed the whole area from the Indus to the Ghaghra under Akbar's rule. When Murshid Qulli Khan launched it in the Deccan at the end of Shahjahan's rule, it saw a significant expansion. The key component of his plan was to first create crop-sharing for a while in order to determine the yield per area for various crops in various districts, and then adjusting the government share in accordance with the crop as well as variables like natural or artificial irrigation. Then he calculated the cash rates, also known as *dasturu'l 'amah*. Crop-sharing was dominant over *zabt* in seventeenth-century eastern Rajasthan. Abu'l Fazl said that crop-sharing was common in suba Ajmer (Rajasthan) around 1595. Crop-sharing was popular for raising money in Kashmir and southern Sind, and it assumed the function of calculation in Gujarat towards the middle of the seventeenth century. Bengal distinguished apart from other provinces because it used the fixed demand system known as *muqta'i*. The income was collected in cash, at rates per parcel of land, or in lump sums covering entire villages; the same amounts were collected year after year, with the possibility of a

modification or improvement as a special measure. The proportions of the crop collected under the *bhaoli* or *kankut*varied according on the crops and regions, but it appears that the norm was around one-half in the less fertile places and significantly more in the more fertile areas. Despite the fact that the levies, imposts, and officials' fees included under these sections differed from locale to locality.It appeared that the total amount collected under the miscellaneous items may reach up to 25% of the land revenue. When Aurangzeb imposed the *Jiiya*, or poll tax, on non-Muslims in 1679, it was a brand-new burden. The *jiiya* was unquestionably a harsh burden because, even at its cheapest rate it was very discriminatory.It was equivalent to approximately a month's salary for an unskilled urban labourer. Crop-sharing had an automatic provision for harvest failure since, in the event of a meagre harvest, a predetermined part of the revenue share would be reduced.

To help the peasants purchase seed and begin farming, laws also required for the granting of loans known as *taqdvt*, or "strength-giving," which were often returned after harvest. To promote the use of waste land for agriculture, lower revenue rates were provided. That land income was typically collected in cash was indicative of the level of commercialization in Mughal India. There was an instantaneous conversion into cash at agreed-upon prices under *bhdoli* and *kankut* as well, where the income was essentially collected in kind. The grain amounts reported as revenue are always converted to cash, which is the form in which the money was really obtained. Only a few remote areas, such as Kashmir or Orissa, made their collections mostly in kind. In so far as incidence per area varies depending on the crop, rather than the size it might serve as an emblematic

illustration of a regressive tax because of the taxpayer's holding. Bigger landowners could pay less per unit of area if they are *zamindars*, headmen, or members of a preferred community. Thus, the tiny farmer bore the brunt of the financial load. Smaller peasants who cultivated the course foodgrains, which at best had a limited and local market, would find it harder to pay the revenue upon selling the produce than those who had the afford to raise cash crops. Mughal tax system had a tendency to undermine superior agriculture while widening the gap between the affluent and the poor in the countryside. The emperor was the only legitimate claimant to land revenue and other taxes, but in practise, members of a tiny ruling elite divided the money among themselves through a system of temporary alienations of the claim in certain regions (*Jagirs*). The people who held the *mansabs* or grades or ranks bestowed by the emperor made up the governing class. Each rank entitles its owner (*mansabdar*) to a specific amount of compensation (*talab*). Unassigned land was referred to as *khalisa*. Officials were responsible for collecting the revenues on behalf of the imperial treasury, which predominantly received its funding from this source. Few *mansab*-holders, including the Rajput, Baluch, and Ghakkar lords, belonged to the *zamindar* class. Although the *mansab*was not inheritable but it was often given to sons or relatives of higher *mansab*-holders, which led to the creation of whole families running the process through generations. By giving the *jagir* a character that was only transitory, the emperor's power was further increased. A *mansab*-holder had the right to a *jagir*, but not to a specific plot of land within it or to the same plot of land each year. It was also an unavoidable result of how the *mansab* system functioned. Periodically, the *mansabs* were changed to assign promotions or demotions. Each modification to the *mansab* necessitated a corresponding adjustment to the *mansab*-holder's *jagir*. As a result, a *jagirdar's* assignment did not grant him any ongoing rights. The Persian word *zamindar*, which means "keeper" or "holder of land" (*zamin)*, is a compound. The chiefs of Mughal India were still referred to as *zamindars*, but from Akbar's reign onward, the name started to be used more and more frequently for anybody having a hereditary right to a direct part in the peasant's production. When the *zamindar* in Bengal was asked to account for the payment of land revenue within the boundaries of his *zamindari*, it appears that he did so by collecting the land tax from the peasants at rates set by custom or by himself, and then paying the amount imposed on him by the government. On the other hand, throughout the greater portion of the Mughal empire, he was only required to collect the tax from the principal cultivators in exchange for a one-tenth allowance (*nankar*), which might be paid in cash or in the form of a grant of revenue-free land. If he disobeyed his duties, he would be permanently barred

from the property but would still get 10% of the land's earnings as *malikana*. In the past, caste or clan power was closely associated with the *Zamindars'* privilege. A locality's *zamindars* frequently belonged to the same caste. In its renowned "Account of the Twelve Subas," the *Ain-iAkbart* not only lists the *zamindaar's* caste or castes, but also the quantity of horses and foot labourers used by the *Zamindars* in each pargana. The *Zamindari* right was a piece of property in and of itself. It was passed down in accordance with the same rules and traditions that applied to the inheritance of other property. The saleability of the *Zamindari*privilege also allowed those who had amassed riches via the extraction of land income, such as revenue grantees and minor officials, to become Zamindars. An individual who purchases the rights of a village's peasants will then become the village's *zamindaar*. The Indian labourers, or peasants, gave the impression of being a homogenous group who were all struggling to survive in misery under rising persecution.There were huge farmers who raised crops for the market with hired labour, and there were also little peasants who could not grow enough food for themselves.

Industry

India's past as a manufacturing nation has been a subject of debate and analysis. Some argue that the country had an exceptional industrial sector in pre-colonial days, with an unending flow of precious metals from all over the civilized world in payment for its fine manufactures. This led to a leading manufacturing nation at least at par with pre-industrial Europe. However, this advantage was lost only after Europe achieved a revolution in technology, and her prospects of following suit were undermined through the intervention of colonial rule. The image of high economic achievement has been questioned by others, with Gibbon's description of the staples of oriental trade being held to be true of India's exports as well. The transport technology of the period was primitive and almost totally stagnant, leading to low productivity and stagnation in manufacturing output. Self-sufficiency, far from being an indicator of a high level of performance, simply reflected a weak articulation of exchange and hence reinforced a stagnation in manufacturing output. The double tyranny of a caste-based social system and a rapacious administration destroyed economic incentives and inhibited mobility. The trend in demand for manufactured goods was almost certainly upwards, with the population increasing very slowly over time by about 50% in two centuries. The inhibiting influence of a subsistence-oriented rural

economy was modified by the existence of a relatively prosperous rural elite, increased production of cash crops, and the general development of exchange stimulated by the collection of revenue in cash. The 3,200 *qasbas* mentioned in the *Tabaqat-i Akbari* are interalia evidence for an extensive rural demand for manufactured goods. Chronic poverty of the masses was the major constraint on demand in all pre-industrial societies. It is worth noting that all European travellers, no strangers back home either to the spectacle of poverty or to sharp contrasts between wealth and destitution, comment without exception on the grinding poverty of the Indian masses. Social habits rather than absolute poverty partly explain the patterns of consumption, such as scanty clothing and the minimal use of furniture and domestic utensils. Even if this were true, the net effect on demand would be the same. However, the masses were by no means uniformly poor. The affluence of regions like Bengal and particular social groups like the *Mogar* and *Mukkuvan*fishermen of Malabar who were “very rich” and owned large houses, farms, and ships, also contributed to the demand for imported items like salt, metal utensils, and weapons. In pre-modern societies, the basic demand for consumer goods centre around the three necessities for food, clothing, and shelter. A variety of manufactured foodstuffs, such as oil, butter, ghee, salt, and sugar, were among the staples of the inter-regional trade. Cooked food and sweets were in demand in all urban markets, and the sheer volume of market demand represented by the urban poor would have been enormous. Soldiers and retainers were elaborately attired in public, and the urban artisanal was almost invariably shown in simple tailored clothes and other items of dress. At the end, India’s past as a manufacturing nation has been a complex and multifaceted one, with various perspectives on the role of the industrial sector and the impact of colonial rule on the economy.


BIBLIOTHECA INDICA

THE TABAQĀT-I-AKBARĪ

KHWĀJAH NIZĀMUDDĪN AHMAD

CALCUTTA:

Figure 100Tabaqat-i Akbari

The mass demand for goods in India was relatively low for two groups of commodities: housing and domestic utensils. The majority lived in houses made of mud, thatching, or bamboo, while a few earthenware pots, scanty bed-clothes, and a flimsy bedstead or two



Figure 102Manufacturing in Mughal period

exhausted the list of household goods. Recent research suggests that there was a sizeable middle-income group, including lower ranks of the bureaucracy, professionals, holders of rent-free tenures, who constituted a proportionately large market for comfort and luxury goods. The *amirs'* capacity and the alleged *baniyas* ethic did have an inhibiting influence on the consumption pattern of the traders and professional groups. Tavernier speaks of the extreme parsimony of shroffs and all Indians in general, and describes how the *baniyas* accustom their children at an early age to shun slothfulness and learn the arts of acquiring

wealth. Freryer writes of the innate thrift of the Gentiles, *Baniyas* of the Hindu belief that the money concealed during life will prove beneficial to them after death. In the houses of some Agra merchants Manrique saw such vast sums of money piled up. Some observers noticed a difference in the standards of consumption as between affluent Muslims and their Hindu counterparts. The former could emulate the grandees' life-style because they were relatively free from extortion. The causes were probably more complex and evidently had much to do with the social habits of the community. The housing needs of the rich traders and the middle-income groups did represent a considerable market demand for the relevant skills and material, though here again the pattern was not uniform. In cities inhabited by large groups of traders and artisans like Lahore, Benares, Cambay, Sironj, Chanderi in Malwa, Agra the lofty stone houses of the Hindu merchants had the appearance of old castles buried in forests. In Delhi, the richer merchants lived like the nobles in imposing buildings within large enclosures. The lower orders of the bureaucracy in Delhi had dwellings with a tolerable appearance which were rarely made entirely of stone and brick. Furniture and utensils even in well-to-do homes were limited in variety. Quilts, mats, carpets, pillows covered with silk brocade, rather than furniture made of wood or other material, were mainly in demand, though bedsteads decorated with brass plates, jugs, metal pots, mirrors etc. also had functional as well as decorative uses. The celebrated Kashmir ware—bedsteads, trunks, boxes, ink-stands, etc.—were in demand in every part of India. In terms of dress, quality rather than variety seems

Figure 103Kashinath House, built in 1898 ADSonargaon, One of the oldest capital of Bangla. It is located near the current-day city of Narayanganj, Bangladesh.

Antique Prayer Rug, 18th Century Mughal. Probably from princely state of Kashmir. Source: Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000

to have distinguished the life-style of the rich from that of the poor. There were exceptions to this pattern, such as the Hindu traders at Agra going in for a fair degree of ostentation, using Kashmir shawls and shoes covered with silk-embroidered velvet. Elaborate tailored cloth and silk and brocade for men's dress are mentioned in our sources mainly in connection with Muslims, though the same types of dress were in vogue as 'formal' wear among well-to-do Hindus as well. Gold ornaments and jewellery were used in profusion by both men and women. At the end, the mass demand for goods in India was very low for housing and domestic utensils, with the majority living in houses made of mud, thatching, or bamboo. The Mughal revenue demand was estimated at 50% or more of the gross produce of the land, with the majority of these incomes going into hoarding. The Mughal harem was a continuous market-place where goods could be procured in the royal bazar accompanying the camp. The imperial household set the pace in conspicuous consumption, which all the grandees sought to emulate. The luxury of the nobles was scarcely described, with palace buildings made of fine material and appropriately furnished containing fine cloths, jewellery, decorations of velvet and brocade for the palaces as well as for the camps, carpets, bedstead, mirrors, gold and silver service, perfumes, a great deal of wine, equipment for horses and elephants including picket chains of beaten gold, magnificently decorated palanquins, and weapons (which were often works of art, wrought with jewels and precious metals). The demand for these items was enormous, with thousands of suits made up for Akbar every year. Abu'l Fazl had his entire wardrobe replaced annually, with all the old clothes being distributed among his servants. De Laet estimated the daily outlay at Agra at Rs.5,000 for the emperor's food and clothing and the cost of feeding the elephants etc. and another Rs. 30,000 for the harem.

Figure 104 Carpet and

Figure 106 The Mughal army

Moreland suggested that more money was spent on the stables than in any other branch of a courtier's household. The number of slaves and servants in the employ of the nobility was truly staggering. Each noble had three or four wives, and each wife had her own slaves, 10 or 20, or 100 according to her fortune. A noble's standard requirement, as indicated by Abu'l Fazl, included four men for each elephant, two or three per horse, a crowd in the kitchen, two crowds of tent-pitchers, etc. A large retinue always accompanied the nobles when they went outdoors. The line of demarcation between private and public demand is obscure in all pre-modern societies. The Mughal forts were as much the residences of the royalty as constructions essential for defence and day-to-day administration. The expenditure incurred by the imperial government and its functionaries created an enormous demand for construction work, road-building, arms, equipment for horses and elephants, camp equipment, and means of transport like palanquins, carts, boats, etc. The Mughals spent freely on the construction of the chief cities, and the nobles embellished Delhi at their own expenseto gain the monarch's favour. Charitable expenditure by the rich went into the construction of caravanserais, mosques, alms-houses, and hospitals. Shahjahan's building activities and the size of the army under Aurangzeb suggest an upward trend in the 'public' demand for goods and services. Where required commodities were produced in the imperial karkhdnas, the relevant market demand was for wage-labour rather than manufactured goods. All available evidence suggests that the inter-regional flow of commodities both by land and along the coast increased substantially during the Mughal period, leading to an expansion in the demand for manufactured goods. The grossly inequitable distribution of income both inhibited and stimulated this demand. The inland market for a range of basic consumer goods, such as cheaper textiles, manufactured foodstuffs, salt, some metalware, and building materials, was large in absolute terms and expanding. This was particularly true of textiles, which was further stimulated when European companies began to export in bulk coarse fabrics like the Negro cloth. The vast internal market for luxuries, heavily dependent on the amirs'

Figure 105 17th century Mughal (source: Architectural digest)

spending capacity, presumably followed the trends in the imperial finances. Foreign observers like Bernier who lament the destructive results of the nobles' rapacity for India's manufactures also note the variety, excellence, and profusion of the country's manufacturing output. However, it is unclear how far the political disturbances of the eighteenth century affected the domestic demand for these products. The text argues that the low purchasing power of the masses and the silence of sources regarding the manufacturing scene in extensive parts of the country suggest that despite the poverty of the masses, the aggregate demand was large and expanding. Cotton textiles were produced in every part of the country both for local consumption and distant markets. The bewildering variety of cotton fabrics mentioned in contemporary sources can be divided into a number of overlapping categories according to the criteria of classification used. They were produced as piece-goods or ready-made clothing (which involved littletailoring), calico, plain (i.e., unbleached), bleached and dyed or patterned, with patterns being produced on the loom with coloured yarns but more commonly printed with a wooden block or painted with a pen or stile. Th and Calcutta, and urban centres with a relatively affluent class of consumers. In some instances, availability of the relevant raw material was the determining factor. A major emporium like Hugli or Cambay attracted manufacturers of a wide range of commodities, including silk, sugar, opium, oil, butter, gunny, cotton cloth, carpets, quilts, tents, furniture, ivory, and cornelian. On the other hand, certain centers were famous for only one or two products, such as Srinagar for shawls and woollens, Jaunpur for woollen carpets, Kalpi for sugar candy, Alwar for glass, Lander for oils and perfumes. Specialization was carried much further, as fabric of every region having its peculiar qualities would not permit of their being packed in one and the same

Figure 107Akbar inspecting construction for his new capital Fatehpur Sikri, Akbarnama, 1603-5, Chester Beatty Library

bale. The increased localization and specialization were mainly a quantitative development, the expansion of one familiar feature of manufacturing organization to cater to an expanding market. However, the innovation in the Indian case was within the limits of a familiar circuit; whatever their potentialities, in themselves they did not mark any break with long-established patterns. The relative lack of dynamism was characteristically expressed in the very limited range of forms of organization. An interesting contrast is offered by Ming and Ch'ing China, where the silk industry occupied a position similar to that of the cotton-textile industry in Mughal India. The former made extensive use of wage-labour with the 'accounting houses' owned by wealthy merchants lending looms and materials to the artisans. The artisans ranged from the very affluent employing others to weavers who could not afford to own looms. In the mid-18th century, the rich

Figure 108A seventeenth-century painting depicting textile production

artisan appears to have been peripheral to the system of production, possibly even a late development linked to the growth of the market. The Parsee master-carpenter as shipwright employed hired labour. Virtually every relevant feature of the economy, society, and the state was designed to hold the artisan firmly down to his lowly place in the scheme of things, allowing very little scope for upward mobility or differentiation. Nearly every foreign observer spoke of the relentless tyranny suffered by the artisan, confirmed by indigenous accounts of the manner in which duties on manufactured goods were collected and literary references to extortions by even the village headmen. The whip and cudgel were freely used not only by nobles' minions but also by middlemen as well. Attempts on the part of the weaver or buyer to bypass the middlemen usually failed. The data provided in the A.'in for artisans' wages are probably good indicators, as they could vary from bare subsistence to a reasonable degree of comfort. Abu'l Fazl mentions a relatively high pay for jewellers and workers in precious metals, especially two groups of workmen — coin engravers and pearl-borers. Whether such artisans emerged as capitalist employers or independent artisans with enough capital to procure their expensive raw material, there is no direct evidence on the point: mercantile profit, a major source of high income which contributed to the upward mobility of artisans in Europe, was virtually absent in the Indian case. Mobility of any sort — beyond the movement of rural producers to the localized centres of production — appears to have been strictly limited. The major example of occupational mobility was from agriculture to weaving. In parts of southern India, several occupations – carpenters, braziers, goldsmiths, and stone-cutters – were included in the same caste-group allowing a certain degree of horizontal mobility. The instances of artisans moving from one region to another were few. The hold of tradition was characteristically reflected in the fact that the artisans' corporate organizations were not primarily economic in character but simply their caste organization which automatically excluded "outsiders."

Figure 109Indian Cotton Muslin (1770-1820)

The impressive edifice of India's manufactures rested on the labour of men and women who meekly pursued their hereditary occupations, with hardly any hope of a better life, exploited and abused by rulers and merchants alike. Sometimes, the worm did turn, and in 1630, at Baroda 'the weavers grew into a mutiny' against the English demanding that the latter should stop buying cotton yarn. The weavers of Baroda left the city in protest against the governor's tyranny. In 1686, the entire Indian population of Madras went on strike under the orders of the heads of castes to protest against a tax levied by the English. Such instances of resistance were rare and have to be read together with the fact that the use of the horsewhip by the merchants' servants was accepted as a normal fact of life by most artisans. The most significant innovations of the period were the growth of organizations involving the employment of large numbers of artisans. These were not typical, as the nature of the demand and economies of scale were not such as to favour large organizations. Even the typical large organizations were not set up to achieve any economies of scale. The technology which hardly made any use of fixed capital equipment or power also did not have much use for centralized production. The real reasons for setting up organizations employing up to several hundred workmen under centralized control are to be found. Employment of a body of workers under centralized control was also necessary in productive enterprises involving assemblage, such as shipping and construction work and in extraction industries. Techniques such as boiling or steeping - as in dyeing and processing of indigo, or refining saltpetre - also could benefit from such arrangements. Yet how atypical centralized or large organizations were can be gauged from the fact that even in such areas of manufacture the characteristic units of production were small or ad hoc, often both. Until the emergence of the Parsee shipwrights in the eighteenth century, the organization for shipbuilding appears to have consisted simply in getting the

Weavers at Work, beating cotton, dyeing thread, stretching yarn and working with treadles on loom (see pit-loom) (*c.* 1590). Johnson Album, India Office Library, London, Vol.8, No. 5. *Cf.* S.P. Verma. *India at Work in Sculpture and Painting*. Aligarh. 1994.

carpenters together and providing them with the raw materials when a trader wanted a ship built. In diamond mining, the mine workers were under the control of the local governor whom the fortune-seekers paid, while the governor provided the tools. At Kollur, a prospector might employ 200 to 300 miners, at Gollapalle near Bezwada ten to forty was the more usual number. Production for the market under centralized control employing wage labour developed as a characteristic feature of European Companies' procurement. They imported copper kettles and pans from Europe were superior to the local iron pans.Saltpetre refineries were set up by the Dutch at Hugh and Pipli and by the English at Ahmedabad. Similar establishments were set up for processing textiles, especially silk, and European experts instructed local artisans in particular techniques.

Figure 112Cannons were an important addition in sixteenth-century warfare. Babur used them effectively in the first battle of Panipat. (Source:NCERT)

In the time of Plassey, Armenian traders had similar silk-reeleries employing wage workers. Wage labour was widely prevalent in manufacturing activity in the A'in, but the employment of a large number of workers for important lines of production, like textiles, appears to have been confined by and large to European companies. As a form of organization, the small-scale family-based unit was not displaced from its position of primacy. The organization of manufacture in Mughal

Figure 111 Mughal Weaponry

India did not remain unchanged. A lot was happening but on a limited scale, and the sum total of new developments did not amount to a break with the past: continuity was still the dominant characteristic. However, the changes in organization were more basic than those in technique. Localization of manufactures, more than peripheral changes in the technology of silk production or saltpetre refining, accounted for the undoubted growth in output. The limited changes in organization performed the role of technological development, but these were not dramatic enough to induce any dramatic change in productivity. Contrary to popular assumptions, the rates of saving in pre-industrial societies were not uniformly low. In the case of Mughal India, the massive expenditure on roads, monuments, fortifications, and equipment of the army as well as the immense liquid assets of merchants and nobles suggest that the surplus over the consumption needs of the population accounted for a high percentage of national income. This is especially true considering that an agricultural technology which was backward compared to that of Europe, China, or Japan around the same period, implied a correspondingly low level of output. The potentialities of savings in Mughal India, with its high concentration of income in the hands of a small section of the population, were probably greater than in Europe. However, the life-style of the nobility with its heavy emphasis on conspicuous consumption acted as a brake on savings. The artisanate, with hardly any access to mercantile profit and poor remuneration for high skills, had very little savings. Whatever the ratio of savings to national income, savings did not equal investment. Limited opportunities for productive investment, absence of institutions for channelling savings into production, and the fact that savings accumulated mainly in the hands of social groups—nobles and traders—not involved in productive activities, inevitably converted a large proportion of savings into hoarding, which offered a measure of economic security in situations of political uncertainty. Manufactures accounted for a mere fraction of capital investment, which mainly went into irrigation, roads, fortifications, urban housing for the well-to-do and the merchants' working capital. The structure of

Figure 114Women carrying loads

demand and the technology of manufactures severely restricted the possibility of capital formation in the manufacturing sector. The capital generated from the artisan's own savings and the advance in cash and kind provided by the merchant in the commercialized sector of production were predominantly in the nature of working capital. Our information regarding the relative magnitude of inventories is inadequate. The artisan himself does not appear to have kept any goods in stock. The fact that European Companies needed to specially order their supplies, generally through middlemen, was no doubt partly due to this lack of inventories, though the special characteristics of their requirements with their emphasis on standardization also necessitated such an arrangement. The vast amounts of liquid assets held by merchants at any given time were in effect a form of hoarding, as they represented so much savings kept away from circulation and productive investment. Even the two major forms of large-scale enterprise—shipping and mining—involved very limited investment of capital. In the Golconda diamond mine areas, any merchant adventurer could "purchase a piece of land... but at dearer rates," paying as much as 8,000 to 20,000 *pagodas* for a small plot of land. However, Streynsham Master, a more dependable authority, wrote that Those that employ the miners do not buy the ground, as some have reported, but secured a license from the governor, paying 3 to 5 pagodas per month according to the number of labourers employed. The flourishing shipping industry did not involve any capital formation in the shape of large dockyards or plants but was based on ad hoc organization using the skilled labour which was attracted by the growing demand and which settled in the neighbourhood. Thus, labour remained the chief input with working capital partly provided by the merchants playing a crucial role

Figure 113Life at the court of the King of Golconda, including the fabled diamond mines, from 'La galerieagreable du monde (etc.). Tome premier des IndesOrientales.', published by P. van der Aa, Leyden, Leyden, c. 1725

wherever the artisan's resources were inadequate in relation to the market demand. The flow of bullion in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not generate any mobility of capital or a downward trend in interest rates. Capital was concentrated in the major trading areas, especially Gujarat, and interest rates were much higher elsewhere without causing a flow of resources to the capital-scarce regions. All in all, capital, especially in its fixed and tangible forms, was relatively unimportant in India's manufactures. One advantage and perhaps a raison d'etre of this situation was that wars and famines did not have any very long-term effects on Indian manufactures. In striking contrast to India's pre-eminence as an exporter of manufactured goods, her technology was remarkably backward in comparison with the other advanced civilizations of the period, especially western Europe and China. Her world-famous textiles were produced without the aid of multi-spindle wheels known to China from at least the early fourteenth century, and her seagoing vessels were devoid of virtually all modern nautical instruments with the probable exception of the astrolabe. India's shortcomings in fuel resources, metallurgy, and chemical industries effectively blocked any prospect of wide-ranging technological development. Even such elementary objects as screws with proper grooves essential for most mechanical processes were not produced. Watermills and windmills, were in use for centuries not only in China but also in neighbouring Iran, were peripheral to the technology of the period. Despite its contact with both Europe and China and its knowledge of block-printing, this highly literary culture showed no inclination to replace the copyist by the printing press. In certain lines of production, a measure of sophistication had been achieved despite the dominant non-mechanical bias and the basicsimplicity of Indian technology. The one "heavy industry" of the period, the manufacture of cannon and hand guns, was technologically the most advanced. In the sixteenth century, India produced the heaviest cast of bronze cannons, the most famous being the Malik Maidan 12 feet 4 inches in length. Both matchlock and flintlock were manufactured for the



Figure 116 Types and features of Jajmani system

imperial arsenal in the seventeenth century. BJ-rockets made simply of bamboos, with iron cylinders containing combustible material, anticipated and inspired the first European rockets of the early nineteenth century. India's manufacturing sector during the Mughal period was characterized by a high level of innovation and development. Water- and wind-power were not widely used in the Deccan, but watermills were used with greatingenuity in the north-western district of Hazara to manoeuvre a wooden trip-hammer for milling rice. The technology in India's most developed manufacturing sector, textiles, was no doubt surprisingly simple, yet it was superior to its European counterpart. Indian craftsmen had discovered techniques unknown to Europe at the time. The popular impression that Indian technology was altogether stagnant also does not conform to facts. In more than one important area of manufacture, the Indian artisan showed a remarkable capacity for imitative innovation. The most striking development along these lines was the production of European-type shipping in the second half of the seventeenth century. The only Indian involvement in the production of this type of shipping was sheathing 'with boards of this country'. In the manufacture of armaments, very probably the flintlock was a development of the late seventeenth century, as was the production of

Figure 117Whiteway Laidlaw department store (estd.1905)

heavy cannon. Aware of their technical backwardness mainly due to their failure to develop cast-iron, the Mughals attempted, apparently without success, to recruit European gun founders. A technique of casting iron for the production of anchors, though these were ‘not so good as those made in Europe’. In textiles, according to Streynsham Master, the manufacture of carpets on upright looms was introduced in Andhra by Persian immigrants in the sixteenth century. The labour-saving technique of colour printing with wooden blocks was also probably a seventeenth-century innovation. Methods of silk-reeling in Bengal were improved under the guidance of European experts at the instance of the Dutch and English companies. A level of manual skill which bordered on the fantastic served as a substitute for sophistication of techniques and instruments. European observers never ceased to marvel at the ‘matchless ingenuity’ of the Indian artists, generally ‘destitute of tools’ who in many things could out-do all the Ingenuity of Europe. This high level of excellence was particularly noticeable in all branches of the textile industry, but was also noted with admiration in connection with such diverse areas of manufacture as jewellery, objects made of steel, excellent muskets and flocking pieces, and shipping. It has been suggested that this excessive development of manual skill in combination with the rudimentary character of the tools used, implied a low level of productivity. However, the objects produced by the skilled artisans included a wide range of luxury articles of great value, and any assessment of productivity would need to take into account not merely the volume but the value of the output. While there were institutional and economic factors which inhibited increase in output, the Indian artisan

Figure 118 Use of canons in Mughal warfare

was at least not subject to the European-type gild restrictions which forced production to move to the country to meet the demands of an expanding market. The characteristic weakness of Indian manufactures as a potential 'growth sector' in the economy was a lack of standardization and emphasis on quick turnover to produce cheap goods. Domestic demand did not call for standardization, and when this was seen as the requirement for the European market, the weaver adjusted his looms accordingly, albeit with some reluctance. In India, the pressure of necessity was not insistent, as technology had been devised through centuries of experimentation that could comfortably supply the demands of both domestic and foreign markets. The demand for India's manufactures experienced no pressure of competition, and the bulk of the production was geared to the reciprocal arrangements of the rural caste organization. India enjoyed the position of a monopolist in her export markets, which did not expand with dramatic suddenness. The nature of the demand itself favoured excessive specialization accommodated within the social system through a proliferation of occupational castes and sub-castes. Even the demand for textiles in the south-east Asian market was so specialized that particular varieties were supplied only by the weavers of certain Indian villages. Both the psychology and economics of such a system would be averse to labour-saving, mechanical means of production, best suited to turning out cheap standardized goods. Such a system would also necessarily generate a certain degree of changelessness, though in an otherwise vigorous economy this can never be absolute. There was a measure of rigidity about the hereditary character of the occupations which affected the Moslem artisans as well. Exceptions to this pattern do not appear to have been quantitatively significant. Lack of mobility had a spatial dimension as well. Migration of artisans appears to have been confined within limited areas or induced by extreme calamity, though one does occasionally come across a different pattern, like the migration of weavers from Sind to Bombay or the practice of placing surplus trainees from the imperial *karkhanas*of the nobles and the Rajas all over the country. The view that there was no resistance to innovation also cannot be accepted with qualification. In terms of innovation, the Indian workman living on the margin of subsistence had hardly the means to undertake it. He had no incentive to do so, as they were only 'nominally free', their status being very little different from voluntary slavery.

TRADE

The production and distribution of economic goods in India were based on the co-existence and inter-penetration of subsistence and commercialized sectors. As the majority of the population lived in villages, their needs for goods and services were satisfied through production for use and a network of reciprocal obligations. Exchange accounted for a relatively small proportion of economic activity, but the exchange of goods was impressive in its magnitude and complexity. Surpluses and deficits necessitated multi-tiered and multi-faceted commercial activity. The rural market was a feature of the intra-local trade of the period. Even in the smallest villages, rice, flour, butter, milk, beans, vegetables, sugar, sweetmeats, dry and liquid, can be procured in abundance. In large villages, usually under a Muslim official, sheep, fowl, and pigeons were on sale, while in exclusively Hindu villages, one could find only flour, rice, vegetables, and milk. It was not necessary that those who traveled in India should provide themselves with food beforehand, as other travellers confirm this account of abundant food purchasable everywhere. In Bengal, the good raja or zamindar was expected to establish markets for the periodic hat. Streynsham Master noted that in some places there were two, three or more market days in a week. A distinction was made



*Figure 119*Major routes and ports, seventeenth century

between bazaars, which were mainly retail markets, and the mandis, or wholesale markets, in the countryside. The Bengali literary sources provide a much more extensive and varied list of commodities offered for sale in these markets. The intra-local trade of towns and cities was necessarily more complex and varied than that of the countryside. Most major towns had several markets or bazaars, one of which was the chief or ‘great’ bazaar. At Surat, for instance, between the custom house and the mint was a crowded Busbar of all those who came to sell and buy cloth. The inter-local trade, both the country to town and inter-town flow of commodities, was essentially a short-distance version of the interregional trade. Villages around a town were often described as being dependent on the latter, implying primarily an administrative relationship. The economic ties between town and country were no less strong, with the collection of revenue in cash generation a pressure to sell. A striking feature of the inter-local trade was the extreme responsiveness of food supply to market demand. All major urban centers had abundant supply of food, a large part of which necessarily came from outside. Different types of “producers’ goods” featured prominently in the inter-local exchange of commodities. Raw material for textile manufacture in the towns - cotton, wool, silk cocoons, as well as dyestuff - necessarily came from the countryside. The volume of trade along the land routes accounted for a high proportion of the total. While virtually every part of the sub-continent contributed to this commerce, it was clearly dominated by certain regions. The trade in foodstuff and a wide range of textile products, some of which cannot be described as luxuries, were the most important components of the inter-regional trade of the period.The Mughal period in India was marked by a significant shift in the trade patterns and economic landscape. Rice from Bengal and Orissa to Coromandel was primarily exported due to its relative cheapness, with parts reaching southern Coromandel, a deficit area. Gujarat, with its large manufacturing and commercial sector and famine-prone agriculture, was the chief importer of foodgrains. The region received its supply of wheat and coarser grains from Malwa, Rajputana, and northern India via Agra, rice from the Deccan and even Gondwana, and by sea from Malabar. The trade in foodstuffs included butter and oil, butter, sugar, salt, rock-salt, and cotton textiles, all of which were exported to other parts of the country. European traders procuring textiles frequently noted that their purchases accounted for a mere fraction of the total trade, with the bulk being bought up by Indian and other Asian merchants for other parts of the sub-continent and the overland trade to west and central Asia. The inter-regional trade in Bengal during the Mughal period was characterized by intense competition

between traders from north India and other countries, making it difficult for them to procure silk. Bengal also imported large quantities of cotton, dyestuffs, indigo, and chay roots, which were essential for the textile industry worldwide. India was self-sufficient in iron, with the Gwalior mines being used to produce numerous articles sent to the principal cities of the Mughal empire. The Malabaris imported a quantity of this metal from Bhatkal, while saltpetre was produced in abundance in Agra and Patna and sent down the river to Bengal, which was the principal emporium for its export trade. Data on the trade in diamonds, especially from the Golconda mines, are also plentiful. A variety of miscellaneous items entered into the inter-regional trade of the period, including Malabar's trade in pepper and spices like ginger, cardamom, radix china, and wild cinnamon. Merchants from Bijapur and the Carnatic procured pepper at Cochin and Cananor, while spices, areca-nuts, coconuts, and palm candy were regularly carried in Malabar ships or by Chetti merchants to Coromandel, the Konkan Coast, and Gujarat.

Figure 120MaginiMogolis Imperium (Great Mughal Government), 1640, Willem/Joan Janszoon Blaeu, © Sarmaya Arts Foundation. (2021.12.5)All along the highways of medieval commerce in the Subcontinent, from the Eurasian Silk Road to the historic Grand Trunk Road, lay a series of rest-stops and inns where caravans of travellers, pilgrims and traders could break their journey. These were called caravanseraisor simply sarai.

The trade between Malabar and Gujarat mainly trade in pepper for opium and cotton was disrupted when the Dutch established a monopoly over the pepper and opium trade. Bengal received a quantity of opium from Bihar and some tobacco from Masulipatan, and tobacco was produced in abundance at Burhanpur, evidently for export to other regions. The likely increase in population would suggest an increased demand for foodgrains and other foodstuffs unless the increase was concentrated in the food-exporting areas. European companies' trade accounted for a mere fraction of the output and export in any given center of production. Moreland's view that commodity prices in India remained remarkably stable down to the 16th century has been challenged by more recent research. Evidence that foodgrain prices increased very substantially in Hindustan, the Punjab, and Gujarat is incontestable. However, Moreland's view that silver imports had an inflationary effect on food prices in Bengal has also been disproved, as the export of foodgrains from Bengal to traditional markets along the east coast, Gujarat, and regions far outside India's boundaries shows no sign of decline after the alleged equalization of prices.The overland route from Agra to Patna was an important part of the Mughal trade network, connecting remote parts of India to major highways. There were alternative routes that connected much of the interior region to these main

Figure 121A vortex of streets lead to the Mughal-era Sarai Mirzathat has existed for the past 323 years.(Source: Hindustan Times)

highways, such as Sir Thomas Roe's eastern route from Surat to Burhanpur and on to Mandu, which went through Dhar, Jalor, and Chitor on his way to Ajmer. In western Rajasthan, this route went through Mewar instead of Marwar. Other roads connected Golconda to Goa, the diamond mines, and, through Gendikota, to Madras. The Dabul-Goa route went some distance into the interior of the country where it linked up with the Goa-Bijapur road. The Masulipatam-Paliacatta route hugged the coastline most of the way, passing through Nellore. The evidence on trade routes strongly suggests that there was an elaborate infrastructure to facilitate the growth of an integrated market covering extensive parts of Hindustan, Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Malwa, and the Deccan, both east and west. The link with regions further south was maintained mainly along the coast, as production for distant markets in the region was heavily concentrated in coastal zones. The trunk routes were evidently served by branch roads which went deep into the country. The network of trade routes does not prove that a national market had emerged but their alignment does indicate the extent to which places in the deep interior, and not merely a few major emporia or centres of luxury production, were involved in the interregional exchange of commodities. India's commerce of peace and security was extraordinarily high in parts of the country. In Golconda, for instance, a person with goods or money travelled in perfect security with a governor's Map (signet-stamp) on his wrist. Post-Aurangzeb's death, political insecurity plagued many parts of the empire, particularly Gujarat, which suffered heavily from the Maratha inroads. Even during the worst years of the anarchy, trade evidently adjusted itself to the lowered level of peace and security, as evidenced by the persistently low rate of insurance. The Mughal India economy was marked by a paradox, with the majority of people consuming their own produce or secured from their neighbours based on customary arrangements. Most people were involved in exchange as both producers and consumers, with a significant proportion of agricultural produce being given as revenue. This led to a massive extraction of revenue, which the Mughals succeeded in better than their predecessors. The range and volume of exchange were correspondingly greater, with producers having limited scope for buying anything. The organization of trade at all levels was sophisticated and complex, with both inland and foreign trade being dynamic and changing. The increasing demands of commerce, both inland and overseas, were met comfortably within the existing structures of trade and manufactures. No basic innovations occurred, and the country's traditional commercial organization remained impressive.

Foreign trade

The Mughal Emperors were keen on trading and encouraged trade by offering concessions to merchants. Custom levies were imposed on goods transported between



Figure 122 International trade Routes

places, with rates ranging from 2% to 5%. Aurangzeb imposed separate transit taxes for different groups, with a fixed rate of 2½ for Muslims, 5% for Hindus, and 3½ for foreigners. Articles valued less than 52 rupees were exempted. Despite the Emperor's instructions, merchants were often charged more than prescribed customs. Foreign merchants complained about custom dues, and the English and Dutch obtained farmans for exemption but were made to pay duties at custom-houses. Autonomous chieftains also levied customs and duties on goods passing through their territories. Another tax, called rahdari or transit tax, was collected on goods passing through various territories. Although the amount at each place was small, the cumulative charge became heavy. Even zamindars collected tools on goods passing through their territories. According to contemporary accounts, rahdari was considered illegal but large amounts were collected from merchants and traders. The

policy regarding these taxes changed periodically, with some items being exempted during certain periods. For example, Jahangir abolished customs on trade with Kabul and Qandahar, while Aurangzeb abolished tolls and taxes on food stuffs during his accession in 1659.India has a long history of maintaining trade relations with other countries, with the 16th and 17th centuries being particularly significant. The Europeans brought a significant aspect of foreign trade to India, increasing its exports of Indian goods. The main exports were textiles, saltpetre, and indigo, along with sugar, opium, spices, and other sundry commodities. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the main purchasers of Indian cotton textiles were the Mughals, Khorasanis, Iraqis, and Armenians who carried them to Central Asia, Persia, and Turkey. The Dutch and English concentrated on Indian textiles from the 17th century onwards, with the main varieties of cotton fabrics being baftas, Samanis, calico, Khairabadi and Dariabadi, Amberty and Qaimkhani, and muslin. Other important items of export included chintz or printed cotton textiles, carpets from Gujarat, Jaunpur, and Bengal. Saltpetre, an essential ingredient for making gunpowder, was in high demand in Europe, and the Dutch and English started exporting it from Coromandal in the 17th century. Indigo for blue dye was produced in most of northern India, with large quantities exported to the Persian Gulf and Aleppo markets from Lahore. The Portuguese started its export around the last quarter of the 16th century. Europe’s demand for dyeing woollen cloths was large, and the Dutch and English started exporting it in the 17th century. Merchants from Persia purchased it for Asiatic markets and Eastern Europe, while the Armenians also bought substantial quantities. A large number of other commodities were exported from India, including opium, Bengal sugar, ginger, turmeric, ginger, and aniseed (saunf). Large-scale trading operations were conducted between the ports of Gujarat and the Indonesian archipelago, where cotton textiles were taken in bulk to Indonesia and spices were brought in return. Brightly colored cotton cloth and chintz from India were in great demand, and a large part of this trade was later taken by Coromandal. Imports from India were limited to select commodities, such as silver, copper, lead, mercury, silk, porcelain, wine, carpets, perfumes, cut glass, watches, silver utensils, woollen cloths, and small weapons from Europe. Horses from Central Asia were also imported in large numbers for military uses, with the state being the main purchaser. India also had trade relations with its immediate neighbors in the hill kingdoms, such as musk from Nepal and Bhutan, borax from Tibet and Nepal, iron, and foodgrains supplied in return to these hill regions.The Portuguese arrival in the Malabar coast of India in the late

fifteenth century marked a significant turning point in history, with the Portuguese claiming to be the Lord over conquests, navigation, and trade with Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India. Two essential conditions for the success of the Portuguese plan were a clear naval superiority over Asian ships and the establishment of a few key outposts on land acting as strategic bases for the naval fleets and men left in charge of the trading operations. The Portuguese onslaught towards a realization of this goal began with the bombardment of Calicut in 1502, when it became clear that its king, the Zamorin, was not prepared to co-operate in expelling Muslim traders from his port. Calicut's natural enemy and rival on the Malabar Coast, the Raja of Cochin proved more pliable, and the first Portuguese fort on Indian soil was constructed in his territory during 1503. However, it wasn't until the capture of the island of Goa from the Sultan of Bijapur in 1510 under the governorship of Alfonso de Albuquerque that the foundation of the future Portuguese maritime empire in the Indies was truly laid. Over the coming years, other fortified settlements and trading stations were added to the list, such as Sao Tome de Meliapor on the coast of Coromandel, Hugh and Chittagong in Bengal, Macau on the estuary of the Pearl River in China, and Colombo in Ceylon. For over a century, since 1506 when Dom Manuel turned the spice trade of Lisbon into a crown monopoly, the Portuguese sought to preserve their exclusive trade and empire in Asia through an undisguised exercise of sea-power. However, their efforts to turn the flow of pepper and finer spices through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean were ineffectual in the long run, and after 1550, there was a revival of prosperity for the overland caravan trade bringing many low-bulk high-value commodities of India and the further east to the Mediterranean ports of the Levant. There is now a general consensus among historians that from the very beginning the Portuguese discovery of the Cape route to India was accompanied by a determination to place coercive methods before those of normal peaceful commerce. Long-distance trade, in its Asian context, was an object of interest to indigenous rulers and governments primarily for the revenue they could derive from taxing the merchants. From the latter's point of view, the levies and tolls paid to the political authorities were necessary items of expenditure, incurred in order to secure protection. Protection at an inter-regional level was not free, and the whole institutional practice may be described under the term "redistributive enterprises." Therefore, the Portuguese arrival in the Malabar coast marked a significant shift in history, with the Portuguese claiming to control exclusively the sea routes and maritime trade of land-based states and empires of Asia. This new concept of redistributive enterprises played a crucial

role in shaping the development of the Portuguese commercial aims in India. The Portuguese navy played a significant role in the redistributive enterprise of the Indian sub-continent, with the prosperity and wealth of Portuguese capital in the Indies heavily dependent on the revenue earned through this enterprise.. Golden Goa had a considerable inter-Asian trade of its own, and the Portuguese crown had the choice to eliminate its competitors by undercutting their prices in Europe or restrict its supplies at the level where Portuguese prices matched those of Levant traders, being determined by the latter's transport costs and payments for protection en route. This led to the survival of caravan routes in this period, with crown profits fixed by protection costs on the caravan routes. In the seventeenth century, both the Dutch and English merchants began organizing exploratory voyages to the Indies, driven by the decline in naval and military strength of the Iberian powers and increasing commercial confidence of maritime nations of Atlantic Europe. The foundation of the English East India Company in 1600 and the merger of various separate Dutch companies trading with the East Indies under one single organization, were con many artisan villages depended on overseas outlets, among which were those of Indonesia and the Spice Islands, the Indian exports were paid for by the latter's economic surplus. Indian consumption of pepper and spices made the Indonesian trade a lucrative one for merchants in both directions. Therefore, the redistributive enterprise of the Indian sub-continent was crucial



Figure 124 Areas of Dutch dominance

for the growth and prosperity of Portuguese capital in the Indies. The Dutch and English companies in the Indian Ocean played a significant role in the development of Indian commerce, with both companies promoting direct trade with Europe. The Dutch and English methods of trade in the Indian Ocean incorporated a much greater degree of mercantile and economic spirit than the Portuguese. They also sought to strengthen and recreate the old monopolistic share of Asian trade for each European trading company and secure special fiscal privileges, thus reducing the burden of redistributive enterprises. In 1605, one of the Dutch factors, Van Soldt, had visited the port of Masulipatam, where he obtained *farman* from the King of Golconda, allowing the Dutch to establish a factory in Masulipatam and granted them a much lower rate of duty. The VOC's (Dutch east India company) early factories in south India should have been located in the delta between the Krishna and the Godavari rivers, as it was a region famous for the weaving and painting, exported in such large quantities to Bantam, Achin, Malacca, and even as far afield as Manila. However, increased familiarity with the economic conditions of Carnatic brought with it an awareness that much cloth was produced further south and that the finer chintz could be purchased much cheaper in the areas under the milder rule of Vijayanagar than that of Golconda. The establishment of a proper trading factory at Surat took the Dutch much longer to achieve in the north.

Figure 123 East India company logo

Figure 125 William Hawkins

The Portuguese political influence in the imperial court of the Mughals made it hazardous for the Protestant trading companies to enter into regular and extensive commercial transactions at the Mughal port without proper diplomatic safeguards.One of the officials of the Dutch Company, Philip Lucasz, considered the Portuguese cloth sales in Malacca as damaging to the trade of the Company. To strike a decisive blow against this trade, it was necessary to conquer Malacca, besiege Goa, and patrol the Coromandel Coast. The second element in Dutch policy was the capture of the cinnamon trade of Ceylon and the elimination of the Portuguese pepper factories in Malabar. From 1636 for ten successive years, Goa was blockaded every trading season. Malacca fell in 1641, after a determined resistance, and the policy of conquest reached its final fruition with the conquest of Colombo and Cochin (1659—63). Thus, the Dutch and English companies played a crucial role in the development of Indian commerce and trade. Their strategies and tactics were influenced by their strategic objectives and the changing circumstances of the Indian subcontinent. The English East India Company (EOC) faced two major problems in the pepper and spice trade. Firstly, the Dutch were not prepared to admit rivals, and secondly, the home market was too small for profitable operations. Military dangers from the Portuguese and Dutch made it necessary to equip and dispatch a fairly large fleet of ships to the Indies. This led to the tremendous glut of pepper in England in 1603 when the returning East India fleet brought back practically nothing but pepper. To address these issues, the EOC extended trading relations to the ports of India, diversifying its exports from Asia and optimizing profits by securing a secondary line of trade goods for sale in the eastern islands. This sequence of events led to the rise of an active re-export trade in Europe and the establishment of trading posts in Gujarat, the Coromandel Coast, and eventually in Bengal. The earliest plan for approaching Surat and the Red Sea to explore trading prospects was drawn up in London in 1607 when the Third Voyage was being prepared under the command of Captain Keith and William Hawkins. Although the latter succeeded in reaching Surat two years later and spent several years in the court of Emperor Jahangir, the early English efforts to gain a foothold at the Mughal port were not very successful. It was only after the arrival of Thomas Best, the commander of the Tenth Voyage, in 1612 with three ships, that the Company’s factors finally managed to obtain an imperial edict granting formal trading rights.

URBANISATION UNDER MUGHAL EMPIRE

The urban population of Mughal India during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was predominantly agrarian, with only a small minority familiar with urban patterns of living. However, the urban population of Mughal India possessed an economic and cultural significance far exceeding its actual size. Under the Mughals, cities and towns fulfilled diverse and overlapping roles, including manufacturing, marketing, banking, entrepreneurial activities, intersections in a network of communications by land and water, and local commerce, resources, and consumer needs. The largest urban centres were thriving centers of manufacturing and marketing, banking, and entrepreneurial activities, which crossed and recrossed the sub-continent and extended far beyond to south-east Asia, the Middle East, western Europe, and elsewhere. In a contracted network of regional or sub-regional markets, smaller urban centres performed a more modest role in relation to local commerce, local resources, and local consumer needs. European travellers noted the activity and prosperity of the urban centres, especially those most heavily engaged in weaving and ancillary crafts inseparable from the manufacture of textiles. However, their commercial and manufacturing roles alone did not account for the importance of the cities in the economic and cultural life of the period. A number of metropolitan cities derived their prosperity partly from their role as political centres and administrative headquarters, as capitals of the empire or at least temporary residences for a peripatetic court. Some cities and towns had a sacral significance that complemented or transcended their economic or political importance, as was the case with Benares or Nasik, or on a much smaller scale, Ajmer. Above all, the cities and towns of the sub-continent served as repositories of higher culture and learning, both as reservoirs in which were preserved the Sanskritic and Indo-Islamic ‘Great Traditions’ and as conduits through which those traditions could be transmitted to society as a whole. There are four distinct types of urban centres: those whose prime function was administrative and where other roles, such as manufacturing or sacral, were of secondary importance to, and partly dependent upon, the primary role. These include Agra, Delhi, Lahore, Hyderabad, Fyzabad, Patna, Ahmadabad, Benares, Mathura, and Khairabad and Daryabad in Awadh. The urban history of the Mughal empire has not received the attention it deserves, but source material for future research is both extensive and varied. Contemporary European writers on India often focused on commercial matters, observing conditions prevailing in cities and towns mainly concentrated in

commercial and manufacturing activities rather than the countryside. Despite the uneven quality of sources available to the urban historian of Mughal India, there is a lack of demographic data or statistical data of any kind. Instead, there are merely contemporary estimates based on probability rather inadequate information provided by generally unknown informants. Some points to consider include the golden age of urbanization, which occurred in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and part of the eighteenth century, as well as the rate of growth and the degree of prosperity within a general framework of urban growth and urban prosperity. Some centres prospered more than others, particularly those that could benefit from river communications and access to new and important markets of the down-river and coastal ports that fed the insatiable European demand for Indian goods. The period between the Panjab and Bihar in north India was marked by a steady shift in urbanization from west to east, possibly reflecting the situation throughout north India as a whole during the Mughal period. Four generalized observations can be made: (1) the area between the Yamuna and the Sutlej as well as the Yamuna-Ganges Doab seems to have attained a high level of prosperity during the early Delhi sultanate, as indicated by the assignment of iqtd's in this area to pivotal political figures; (2) a similar concern with this area, especially the Doab, is characteristic of the early Mughal period; (3) but during the seventeenth century, the western and central parts of what is now Uttar Pradesh come into their own, as demonstrated by the fortunes of numerous towns and townships in this area which were either founded or enlarged at this time, often by direct government patronage; and (4) by the middle decades of the eighteenth century, while the western districts of Uttar Pradesh, and especially in Awadh, were prospering, and this was manifested especially in the flourishing conditions of urban life. The flowering of an urban-based economy and of urban culture during the reigns of Akbar, Jahanglr, Shahjahan, and for much of the reign of Aurangzeb, derived largely from the establishment of political conditions highly advantageous to commerce and to the trading and artisan classes of the cities. Similarly, the spread of political instability over much of northern India during the eighteenth century led inevitably to a contraction of urban prosperity over large areas of the Panjab, Rajasthan, the Jumna-Ganges Doab, and of the country between the Chambal and the Narmada. Wherever that instability could be held at bay - in Awadh, for example, or in the 'new' Maratha capitals, Poona, Nagpur, Baroda, etc. - urban life continued to flourish. Most strikingly it was in the port cities under the control of foreigners and relatively immune to the disorders consequent upon Mughal political decline (i.e. in Calcutta, Madras, Pondicherry,

and Bombay), where urban growth in the eighteenth century was most conspicuous. Considering the enormous diversity of urban economies and urban cultures spanning the sub-continent, it would be impossible to speak of a ‘typical’ Indian city of this period. There were profound differences between a Hindu sacral center like Benares or Ujjain and the administrative headquarters of the imperial government, such as Agra or Lahore. Furthermore, there were obvious differences between the Muslim capitals of the south - Bijapur, Golconda, Ahmadnagar, and later, Hyderabad - bore a closer resemblance to their northern counterparts than did the Hindu cities of the south to those of the north. Although some of the most flourishing cities of sixteenth and seventeenth-centuryIndia were unmistakably centres of Muslim political and cultural hegemony, the pluralist nature of Indian society, and the fact that almost everywhere the Muslims were a minority community, makes it difficult to regard even such metropolitan centers as being truly ‘Islamic’ in form and function in the way that contemporary Herat or Bukhara were. Muslim religious structures, such as mosques, colleges, and tombs, as well as secular structures like bazaars and caravanserais, were built in architectural styles derived from Iran or Turkistan. These structures served to protect both the governmental authorities and the city itself from local enemies and rebellions, as well as enemy invasion. Climate, topography, and exposure to Islamic cultural influences also influenced these characteristics. Local traditions of architecture gave public buildings erected by Muslim rulers a more indigenous character than those in the north-west, where Iranian and Turkistani cultural influences were stronger. Despite the prevalence of impressive fortifications, larger Indian cities of this period of urban prosperity and expansion tend to outgrow their walls. Such suburbs usually grew up around particular focal points: a local shrine or cluster of noblemen’s houses and gardens. In some major cities of the empire, it was customary for the princes and nobles to construct residences and gardens outside the walls and along the banks of the Jumna. Traces of this development have long since disappeared, but the location of the surviving ruins of the Qudsiya Bagh testifies to the continuity of the practice well into the 18th century. A common way for a suburb to grow up was around a sacral site, Hindu or Muslim, which provided a nucleus for continuing growt

UNIT-10: PLANTATION FARMING AND TEXTILE INDUSTRY DURING COLONIAL INDIA

Markets have been known in India since ancient times, and agricultural products were bought and sold in them. In the Mughal Empire, a large part of land tax was collected in money from cultivators, which meant that they were selling their products for money to pay the taxes. This involved selling about 50% of the agricultural produce. Virtually everyone was involved inexchange as a producer or consumer, usually specialized moneylenders and brokers. There is evidence that some kinds of rights in land (zamindari rights) were bought and sold. The Mughal Empire broke up in the 18th century, and various regional kingdoms succeeded it. They sometimes collected lower taxes than the Mughals had done, but they also collected mainly in cash, which indicates that the commercial system continued to exist. One new power that took advantage of the decline of the Mughals was the British East India Company. It acquired territories in South India, Bengal, Bihar, and coastal Orissa in the East, which possessed rich agriculture, flourishing trade, and handicrafts. The Company's methods adopted by these powers gave the commercialisation under their control its distinctive characteristics. The company was a trading company based in Britain, which had been granted a monopoly of the Eastern trade by the British Government. Its aims and objectives would be different from those of an Indian ruler or even a raider like Nadir Shah. The Company was mainly concerned with acquiring Indian goods for sale in Europe. After the conquest of Bengal, the Company hoped that after the

Figure 126 Coins during Mughal period

Figure 127(Source: https://in.pinterest.com/) active ca. 1770-1820

conquest of Bengal, it would no longer have to import gold and silver bullion into India to pay for its purchases. Instead, it would collect taxes from its Indian subjects and use the surplus over its local expenditures to buy goods that would be exported to Europe. Under this arrangement, India would pay tribute to the Company in the form of goods to be sold in Europe. To achieve this aim, the Company had to manage to collect taxes to yield enough to pay its military and administrative expenses in India and provide a surplus for the finance of its trade. Additionally, India should produce at low prices goods for which there was a demand in the West so that the surplus revenues could be remitted in the form of these goods. When Indian rulers collected taxes, most of the money was spent within the locality or region, so agriculture was little affected by foreign demand. Indian exports of handicraft and other goods more than covered imports from outside the country. Initially, the British also concentrated on exporting Indian manufactures, like textiles, to the West. However, a dangerous rival to Indian textiles appeared in the later 18th century, as a cotton mill industry grew up in Britain. These mills found it difficult to compete with Indian products, leading to an agitation against the East India Company's import of Indian fabrics. By the 1780s, an indirect method of remitting the Indian tribute via China had begun to take shape. The British imported large quantities of tea from China, paying for it in silver as the Chinese did not want Western goods. Indigo was a textile dye needed in the West, and tea cultivation was introduced in Assam from the 1840s so that Britain could control its supply without relying on China for it. All of these crops were valuable in relation to their bulk, meaning their price per kilogram or cubic meter was high.

The cost of transport was high, making it difficult for the British to trade in cheap, bulky goods. To avoid this, the company focused on products that were profitable relative to their weight. Raw silk was an important export until the last decades of the 19th century, and experts were brought in to improve methods of silk making in India. The company coerced growers of mulberry trees and workers in the filatures to keep the price of silk low, allowing contractors to make large profits. Opium, an addictive drug, was sold by the British to maintain a high price on the Chinese market. Indigo, a blue dye extracted from a tropical plant, was used to colour textiles. The company encouraged Europeans to settle in its territory to produce indigo and purchasing it from them for export. Production increased rapidly, reaching 133,000 *maunds*by 1829-30. Indigo was grown under two systems: *nij*(planter-led cultivation) and *ryoti* (peasant-cultivated cultivation). The first

system had many advantages for the planter, such as low prices paid to the peasant but no repayment due to debt. Doctored accounts were maintained to show the peasant's power, but the debt never cleared and increased year by year. Cotton was the important commercial crop in Eastern India, with a significant export to China developed by the 1780s. The East



Figure 128 The founders of Assam Tea Company (Source:facebook page:Rujani Tea)

India Company and Bombay merchants sought to control the sources of supply. By 1806, substantial territory had been acquired in Gujarat, and the Company began forcing cultivators to sell to them at a lower price than elsewhere. However, the Company came into conflict with private European merchants and retired from this trade in 1833. Pepper was another important commercial crop in Western India, and the political power of the Company was used to force down the price and prevent merchants from selling to the French or competitors. The company was forced to hand over the trade to private British merchants in the 1830s. Sugarcane, indigenous to India, was produced here for centuries and was extensively consumed within India. In the 1830s, the indigo planters faced a fall in prices and sales, leading to capital investment in producing super for the London market. European speculators set up sugar plantations in eastern Uttar Pradesh, where local peasants were made to produce gur and chini for delivery to the planters who processed it into sugar. Large profits were made by the planters, and exports grew. Calcutta sent less

than 1,600 tons of sugar to England in 1833-34, but by 1848, most factories shut down, and exports almost ceased. Indian gur merchants and khandsaris then took the trade back into the old channel of sale to Mirzapur and central India. In the 1830s, the Assam Company faced hostility from China due to its insistence on smuggling opium. To counter this, it promoted tea cultivation within its territories in Assam and handed over the gardens to a private company called the Assam Company. Othertea companies also set up gardens in the 1850s, bringing in indentured or bonded laborers from Chota Nagpur and elsewhere in large numbers. This is the only instance in which commercial crops were produced in large capitalist enterprises. The expansion of tea, coffee, and other plantations really occurred after 1860, and thus falls outside the period that we are studying now. Private English businessmen also wanted to send money back to Britain, so the exports severed essentially to remit resources out of India received no imports in return for these exports. Obviously such a transfer impoverished India. The growth and export of commercial crops thus served to impoverish rather than to enrich India. Instability in agriculture in India was exposed to many hazards; drought, flood, or other calamity could destroy the crops and ruin the farmers. But with commercial agriculture, a new set of dangers appeared. Crops were now going to distant markets, and both zamindars and peasants became impoverished, the land went out of cultivation, and finally, in 1842, an uprising, known as the Bundela Rebellion, broke out. Uttar Pradesh also suffered in the same way in the 1830s, with the price of cotton and indigo falling, and as Professor Siddiqi describes it, “Peasants were abandoning their lands, Zamindars had suffered losses, money-lenders had been ruined because the loans they had made had not been repaid; many of them now refused to lend money to the cultivators. Land had depreciated in value, and innumerable cases were reported of estates being up for sale and no buyers coming forward.” The way that commercialisation developed in India actually tended to check the appearance of other markets. First, except in the case of tea, the crops were not produce by hired labour. The preferred system was one in which the peasant could be coerced into supplying the require

Figure 129The Bundela Rising, by M.R. Acharekar (1907-1979)

product at a very low price (the ryoti system). In such a system, earnings would be very small, which was why the peasant had to be coerced into it. They could survive because they and their families could grow food on the rest of their land, but a landless labourer could not do this, and would have had to be paid more. So the planters and businessmen did not like to employ wage labour market. The effect on the input market was similar, with the peasant having to use his own plough, bullocks, etc. to raise the commercial crop. He was not paid enough for this, as that would reduce the planters' profits. The growth of a land market would also be inhibited, as land cannot be consumed like rice or dal. The exacting regime of the tax-collector, the zamindar, and the planter would check the growth of a market in land. Lastly, the credit market, the market for loans, also had the effects of checking the expansion of commercial production. Indigo cultivators were given loans by the planters as a way of tying them down, and no one else would lend to a man in this situation. Thus, the commercialization of India during the 1830s resulted in growing inequality within the peasantry, with some becoming wealthy and employing wage-labourers, while others lost their land and forced to work from wages. The continual use of coercion and state power distorted markets and prevented the appearance of a full labour market. The peasant and his family continued to produce on their small plot of land, but were forced by an opium agent to mark off a portion for commercial crops. This led to impoverishment, but the method and organization of production remained unchanged. European businessmen found it more profitable to exploit the peasant household than engage in large-scale production with hired labour. Textiles and fabrics from the Indian subcontinent were well recognised in Europe prior to the Industrial Revolution. Tavernier, a French gem dealer, noted the 'Qalamdar' or painted fabric from India in the 17th century. The exceptional quality of Masulipatnam's coloured and painted textiles was highlighted by John Fryer, an English physicist and travel writer. More records of merchants and tourists from the 18th century exist, documenting the sorts of clothing, materials utilised, and manufacturing processes widespread in the subcontinent. The popularity of Indian textiles and fabrics in European marketplaces prompted attempts to replicate their manufacture locally in Europe, particularly following industrialization in the nineteenth century. Forbes Watson, the director of the Indian Museum and a reporter on Indian items, methodically compiled names of wild plants that might be used to produce dyes for fabrics and explained the many procedures employed in textile manufacture. Traditional manufacturing remained small-scale, with basic units often consisting of weavers and their household looms. Each region's craftspeople developed their unique techniques for treating

and adorning fabrics using locally accessible raw materials. Tavernier, for example, noted that Barouch (Bharuch), with its huge fields full of lemon trees, was especially recognised for whitening fabrics that required lime juice. To bleach and brighten the natural hues of cotton and silk fabrics, they were soaked in water containing lime juice and sugar. Rich and



(a) (b)

Figure 130 Crops grown in colonial India Source: (a) Title: A handbook for travellers in India, Burma, and Ceylon. Year: 1911 (1910s) Authors: John Murray (b) J. G. Bartholomew. Provenance: "The Imperial Gazetteer of India"

diverse needlework was also a popular way of embellishing materials ranging from coarse cotton to the finest Muslin. Every area of India has its unique embroidery style. The various stitching techniques were determined by the quality of the available fabric and the people's dress styles. The lovely embroidered designs, plant and bird motifs, and so on were inspired by the local flora and fauna. Cotton is the most evolved of the traditional textiles made in India in terms of regional specialisation. Regional heterogeneity was evident in cotton fabric quality, with differing degrees of coarseness and refinement coming from the various types of yarn produced. The sorts of locally made cotton fabric were so numerous and adaptable in the 18th century that Indian cotton items could readily fulfil the varying tastes of people all over the world. Silk from China and Indian cotton were popular in European marketplaces during the mediaeval period. Vasco De Gama's 15th-century discovery of the maritime route across the Cape of Good Hope boosted India's trade with England. The production and international trade of Indian textiles and fabrics increased

throughout the mediaeval era when the East India Company expanded into the Indian subcontinent in the 17th century. Its primary goal was to deliver a consistent supply of Indian items to European markets. The wide range of patterns and colour combinations available in Indian Calico and other varieties of cotton, which can be used to make everything from handkerchiefs to draperies, raised their demand in European markets. Indian Cotton, which is mostly produced in the areas surrounding Gujarat, the Coromandel Coast, and Bengal, was created with a diverse variety of clients in mind. The cloth was embellished with a variety of dyes and techniques such as painting, block printing, bleach printing, and so on. The vast diversity of manufacturing patterns, as well as the expertise of Indian craftsmen gathered over centuries, rendered Indian textiles significantly better in quality and range to European textiles. To defend the interests of English manufacturers against the rising popularity of Indian cotton in the English market, the British government passed the 'Calico Act' in 1721, outlawing the use of all types of Calicoes in England. Only after newer technological advancements permitted English garments to compete with materials made in the Indian Subcontinent and other Eastern markets was the Act removed in 1774. The Steam Engine, the Spinning Jenny, the Crompton Mule Spindle, the use of copper plates instead of wooden blocks for printing, printing machines with rollers, and other 18th-century inventions revolutionised textile production in England, allowing the production

Figure 131Robe à l'Anglaise, 1770-1780, Mode Museum (Source:https:/www.pinterest.de/)

Figure 132illustration of power loom weaving during Britain's industrial revolution by T Allom, from 'History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain' by Sir Edward Baines (1835)

of textiles that could compete favourably with Indian products. These producers not only developed the techniques of Calico printing with designs inspired by Indian textiles, but they could also create a great number of fabrics in a short period of time. As cheaper garments produced of machine spun yarn flooded not just European but also Indian markets, traditional hand spun yarn and textiles faced strong competition, which was exacerbated by the introduction of chemical colours in the West. Indian textiles struggled to compete with textilesand fabrics made in

Figure 133

European mills, resulting in a significant decrease in public demand. The East India Company offered advances and enforced severe output quotas and stringent delivery dates on the textiles that were still made in India by indigenous weavers in the early years of the nineteenth century. Because of the demand, many of these craftspeople had to leave weaving and pursue other careers. The new industrial class in Britain put pressure on the government to break the East India Company's monopoly on commerce in India. They desired a potential market for their manufactured goods and also need raw resources. India might meet both of these requirements. Finally, once the Charter Act of 1813 abolished the East India Company (EIC)'s trade monopoly, British industrialists entirely converted India into an exporter of raw materials and a market for completed goods. Furthermore, Indian goods entering the United Kingdom were subject to a hefty duty. In the early nineteenth century, Indian calicoes shipped to Britain had to pay a tariff of up to 65%, while British products entering India had to pay roughly 3.5%. Even within India, Indian textiles had to pay a greater levy than British products, damaging both local and global markets for traditional Indian small-scale businesses. In terms of consumption habits, imported clothing have reshaped buyer tastes. Foreign textile fabrics, such as English taffeta and French chiffon, began to appear in Indian markets and proved popular among customers. However, a few English merchants recognised the cost benefit of making textiles in mills in India,

which were closer to the source of raw materials. It would save money on both the shipping of raw materials from India to mills in England and the transfer of finished items to markets in India. A British businessman called Henry Gourger established the first cotton mill in Bengal in 1818, primarily for the manufacturing of cotton yarn. Nonetheless, cotton mills were not established in Bombay, Ahmedabad, or Barouch (Bharuch) until the 1850s, thanks to the effort of Indian entrepreneurs.Cowasjee Nanabhoy Davar established the Bombay Spinning and Weaving Mill in 1851, whichresulted in the establishment of numerous such mills, mostly with the capital and efforts of the Parsi community, which was already successfully engaged in the export and import of raw cotton and finished products to and from Britain.

Figure 134Dundee was named 'Jutepolis' in the Victorian era

By the 1860s, a few additional mills had opened, and by 1900, India had more than 190 mills. This trend sparked concern among British manufacturers, who pressed the government to remove all export levies on products delivered to India, assuring further lower costs for these commodities. Furthermore, the British Indian Government, which was keen to protect the interests of British manufacturers, did not encourage these Indian mills.

Figure 135 Lengths of khadi (detail), plain-woven cotton, Gujarat, India, about 1867. Museum nos. 0120 (IS), 5955 (IS), © Victoria and Albert Museum, London

The British, like cotton, were interested in creating silk yarn in India, but for different reasons. While it is unclear when silk manufacture originated in India, it was undoubtedly

existent before the arrival of the British. Silk was manufactured in Indian places such as Midnapore, Maldah, and Hooghly. However, the quality of Bengal silk was poor, owing mostly to poor reeling techniques. Geogeghan recalls British efforts to enhance silk manufacturing technologies in Bengal. Silk weaving, on the other hand, was overlooked since the goal was to bring raw silk to Britain for the benefit of the country's manufacturers. As a variety of imported silk clothing grew popular, the market for locally woven silk in India deteriorated. There were still a few English enterprises in India producing silk fabrics from locally sourced raw materials. The weaving of Baluchari sarees under the East India Company is an intriguing feature here. Murshidabad has long been known for its red, blue, and purple five-yard silk Baluchari sarees made in the town of Baluchar. These were particularly well-known for the beautiful, golden thread embroidery on the aanchal. Baluchar saris were created in Murshidabad factories under the EIC, with figures of people clothed in European clothing such as caps and bonnets. Wool production in India, on the other hand, underwent a unique sort of transformation throughout the colonial period. Historically, it was largely nomadic groups that herded sheep and weaved the wool into inexpensive and coarse woollen textiles like Patu fabric, which was used to produce shawls. Among the numerous such tribes were the Dhangar Nasiks and the Kumaon Bhotiyas, who grazed livestock (mainly sheep), woven wool, and marketed the goods at different fairs and marketplaces. The establishment of Reserved Forests in the later part of the nineteenth century, as well as greater focus on the sedentarization of nomadic communities, limited these people's access to com economic historians and other experts have analysed its impacts as being considerably destructive for Indian producers, manufacturers, and traders. The local textile sector, like other areas of the economy, sustained significant losses during the colonial era. As a result, the rejection of British machine-made clothing became an essential symbol in the Indian independence fight. As part of his struggle for self-rule or swaraj, Mahatma Gandhi popularised the usage of Khadi (hand-woven clothing made of hand-spun yarn). The goal was to abandon the use of British items made on the ruins of Indian craftsmen and weavers in favour of handwoven, locally produced clothes.

UNIT-11: POST-COLONIAL URBANIZATION IN INDIA

Urbanization, a process that reveals itself through temporal, spatial, and sectoral changes in the demographic, social, economic, technological, and environmental aspects of life in a given society, is a progressive concentration of population in urban units. Louis Wirth, the first to start studying urbanization in 1938, argued that cities are not enough; a theory of cities should be based on the behaviour of social groups. Three factors within a city affect social groups: size, density, and diversification. Structural urbanization is the process of transforming agricultural communities into industrial communities, which is a result of industrialization and economic development. Demographic urbanization is the process of rural settlements being transformed into urban settlements, which is influenced by migration and population mobility. Geographical urbanization is the study of spatial phenomena in space and their distribution. In India, urbanization is defined by the Census of India, which varies depending on the country. The census defines urban areas based on two criteria: the state government grants municipal status to a settlement, known as statutory or municipal towns, and if a settlement does not have an urban civic status but satisfies demographic and economic criteria, such as a population of more than 5,000, a density of 400 persons per square kilometre, and a 75% male workforce in the non-agricultural sector, it can be declared urban.

Urbanization, the spatial dimension of the industrial and technological revolution in the past two centuries, has attracted the attention of scholars, social reformers, and politicians. In the mid-20th century, urbanization studies focus on cities and city systems, while urbanization is a phenomenon describing a process of change in population sites due to changing conditions in society. The study of cities under city life focuses on the product of the change introduced by urbanization in a localized context regardless of the size of the urban system understudy. The study of urbanization represents the macro level and the study of cities and urban affairs the micro level of interrelated phenomena along the continuum rather than a single or two separate phenomena. Demographically speaking, the level of urbanization is measured by the percentage of population living in urban areas. India shares most characteristic features of urbanization in developing countries, with the census showing an increase faster than expected. This has reversed the declining trend in

the growth rate of urban population, which was observed in the 20th century. In India, urbanization has increased faster than expected, reversing the declining trend in the growth rate of urban population. India is at the acceleration stage of urbanization, with trends discussed in the next few sections. Before understanding the concept of urbanization in urban areas, it is essential to understand its behavioural, structural, demographical, and geographical aspects. Louis Worth's paper "Urbanism: A Way of Life" suggested that all urban studies were limited to city-level studies, but there should be a theory of cities based on the behaviour of social groups within cities. The second definition of urbanization is structural, where agricultural communities are transformed into industrial communities due to industrialization and economic development. Demographic definitions suggest that rural settlements are being transformed into urban settlements, and migration deals with population mobility. Urbanization may also occur as a result of individual town growth or the multiplication of towns. To better understand the urbanization profile in India, it is necessary to examine which settlements are treated as urban by the census. There is no standard definition of urban, and it varies from country to country. However, in India, areas classified as urban are defined based on two criteria: state government grants municipal status, or if a settlement does not have an urban civic status but meets demographic and economic criteria, such as having a population more than ten persons per square kilometer and a percent of its male working population engaged in non-agriculture sectors. Thus, urbanization in India has been a complex process that has had significant impacts on various aspects of society. Understanding the historical context and spatial and temporal discontinuities of urbanization is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the impact of urbanization on society.In the early historical period, urbanization was primarily experienced in the middle Ganga region and some parts of the Indian peninsula at its southern tip. This pattern has been observed in modern times as well, with spatial discontinuities being characteristic of this process. The factors responsible for these discontinuities were different from time to time and place to place.

In the prehistoric period, urbanization was synonymous with the original rise of civilization, which can be termed as a cultural process. From historical periods to the British regime, urbanization was related to the rise and fall of kingdoms dynasties and empires, which is essentially a political process. However, in modern times, it is perceived as a process closely related to economic development and industrialization, making it an economic process.

The urban history of India can be divided into three five time periods: the prehistoric period, the medieval period, the British period, and the post-independence field. The post-independence period has colonial characteristics that have a colonial imprint on the process. The British period, which lasted around 150 years, had a negative impact on the Indian urban landscape. The introduction of railways resulted in the diversion of trade routes into different channels, depriving other trade centers their monopoly.

The British rule also led to the creation of the three metropolitan port cities, Bombay and Calcutta. These cities became the leading administrative commercial and industrial cities, with the entire cultural landscape of these cities being of British taste, which was of sharp contrast to the urban design of the Mughal periods.

The British rule also introduced railways, which opened up virgin lands for the Britishers. Railway stations became important, making them the primary foci, or urban centres. As a result, the urban centres that were there before the British started losing their monopoly were lost.



Figure 136 (a) Map of Delhi during Colonial period (1910-12), (b) Map of Delhi/ Shajahanabad during 1857-58 (Source: (a) Map of Lutyens, (b) A History of the Nineteenth Century by Rev. James Taylor, Edinburgh, 1860.

The transformation of the urban landscape during the British period has left a lasting impact on the country's urban landscape and the role of traditional industries and infrastructure. The urban elite in India has been influenced by the British colonial legacy, which led to the development of hill stations and plantation settlements. These hill stations were created in various regions of the country, serving four metropolitan cities: Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. These hill stations had distinct urban features such as processing plants, worker residences, and commercial establishments. The introduction of civil lines and mall roads further modified the existing urban landscape, leading to the development of new industrial townships like Jamshedpur and Darjeeling near Calcutta. These civil lines were designed to separate British and Indian parts of the city, with some being built exclusively for British officers and army men. These modifications segregated the city and broadened the gap between rural and urban areas. The introduction of railways and modern industry also led to the development of new industrial townships like Jamshedpur, Asansol, and Dhanbad. However, these developments also brought unplanned urbanization, as the city started growing unplanned towards the railway station. Industrial development during this period was modest, but exceptions like Jamshedpur emerged as urban areas due to the opening of the iron and steel industry. Urban amenities and administration improved during this time, with facilities like piped water supply, street lighting, domestic electrification, series system, shopping areas, green spaces, and municipal

Figure 137 The Chowringhee Hotel opened in 1897

Figure 138 Presidency college established under colonial rule

city air bodies concentrated only in places where Britishers lived. This urbanization led to segregation within society, as educational institutions in the form of schools and colleges were established.

This elite was known for slogan westernization, and they were unable to relate themselves to rural India or the Indians who were not westernized into the western education system. This segregation is evident today in urban and rural areas, as well as in the plans and unplanned cities. The roots of this urbanization can be traced back to the colonial period, when differences in social and political systems plagued India's social and political systems. The post-independence period saw rapid urbanization, with the mushrooming of one lakh and million+ cities. Major changes in India during this period include the influx of refugees and their settlement in urban areas in northern parts of the country, such as Delhi, Chandigarh, and Bhuvaneshwar. Thus, the urban elite in India has been significantly impacted by the British colonial legacy, the introduction of civil lines and continents, and the influence of westernization on the urban landscape. The post-independence period has seen significant changes in urban planning, infrastructure, and the distribution of resources, leading to a more diverse and complex urban landscape. The process of urbanization in India has been characterized by uneven development patterns between small towns and big cities, with the urban population growing to millions.

Figure 139 Modern , Colonial and Modern Architecture in Delhi (Source:

Figure 140 Street lighting at bangalore,1950 (Source: https:// www.mangalorean.com/)

This growth rate has increased from 6% per annum during the colonial period to 8% during the first decade of the 21st century. The Indian economy has grown from about 6%

per annum during the colonial period to about 8% during the first decade of the 21st century. The power of economic growth is bringing about faster urbanization in India, and it has more acted as an economic process than a social or political one. The pattern of urbanization from the colonial period to the post-independence period has been marked by rapid urbanization, which is due to the number of towns increasing. The reason for this lopsided urbanization is the result of the colonial period, where the focus was on three cities that provided amenities. However, these cities had limited spread effects and were influenced by the imperialistic regime. The hierarchy of urban settlement and spatial structure prevailed during the colonial period, which was mainly due to the imperialistic regime. The colonial economy generated strong commodity and population flows towards key ports and administrative towns, weakening regional centripetal forces established during the medieval period. There was a mismatch between the linkages between the inter-settlement linkages and the directional movement of goods and services between the core and periphery. As a result, only four major agglomerations became prominent urban centers, leading to top-heavy urbanization. To address this issue, a new paradigm needs to be looked into. First, developed states have attracted population due to their amenities and new industrial townships. Second, backward states have remained backward, with government investment also responsible for this. A large part of rural urban migration has been less, and people are migrating from rural areas to large cities rather than coming to smaller towns. This has led to stagnation of smaller towns in backward places in these backward states. Thus, the current urbanization in India is characterized by dualism, with developed states attracting populations due to certain amenities and new industrial townships. The role of regional development can help diffuse positive effects in India’s interior and across borders. The concept of urban corridors or convergences may be one solution, but they must consider local conditions when designing these corridors.

Since the mid-nineteenth century, intellectuals, social reformers, and politicians have been interested in urbanisation, a spatial aspect of the preceding two centuries’ industrial and technological revolutions. On the one hand, urbanisation deals with the study of cities and city systems; on the other hand, there is a conceptual separation between urbanisation studies. In basic terms, urbanisation may be defined as a process of change that occurs when distinct conditions and relationships within society alter. The proportion of the population living in urban areas is used to calculate the level of urbanisation in the field

of demography. To comprehend this process, one must investigate the variables that originate and maintain it, as well as its wide general implications. Among emerging countries, India has the most distinct characteristics of urbanisation. According to the 2011 Census, India's urbanisation has accelerated faster than projected. This represents a reversal of the downward trend of urbanisation experienced in the 1980s and 1990s. Another significant factor is that, for the first time since independence, the absolute rise in the urban population exceeded that in the rural population. This might be ascribed to a significant growth in the number of municipalities as well as the concentration of population in urban regions. The overall population in urban areas climbed from 2.58 crores in 1901 to 37.71 crores in 2011.This data clearly illustrates that India's urbanisation tendency is gradually increasing.



Figure 141

The incorporation of the idea of “modernization” into the concept of development, cultural anthropologists, psychologists, and other behavioural scientists have broadened the multidisciplinary quest for a better understanding of urbanisation and its effects on society. All social scientists study urbanisation; there are three interpretations of urbanisation: 1) behavioural 2) structural 3) demographic 4) geographical.

Understanding the different aspects of urbanization in India is essential for a better understanding of the urbanization process and its impact on society.

Urbanisation in India: The story of Indian urbanisation must be studied in historical context; it is a story of geographical and chronological discontinuities (Ramachandran, 1989). The first cities developments were limited to the Indus Valley and its surrounding areas. This method had little effect on the rest of the country. It was encountered in the

Figure 142 Urban centres during Indus Civilisation, post Indus valley civilisation, modern cities, (Source: adapted from Tokai University, 2000)

early historical era in the Middle Ganga plains and the southern regions of the Indian Peninsula. A similar image may be found even in ancient periods when significant areas of the nation were untouched by urbanisation. In current times, these spatial discontinuities remain animportant feature of Indian urbanisation. The variables that contributed to urbanisation changed throughout time. In the ancient age, urbanisation was synonymous with the birth and emergence of civilisation, hence be referred to as a cultural process. From olden times to the British government, urbanisation has been linked to the rise and fall of kingdoms, dynasties, and empires; as a result, a city is a city. In current times, urbanisation is regarded as a process that is inextricably linked to economic development and industrialisation, and hence as an economic process. The urban history of India may be split into five-time eras based on these chronological discontinuities in the progress of urbanisation. They are as follows:

i) The prehistoric period (between 2350 and 1800 BC)

ii) Early-historic period (600 BC to 500 AD)

iii) Mediaeval period (600 AD to 1800 AD)

iv) The British era (1800–1947)

v) The period following independence (after 1947)

Post-independence urbanisation is characterised by an overburdening of class I and metropolitan cities, i.e.metropolization where the top has gotten heavy. The British Period (1800-1947) had a significant impact on India's urban landscape, with the decline of pre-British cities and the introduction of railways causing the diversion of trade routes into different channels. This led to the creation of three metropolitan port cities, which became the leading colonial cities of the world. These cities became administrative, commercial, and industrial cities, with a British-style cultural landscape. The introduction of hill stations in the Himalayan foothills and South India, along with the introduction of tea and coffee plantations, led to the emergence of smaller settlements with distinct urban characteristics. Between 1815 and 1870, over 80 hill stations were developed in four different regions to serve the four metropolitans cities of Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. These settlements had distinct urban features due to processing plants, residences of workers, and associated commercial establishments. The modification of the existing urban landscape through civil lines and cantonments, particularly in provincial capitals, district headquarters,



Figure 143 Hill Stations Developed during Colonial Period, (Source: Shekhar, 2018)

and tehsil level urban administrative towns, further separated cities and increased the gap between rural and urban areas. The introduction of railways and the modern industry also led to the development of new industrial townships like Jamshedpur, Asansol, and Delhi. The improvements in urban amenities and administration during the British period were one of the major benefits that cities experienced. Facilities like piped water supply, street lighting, domestic electrification, sewerage system, shopping areas, and green spaces were incorporated, but most cities were deprived of these facilities. Municipal bodies were established in many cities in 1881, but these were found only in areas where British population was residing, further causing segregation within cities. The British period also saw the establishment of centers of education in schools, colleges, and universities, leading

to an urban elite that was soaked in westernization. This widening gap between the rural and urban areas continues to plague India's social and political system today.

The post-Independence period in India has witnessed rapid urbanization, characterized by the mushrooming of one lakh and million plus cities. Major changes that India has witnessed during this period include the influx of refugees and their settlement in the northern part of the country, the establishment of new planned administrative centers like Chandigarh and Bhubneshwar, the construction of new industrial cities and townships near major cities, the rapid growth of one-lakh and million cities, stagnation and decline of small towns, proliferation of slums and squatter settlements in big cities, and the introduction of urban planning through Five Year Plans and the improvement in urban governance through the 74th Amendment Act. The process of urbanization in India is not at all different from other developing countries of the world; it is also characterized with uneven pattern of development of small towns and big cities within the system. According to the 2011 Census, the urban population grew to 377 million, showing a growth rate of 2.76% per annum during 2001-2011. The level of urbanization in the country as a whole increased from 27.7% in 2001 to 31.1% in 2011, an increase of 3.3 percentage points during 2001-2011 compared to an increase of 2.1 percentage points during 1991-2001. The Indian economy has grown from about 6% per annum during the 1990s to about 8% during the first decade of the 2000s (Ahluwalia 2011). This clearly reflects the power of economic growth in bringing about faster urbanization during 2001-2011. Thus, in recent years, urbanization in India has acted more as an economic process than a social or political one. The trends of urbanization in India (1901 – 2011) have been relatively slow compared to many developing countries. The percentage of annual exponential growth rate of urban population reveals that in India, it grew at a faster pace from the decade 1921-31 until 1951. Thereafter, it registered a sharp drop during the decade 1951-61. The decades 1961-71 and 1971-81 showed a significant improvement in the growth rate However, 1981-1991 showed a decreasing trend which continued even in 1991-2001; in 2001-11, it shows a very small increase over the last two decades to the present rate (2.76%). The reason for the sharp drop in urban rate during 1951-61 was the declassification of large numbers of towns during that decade. The data reveals that the number of urban agglomerations/towns in India has grown from 1827 in 1901 to 7935 in 2011. This process of urbanization in India has been top heavy or tilting towards large cities, with the percentage of the urban population in 5-million-plus or million-plus

cities higher than in most other countries of the region and going up relatively faster in the last three decades.



Figure 144 Cities in India

In 1947, the country experienced significant political and economic changes, particularly in the Second and Third Five Year Plans. Public-sector investment limited urban hierarchy, but regional disparities persisted. Large cities transformed from colonial to national capitals, resulting in a concentration of low-productive manufacturing and service activities. Rapid urban growth during the first three decades led to informalization of the urban economy and increased deprivation of basic amenities. Despite the public sector's efforts, regional disparities persisted, highlighting the need for more effective development strategies and investment in developing areas. In 1947, the country experienced significant political and economic changes, particularly in the Second and Third Five Year Plans. Public-sector investment limited urban hierarchy, but regional disparities persisted. Large cities transformed from colonial to national capitals, resulting in a concentration of low-productive manufacturing and service activities. Rapid urban growth during the first three decades led to informalization of the urban economy and increased deprivation of basic amenities. Despite the public sector's efforts, regional disparities persisted, highlighting the need for more effective development strategies and investment in developing areas.

The post-independence urban scenario is characterized by dualism, with economically developed states attracting population to urban areas through industrialization and infrastructure investment. However, even in backward states, urban growth was rapid, especially for small and medium towns. This growth was attributed to government investment in district and taluka headquarters, urban industrial dispersal programs, and transfer of funds from states to urban local bodies through a needs-based approach. Rural-urban migration into smaller towns from their rural hinterland in backward states can be attributed to push factors due to the lack of diversification in the agrarian economy. The urbanization process has concentrated in developed regions and larger cities, with backward areas and smaller towns stagnating. Large municipal bodies in developed states have a strong economic base, resulting in high economic and demographic growth. Smaller towns in backward states have languished economically and reported low or negative demographic growth, often failing to meet urban center criteria. Rapid income growth has occurred in developed regions and around Class I cities, but poverty has become concentrated in remote regions and problem areas. Developed regions have developed resistance to in-migration, while backward regions lack the capacity to export person-power with the skills required at the destination. This macro scenario suggests a

slowdown in urbanization and the concentration of urban growth in developed states and a few global centers.

The departure of the British from India signalled a new start in many areas of national life, including cities as centers of large populations and potential sites of economic growth and employment opportunities. Cities were attracted to national leaders for their ability to provide basic urban amenities and create new urban settlements to accommodate refugees and migrants. This transformation began in early post-independence years leading up to the contemporary transformation of Indian cities. In August 1947, India became independent/partitioned, accompanied by large scale violence in which neighbours and communities turned upon each other and millions had to cross newly minted borders under the fear of death and destruction. With this, a new urban life began in the shadow of death, as cities of residents and migrants became camps of refugees. This was especially true of Delhi, the national capital, and Calcutta, then India's largest metropolis. Muslims from the rural hinterland were reported to be pouring into Delhi right through the summer of 1947 to escape the violence that they faced there, turning the city into a 'refugee-istan'. Soon, many of them left for Pakistan even as Hindu and Sikh refugees found their footholds in the capital city of independent India. The emotional pain of partition and forced migration would find expression only much later. In contrast, its physical manifestations were evident from the very outset. In contrast to Delhi, the refugee migrants of Calcutta came not all at one go but in several different periods. The first group of 'old' migrants, consisting of slightly over 40 lakh people, were those who came to India from the former East Bengal in the period 1946-1958. Another wave of migrants came between 1958 and 1963 but seem to have been denied the status of refugees while a third wave of populations that so migrated between 1964 and 1971 were referred to as 'new migrants. Some among the early migrants, especially those of the middle classes, had ties of occupation and kinship and tend to gravitate towards Calcutta, while the lower and scheduled castes preferred resettlement in villages. As these bhadralok migrants converged on the city, an already congested city faced an even more severe housing crisis. The resettlement of these refugee populations was an immediate and urgent necessity, perhaps more so in Delhi than in Calcutta, where providing relief was the major preoccupation of the government, at least in the immediate post-Partition years. Official narratives emphasised the humanism of the Nehruvian state

Figure 145 Refugee Camps post partition near Humayun Tomb (Source: thepatriot.in)

and the resilience of the refugee communities. Refugees were settled at Kingsway camp (at one time housing close to 30,000 people), Karol Bagh and Shahdara. By the end of 1950, close to 300,000 refugees had been housed, two-thirds in evacuated houses and close to a third in new constructions. Over a thousand plots were allotted to displaced persons to build their own houses. Historians have shown that only those who could show that they had lost property were given land in Delhi, thus leaving the poor who had been forced to migrate in the cold. Official accounts stress successful rehabilitation; however, Ravinder Kaur emphasizes the 'austerity measures' adopted towards displaced person's colonies with refugees having to constantly negotiate with officials for space and quality accommodation. In Calcutta, an even greater uncertainty prevailed than in Delhi, with more persistent hopes of continual exchange of populations across the newly created borders and perhaps less emphasis on immediate reconstruction through state efforts. Attempts at fashioning new urban spaces in industrial townships and new capitals were made to envision the creation of new kinds of citizens. In all instances, the burgeoning slum population and the blighted state of the traditional town was a primary cause of worry. Various concerns – those

relating to resettlement of refugees, dealing with chaos and disorder, and housing and other amenities – came together in a common discourse of a democratic city and anxieties around the production of the model citizen who would take the nation forward. The newly independent rulers of India were concerned about the negative impact of a bad environment on all citizens, particularly the poorest sections of the population. They believed that a city of slums was not conducive to high ideals of citizenship and therefore, high priority should be given to housing in any scheme of national welfare, especially for the poorest sections of the population. The primary aim of city planning from this moment would be social welfare, with convenience and utility being the main test of all city planning. This would

Figure 146Khirki village in south Delhi is one of the colonies that gave shelter to the lower caste people back in the Partition era

Figure 147Dharawi Slums of Mumbai

involve forging a new society by providing new planned housing projects and secure employment in public sector works. Community Development Programmes were set up to create a new urban leadership and help communities articulate their own needs, social, cultural, and economic. Technical expertise was needed for democratic city spaces that were both functionally efficient and democratic. These disciplines had not been absent in colonial cities but had been emphasized on sanitarians and engineers. Now, practitioners of these disciplines were subordinated to those trained in physical planning and land-use economics. Large scale comprehensive land use planning and appropriate zoning strategies emerged as key urban strategies for building a distinctive postcolonial city. Planning offered a dream site for the new nation state, incorporating cosmopolitan virtues, internationalism, and an openness to new design. Many Indian leaders felt indifferent to the city, if not anti-urban. Their hearts were in the villages they considered ethically superior to the city and far more habitable. Urban dwellers thus had to be educated into the art of city building by the planning experts. Most Indian residents too, planners argued, lacked a sense of identification with the city, requiring special educational efforts in the form of media campaigns and local meetings to help them identify with the plans made for them and take pride in their cities. The plans that followed had twin aims: improving conditions of existing settlements and reorganizing the city spatially to make a rational and enforceable separation between spaces of residence and those of commerce and industry. Displacement was agreed upon to be temporary in nature and allow for the return of original dwellers to better houses in the former slum areas. There was consensus on providing alternative accommodation and livelihood opportunities before effecting any displacement. Prime Minister Nehru endorsed the proposition at the highest level, stating that the real difficulty is the lack of accommodation for those living in the slums at present. The most ambitious and theoretically sophisticated Master Plan drawn up was for Delhi, which became law on September 1,1962. A few years later, the influential journal MARG published articles on “Planning for Bombay” by some of the leading architects of the city, carrying forward the ideas for the city contained in Master Plan in Outline (1947) and Report of the Study Group on Greater Bombay (1961). Thus, the newly independent rulers of India recognized the importance of housing and urban planning in addressing the negative effects of slums on the lives of the poorest sections of the population. By focusing on housing projects and promoting Town and Country Planning, they aimed to create a more inclusive and sustainable urban landscape. Planning principles, such as ‘optimum population’ and



Figure 148 (a) Master Plan of Delhi, 1962, (b) Master Plan of Delhi 2041

'dispersal', were crucial in shaping the development of cities. S. G. Barve argued that it was impossible to arbitrarily limit the population of any metropolitan city to a particular size, but he suggested that many well-chosen and well dispersed "centres of growth" should be selected at suitable towns and industrial development decentralized over them through the provision of infrastructure facilities and other promotional measures. Others, like Robey Lal, focused on planning on a human scale, urban development as an area with a boundary, technology available for limited travel time, housing related to occupants' needs, and minimum water, power, and sanitary services. The first goal of planning was envisaged as the balanced urban development of



Figure 149 Durgapur municipality

industry, housing, education, and health services in smaller towns, away from existing large metropolis. However, M. N. Buch ruled out dictatorial policies for preventing migration from centers of starvation to centers of potential employment while simultaneously emphasizing the role of middle level towns in absorbing such migrants. Radical dissenting voices also contributed to this debate. Asok Mitra argued that no vital city in any part of the world will agree to limits being set to its growth, as no sooner does the city cease to grow, that it begins to stagnate and decay. Ashish Bose argued that migration to cities must be curbed, which stemmed from a colonial view of urbanization that saw cities as the exclusive preserve of rulers, rich, and supporting middle classes with the service sector. By the middle of the next decade, things began to veer away from the script prepared by planners, as cities grew in ways not foreseen and began to trump all planned conceptions. For example, in Delhi, planners had imagined the city as evolving into a balanced, harmonious unit, but the city soon imploded from within and stubbornly refused to be ordered within the zoning grids. Some have seen this as a critical failure of implementation, while others see zoning and planning as foreign ideas ill-suited to the Indian city. John A. Hansman, advising the Government of West Bengal on behalf of the Ford Foundation, wrote that control of private development was extremely difficult to enforce under prevailing Indian conditions and at any rate was unimportant. A decade later, the mid-term review of the Delhi Master Plan noted that some of its assumptions were at odds with the realities of the city. A substantial proportion of economic activities in the city are in unorganised sectors and are carried out in a manner not amenable to the typically western planning approach based on a complete segregation of land uses. It will be long



Figure 150 Kalyani Municipality

before this segment of the economy is completely eliminated (if at all), so it is only reasonable to make for appropriate adjustments in land uses consistent with felt needs. The old city met with the most debilitating fate, where the percolation of all kinds obnoxious activities and trades in areas once meant for noble and graceful living had long continued. The highly advanced countries of the West, where town-planners had acquired their professional expertise, could afford high-cost housing and community amenities, but there was no money in India either for parks or for an adequate number of schools and hospitals. A. G. K. Menon considered ‘satellite towns’ and ‘green belts’ to be imported solutions, perhaps inevitable given that the writings on the subject were dominated by foreign scholars. Jai Sen proposed a ‘natural’ Indian city that was simultaneously rural and urban, with the majority of the people in these ‘rural’ cities of Asia involved in service and small industry, making these very different from the heavy-industry-based cities of the West that had evolved under very different conditions. The nature of the built form in India was a significant issue, as it would be filled largely by jhuggies, which would continue to be the symbol of human habitation. Charles Correa and I. K. Gujral promoted low-rise, high-density patterns of growth instead of ‘high-rise’ solutions. Jagmohan opposed the conscious and sub-conscious adoption of the western model of settlement, arguing that housing for the urban poor required the use of local materials such as thatch, mud, wood, and brick, and construction carried out largely by the inhabitant himself. As urban policy became increasingly inhospitable to the poorer and more vulnerable sections of society, social and political movements developed in response. For much of the 1950s and 1960s, urban elites provided moral and social leadership to neighbourhood areas, which emerged as important sites of cross-class associations, even if dominated by the upper and middle classes. Anti-price rise movements were another prominent field of political activity, often in alliance with trade unions and feminist movements. In cities across India, especially in Patna and Ahmadabad, movements for the reconstruction of India, with huge participation of students and the youth, heralded important changes in the national political scene. Working class movements too expanded in scale, covering not only larger cities but also smaller urban centres such as Faridabad and Ghaziabad. Many of the features of these struggles – the link between the countryside and the workers, the importance of the neighbourhood for carrying out struggles at the site of the factory, and that of the link between formalized industrial sector workers and the mass of organized labour – described by historians as characteristic of the colonial city, continued to remain a feature of the post-colonial struggles. Caste-

based movements, especially of Dalit groups in western and southern India, made similar strategic use of neighbourhood settlements as sites of protest while struggling to gain greater access to public spaces. They also grew more radical, with the Dalit Panthers of Bombay (1972) especially gaining national prominence. Movements which were more parochial and gave expression to the 'sons of the soil' argument, such as the Shiv Sena in Bombay, begun in 1966, gained political prominence in poor and middle-class neighbourhoods through an engagement with everyday issues. The responses of the state to new social movements varied over time. By the next decade, a more authoritarian response emerged. On April 19, 1976, women, men, and children at Turkman Gate in Delhi faced the onslaught of an Emergency police bent upon ridding the city of the 'encroachers' on government land and resettling them elsewhere. In the ensuing clash between those who laid historic claims to this space and those who were bent upon beautifying the city by getting rid of the poor, a new lexicon emerged, where questions of law began to take precedence over those of justice and 'encroachment' took precedence over 'disease and darkness.' This was one response to the crisis of the city or a more general crisis of democracy itself, through the brutal suppression of subaltern voices and the forced redrawing of existing spatial arrangements. In the years that followed, there was another response to the breakdown of liberal urbanism, with the State intervening through a process of accommodation, extending exemptions without formalizing the demands for basic needs. From the 1970s and into the 1980s, the logic of electoral mobilization and welfare distribution set up the terrain of what characterizes as 'political society', distinguishing it from the more conventional understandings of civil society in which citizens were guaranteed their rights through law. The Emergency policies in the 1970s and 1980s aimed to accommodate the poor and vulnerable, but it soon became evident that the risks faced by low-income groups would translate into environmental burdens posed by the poor. The National Committee on Environmental Planning was conceived in the 1970s, aiming to

Figure 151 Formation of Shiv Sena by Bal Thackrey in 1966 (Source: Dainik Divya Marathi)

address issues such as water supply, water treatment, sewage disposal, and sanitation. However, not all were convinced of the importance of this. A report on ‘Cosmopolitan Bombay’ questioned whether the plan would reorganize services such as water supply, water treatment, sewage disposal, and sanitation. The Report of the International Panel of Experts appointed by the Secretary-general of the UN Conference on the Human Environment argued in favour of location-based solutions, arguing that pollution emanating from industrial development represents more of a potential threat than an actual threat. Many in India concurred, though in a more circumspect manner. The question of finance was posed fairly starkly – industry, even if it came with environment pollution. For some, the choice between environment and development was a false one, and different combinations of the two were needed, subject to two constraints: an ‘outer limit’ avoiding development paths that would put human survival at risk and an ‘inner limit’ defined by poverty levels and basic human needs for survival below which concern for the environment could not be pushed. By the middle of the 1990s, the environmental question gained new salience, often through the intervention of the Supreme Court. The limit of political resolution to questions of urban failures led to greater emphasis on the issue of legality and the formalisation of urban spaces. When operating in conjunction, the consequence has been the simultaneous extension of the body of rights and the creation of new insecurities for the urban poor. The Supreme Court has argued that Article 21 protects the right to life as a fundamental right, including the protection and preservation of the environment, ecological balance free from pollution, and sanitation. However, the persistent presence of slum populations no longer evokes the automatic protection of the Court or the State. Slum politics in the 1990s has been characterized more by dislocation than reconstruction. New groups have emerged that once again evoke the neighbourhood as the unit of politics and governance, reflecting the aspirations of the middle and upper classes. Resident Welfare Associations play an increasingly important role in cities such as Mumbai and Delhi, while larger civic formations such as CIVIC, BATF, and ABIDE have gained prominence in Bangalore.

UNIT 12: PARTITION OF INDIA AND LINGUISTIC FORMATION OF STATE, DETERRITORIALIZATION FOR THE FORMATION OF NEW PROVINCES IN INDIA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

The British colonization of India led to a political unification that had only been enjoyed for short periods in its history. This unification was based on imperialist expansion, which accelerated the pace of political change in India, along with the spread of modern education and the growth of modern forms of transport and communications. However, when the British left India in 1947, the country was divided along religious lines into India and Pakistan, attributed to a policy of divide and rule that the British followed. Indian nationalists, including Gandhi, believed that both Hindus and Muslims should strive for communal harmony, which was consciously damaged by the 'third party' - the British

rulers. Gandhi even said that the communal problem would never be resolved until the British left India. Since the British deliberately encouraged the League and its demand for Pakistan after March 1940, Gandhi argued that Hindu-Muslim unity was a pre-requisitefor fighting the British and for freedom around 1942. The partition of India was the product of complex processes and theoutcome ofseveral factors and the role of the British, the Muslim League, and the Indian National Congress for the division of the subcontinent. It

was neither inevitable nor the product of sheer chance. It was not the fulfillment of destiny or the logical outcome of the two nation theory; nor was it simply an accident that was produced by a single wrong decision or failure of judgment. The socio-economic and political background to the partition of India included the role of the Congress and Muslim League in the process and the 1946 popular opinion that also played a role in the partition. The British's purpose of the policy of divide and rule was to prevent the coming together of Indians against the British. The acceptance of the Muslim League's demand for separate electorates in 1909 was a major divisive move that vitiated the political culture of India until independence in 1947. Historians and anthropologists now argue that the British classification practices encouraged the representation and self-representation of Indians according to caste and religion. British Orientalist scholarship played a role in the development of ideas about the peculiarities of Indian society, leading to the codification of Hindu laws and the rigid interpretation of law. The writing of history also shaped ideas of community that soon became the commonsense of the time. The British were willing to go to any length to prolong their rule in India, deliberately encouraging Jinnah's Muslim League after 1940 to weaken the national movement and thwart Congress participation in government during the war. Their attitude towards the Indian problem was shaped by Britain's role in Asia after World War II and the emerging Cold War.Mohammad Ali Jinnah played a significant role in the partition of India, but his moderate nationalist and constitutionalist views were less relevant in national politics after mass mobilisation began under Gandhi after 1920. He opposed the Nehru report of 1928, which advocated for a unitary form of government and representation to minorities based on numerical importance in different regions. Jinnah's Fourteen points and the demand for Pakistan differed, with Jinnah being a liberal Muslim who was not averse to negotiations with the Congress. The poor performance of the Muslim League in the Provincial assemblies in 1937 led to Jinnah rethinking his strategy. The Congress rejected a coalition government with the League in Uttar Pradesh, leading to a strong reaction from the League. The League declared the right of self-determination of Muslim majorities in the North West and East of India in 1940. The demand for separate states within a common framework even if it meant statehood without a demand for a separate nation, as argued by Ayesha Jalal and the revisionists, fanned communal fears and animosities in the years after. Jinnah's strategy and Muslim League propaganda rather than his hidden objectives influenced Indian political developments and led to the partition of India. Early nationalist accounts apportioned the blame for

partition exclusively between the British and the Muslim League. The Congress tried to bring under its umbrella all sections of Indian society, but separate electorates, British policy of divide and rule, the intransigence of Jinnah, and the communal and reactionary grip over the League led to the partition of the subcontinent. The Congress was unable to reach out to the Muslim masses and reluctantly accepted the wishes of the majority of the Indian Muslims to carve a nation for themselves. Two strands in Indian history challenge this account: Bipan Chandra argues that there was a Hindu tinge in the Congress and that Hindu liberal communalists like Lala Lajapat Rai and Madan Mohan Malaviya created doubts about the inclusive nationalist credentials of the Congress party. However, he believes that extreme communalism was promoted by the League and that Congress failed to handle the problem due to pressure from Hindu communalists and insufficient mass mobilization. A second strand argues that the Congress was substantially to blame for the partition of the country. The Congress party was majoritarian, with the belief that the view of the majority party must prevail. Even Congress's inclusive nationalism entailed the denial of Muslim identity and any signs of Muslimness were regarded as separatist or communal. Many Indian Muslims did not accept the principles of liberal individualism and believed that their representatives should belong to the Muslim community and share their values and concerns. In the perception of many Congressmen and Hindu nationalists, a weak center in India had been responsible for repeated invasions and British conquest, and the post-independence state had to be strong enough to protect its citizens and provide for their well-being.The partition of India was a significant blow to the leaders of the Indian National Congress, who tried to avert it until the terms for preserving unity seemed unacceptable. Gandhi, who had worked for communal harmony for decades, brought a large number of Indian Muslims into the national movement by linking grievances about the treatment of the Khalifa and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire with the nationalist outrage following the Jallianwala Bagh massacre at Amritsar in April 1919 and the imposition of martial law in Punjab. The Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movement brought forth Muslim participation on a scale which the Congress never managed to achieve after this. The withdrawal of the movement in early 1922 was followed by the outbreak of communal conflicts in many parts of north India stretching from Kohat to Calcutta between 1922 and 1926. Critics of Gandhi think that the use of a religious issue like Khilafat was dangerous since it encouraged extra-territorial loyalties and Pan-Islamic tendencies among Indian Muslims. Gandhi's collaboration with the Ali brothers led to

Muslim mass mobilisation within India for achieving objectives within India. Secular and Marxist historians consider the use of religion in politics a ‘double-edged weapon’ and therefore have regarded this strategy as fraught with dangerous consequences. He believed in spiritualising politics and did not consider it essential to separate religion and politics as in the western conception of secularism. His ideas and personality appealed to Maulana



Figure 153Map of the Indian Provincial Election 1946 by largest party

Abul Kalam Azad, who began as a radical Pan-Islamist and became a supporter of composite nationalism. His role and personality are frequently contrasted with that of the westernised Jinnah who was an unconventional Muslim fighting for the rights of Muslims and a separate state using appeals to religion. The argument has been advanced that it was the emphasis on secularism and modernity that led to the failure to deal with the specific grievances of the Muslim community. However, the problem was really about uneven development, economic grievances, and sharing of power rather than hard secularism or

communitarian identities. In terms of communitarian identities, the Gandhian emphasis on Hindustani in the Devanagari script had very little impact on the cultural politics of the Hindi speaking states. The politics of language did play a role in the alienation of the Muslims of North India. The essentialist understanding is that Pakistan was the product of a longstanding difference between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent. Historians disagree on the precise reasons for the partition of the subcontinent but agree that it came about towards the end of colonial rule because of the failure of the Congress and the League to come to a settlement. The British policy of encouraging Muslim separatism and eagerness to withdraw from India after the Second World War made the partition more likely. The consequences of the demand for partition and the jostling for power in the localities speeded up the process of communal polarization that influenced the decisions of the principal protagonists in the story of partition. In the final analysis, the postwar crisis and polarisation in society during the last few years of colonial rule contributed to the climate in which the decision was taken in 1946-47. The League was able to use the British compulsion to justify a constitutional deadlock in India to build a substantial following during the period 1940-1946. The election results of 1946 gave the Muslim League the authoritative position to represent Indian Muslims that Jinnah had long wanted.In ‘Sole Spokesman’, Ayesha Jalal suggested that the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 was the one that came closest to what Jinnah really wanted. However, the Congress leadership had

Figure 154 The Communal Riots in Calcutta in 1946

other plans based on the preference for a strong center. The communitarian perspective is used to understand the alienation of Muslims from the Congress and the multiple identities that unitarian or singular conceptions of nationalism sought to control or delegitimise in the name of nationalism. The demand for Pakistan created higher levels of polarization in a region that was an important contributor of manpower to the British Army in India. The tensions were more likely to spin out of control in this region where there were so many volunteer organizations and demobilized soldiers after the war ended. In the eastern region, there was communal polarisation but fewer demobilised soldiers and a weaker 'martial' tradition. The fear of living under a majority community was not confined to the Muslim community alone. Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab too began to worry about their fate in a future Pakistan and a Muslim majority group in the North West was also a cause for concern. Some Sikhs demanded a separate homeland and adequate safeguards for their community. The opposition to the division of the province on religious lines was stronger in Bengal than in the Punjab. The British had deliberately promoted Jinnah's League during the war but were reluctant to support his claim for a separate state. Their reluctance to prevent the spread of virulent propaganda helped the League gain adherents. The decision to withdraw announced in 1947 and the advancement of Indian independence compelled Indians to come to a decision sooner than they would have liked and probably made partition and the violence that accompanied it more likely. Some historians believe that the British wanted to retain influence in the region after they left and therefore promoted a smaller and more pliable country like Pakistan. The Cabinet Mission Plan was not accepted by the Congress because it gave very limited powers to a common central government for the whole subcontinent. It also created three Groups of provinces, two groups with Muslim majority provinces in the North West and North East of India. It was grouping that was a source of difficulty for the Congress. In order to preserve the unity of the country and restore communal harmony, Gandhi proposed that Muhammad Ali Jinnah be made the Prime Minister of India. He wrote to Lord Mountbatten that the British should "leave the Government of the whole of India, including the States to one party" and that Mountbatten should hand over power to either the Muslim League or the Congress, grant Dominion Status, remain as Governor-General for the next thirteen months, and "then leave them to their own devices." These proposals were not accepted by the Congress leaders, which has been interpreted as the rejection of Gandhi's vision or the clinching evidence for the political ambitions of the top leaders of the Congress. Communal riots followed and India gained freedom through a painful partition.

One of the major facts of India's political evolution during the last 100 years has been the growth of our regional languages. They have during this period developed into rich and powerful vehicles of expression creating a sense of unity among the peoples speaking them. In view of the fact that these languages are spoken in well-defined areas often with a historic background the demand for the unification of such areas to form separate states has gathered momentum and has in some cases assumed the form of an immediate political program. The resolution appointing Linguistic Commission makes a specific reference to the importance of language.A careful examination of the pros and cons of this problem is therefore an essential preliminary consideration of the question of the reorganisation of States.

Figure 155 India's linguistic diversity (which still omits most of our 22,000 dialects) (Source: Shashi tharoob facebookpage)

The advocates of a rigid and uniform application of the linguistic principle in determining the boundaries of states advance important arguments in support of their claim which will be briefly stated and examined here.

A Federal Union supposes that its units are something more than mere creatures foradministrative convenience. The constituent states in a federal republic must each possess a minimum degree of homogeneity to ensure the emotional response which is necessary for the working of democratic institutions. The states of the Indian Union can achieve this internal cohesiveness only if they are constituted on a Uni lingual basis, because language being the vehicle for the communionof thought and feeling provides the most effective single bond for uniting the people. Linguistic homogeneity therefore provides the only rational basis for reconstructing the states, for it reflects the social and cultural pattern of living obtaining in well-defined regions of the country.

Democracy such as in India is based on universal adult franchise, the political and administrative work of state has the necessity to be conducted in the regional language. A multiplicity of such languages would lead to weakness and inefficiency in the administration and rivalry and jealousy in politics.It is pointed out that already in some of the states a large percentage of members in the Legislature want only one language and this trend is likely to become more and more emphasized. In some states even ministers want only one language. Discussions in legislatures would become difficult if considerable number of members are unable to follow the proceedings. But under a democratic form of government based on adult franchise, it is imperative that there should be real consciousness of identity of interest between the people and the government, and that both should work in an atmosphere of coordination and mutual understanding. The success of a welfare state depends essentially on drawing the best popular support, which cannot be secured if the process of government is not brought home to the people. If the legislature of a state is not to develop into a babel of tongues it must conduct it work in one language, the language of the people. The various devices adopted in multilingual states to meet the communication needs of the people have led only to a dissipation of energy and national resources. Educational activities can be stimulated only by giving the regional languages their due place. If the educated few are not to be isolated from the masses, the education of the people must necessarily be through the medium of the mother tongue.

The demand for linguistic states does not represent mere cultural revivalism. It has a wider purpose in that it seeks to secure for different linguistic groups political and economic justice. In multilingual states political leadership and administrative authority remain the monopoly of the dominant language groups, and linguistic minorities are denied effective voice in the governance of their states. Even where there are substantial minorities having adequate representation in the cabinet, the representative linguistic minority groups find it impossible going to be party to the discipline and other factors to do anything effective to safeguard the interest of minorities. Similarly in multilingual states welfare activity as well as development plans are on equally and unfairly distributed.The areas inhabited by the dominant language groups are seen developing at the expense of other areas. The demand for uni-lingual states aims at securing for minorities a fair deal not only in the social and cultural spheres but also in the political and economic fields. Conflict and discord are inherent in administrations in which diverse elements are forcibly held together. Where the requisite sense of unity is absent, and unwilling association or coexistence, howeverlong, would not succeed in producing that atmosphere of mutual goodwill and understanding which is the essential for the working of democratic institutions. Under foreign domination when opportunities for self-development were denied to all elite, different linguistic groups could live together without apparent conflict. Now that the people of India have to shape their owndestinies, consciousness of the lack of a community of interest between different language groups tends to be deeper and deeper with the progressive realisation of their divergent economic and other needswith the limited resources at the disposal of states.Plans for economic development of different areas have inevitably to be based on a systemof priorities and it is difficult to reconcile the rival claims of different regions. It is a peculiar feature of multilingual states that in each one of them suspicion of favouritism and charges of partiality has centred round the linguistic division, each language group considering that it is being unfairly treated. Only the removal of minority consciousness by reorganising the states on aunilingual basis can eliminate this widespread sense of distrust.

The argument that compositesthe meeting place for different linguistic groups and help them to accustomthemselves to living together in a spirit of tolerance and understanding would have had some validity in different linguistic groups. The political atmosphere vitiated by linguistic differences has now permeated into the administrative structure as a

whole. Important administrative posts tend to become the monopoly of the members of the dominant language groups and appointments and promotions are no longer governed by considerations of administrative purity, efficacy and fairness. A majority of the states in the Indian Republic are already predominantly unilingual. The states of West Bengal, Orissa, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, MadhyaPradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerela are all either completely unilingual or could be made so with only minor adjustments of boundaries.

Linguistic redistribution of provinces has been an integral part of the Indian National Movement. Having sponsored the linguistic principle for nearly 40 years, it is impossible for the leaders of political thought now to reverse the current. The national movement which achieved India's Independence was built up by harnessing the forces of regionalism. It is only when the Congress was reorganized on the basis of language units that it was able to develop into a national movement. The Congress under the Mahatma Gandhi realised that the same forces which worked for our national unity has also helped to develop the regional languages, which led to the integration of language areas. It is this alliance between regional integration and national feeling that helped us to recover our freedom.With the achievement of freedom, a tendency had developed to overlook the claims of different regions by denying to them the right to internal integration on the basis that this will weaken the unity of the nation. This however is a false cry, for true development will be possible only if we are able to utilise genuine loyalties which have grown up around historic areas united by a common language.Finally,it is contended that the urge for linguistic states has now gone deep down into the minds of the masses and refusal to create such states at this stage would lead to a widespread sense of frustration which might have very grave consequences.

The case against linguistic States

While there is undoubtedly much that is valid inthe arguments briefly stated above there are also weighty considerations which has been asked against accepting language as the determining principle in the creation of states. The most important of these may now be stated.

The idea of a federating unit organised as the political expression of a single language group; food inevitably encourage exclusivism. It may even tend to blur if not obliterate the

feeling of national unity by the emphasis it places on local culture, language and history. The self-image that any such language group create is necessarily one of superiority as compared to others and this will inevitably be reflected in its educational and cultural institutions. In fact, experience everywhere has shown that states based on languages are intolerant, aggressiveand expansionist in character. Already a sense of irredentism is noticeable in the existing uni- lingual states of India which claim neighbouring territories on the basis of language statistics.In view of the uneven development of India's languages, education as a whole is more over bound to suffer and will lose itsnational character. If the different states pursue policies on their own without regard to the interest of the nation as a whole there will be no coordination and unity of purpose in education. In fact, this tendency might lead to education itself being used as a vehicle of regional particularism and revivalism, resulting in interstate conflicts and the weakening of the national tie.

Already in the schools some of the state's songs exalting the regional idea hasbeen introduced into text books, history books, taught in lower classes have disclosed a marked tendency to exaggerate the past achievements of the dominant linguistic groups. These inevitable tendencies in language-basedstates will and avoidably weaken our sense of national unity.

Grievances and the sense of frustration in the political and economic field are not the inevitable or necessary features of multilingual states. Even after a state is reconstituted on a linguistic basis there is no reason to suppose that all areas will receive equal attention and that there will not develop an equally strong sense of frustration and neglect in areas which feel that their claims are not receivingadequate attention. The remedy for redressing such grievances lies in the fulfilment of the aspirations of the various groups by positive measures based on merits of each case and not in the wholescale re-organisation of states on the basis of language.

Planning at national scale also cards across linguistic affiliations. Economic development should obviously proceed on such considerations as the capital income ratio, the more remunerative projects being preferred to the less remunerative ones, the employment possibility of various projects, the requirements of river valley projects, the optimum utilisation of natural resources etc

The formation of linguistic States would not only accelerate but may retard the pace of planned economic development of the country for local sentiment may resent the

utilisation of the resources of one area for the benefit of another. Any large scalere organization of states may result in the diversion of national energies into unproductive channels and to that extent impair the economic advancement of the people and the execution of various development projects.

Importance of language for administrative and other purposes

It is obviously an advantage that constituent units of a federation should have a minimum measure of internal cohesion. Likewise, a regional consciousness not nearly in the sense of negative awareness of absence of repression or exploitation but also in the sense of scope for positive expression of the collective personality of a people inhabiting a state or a region may be Conducive to the containment and welding of the community.Common language may not only promote the growth of such regional consciousness but also make for administrative convenience and for a proper understanding of government measures by the people. Indeed in a democracy the people can legitimately claim and the government has a duty to ensure that the administration is conducted in a language which the people can understand.

The objective therefore of community of language between the people and the government is not only unexceptionable but also highly commendable. The essential points to remember however is that if we purse an abstract proposition and not a practical administrative issue we are apt to lose the sense of perspective and proportion.

The problem of linguistic grooves within a state is not unknown and outside India but precedents elsewhere which are often cited, provide but little guidance. Except in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and in the states of Europe no language groups are large enough to claim separate political organisations. Linguistic minority hascontinued to exist in many states even though the political settlement following the first great war had a demarcated the boundaries of Central Europe broadly on a language basis. In view of the intermingling of languages and peoples in Central Europe this settlement however left large minority groups within the new states for example over 3 million Germans in Czechoslovakia and several considerable minorities in Poland.The problem in these countries however was one of the protections of linguistic minorities in sovereign states erected on linguistic basis. The problem of minorities exists in India also but the character of the problem is different as the states of the Indian Union are not sovereign independent but parts of a national

whole. European history however clearly shows that language is one of the fundamental elements of social life and influences to a large extent national psychology so much so that speaking of central and eastern Europe Professor Toynbee has been led to observe that“the growing consciousness of nationality had attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical associations but almost exclusively to the mother tongues”. It is to be noted that most lingual or multilingual state have had to face separatist movements. Belgium and Spain are notable examples. Catalan separatism has been one of the most persistent strands of Spanish history. In Switzerland divided sympathy for Germany and France severely strained Swiss neutrality during the war of 1914 to 18. Only in the USSR has an effort been made to organise units on linguistic basis. The units constituting the USSR are organised generally on this basis, they are in operation with adequate constitutional, extra constitutional and ideological correctives, which could be applied in case any regional loyalties challenge the loyalty of the party of the state.

Constitutional relationship between the centre and the states of the Indian Union

The problem of linguistic state has also to be examined in the light of the bonds of a unity and the constitutional position of the centre. It has to be realised that the political unity of India is a recent achievement. It was not as in generally supposed brought about by the administrative unification of India by the British. The former British areas of the present territory of the Indian Union constituted less than three fifth of the total. The rest was under the rule of Indian princess and it is well to remember that from 1917 at least a determined effort was made to separate India from the rest and to bring the princely states in direct relationship with the Crown.Even what was British India did not achieve a real measure of unity.It was the determination of the Indian people to rid themselves of foreign domination and to build up a life for themselves as a free people that created the present unity of India speaking away not merely the alien rule but also the heritage rulers who had divided up India and does to in the way of that unity.But this sense of Indian unity is a plant of recent origin. It has not only to be watered and nourished but protected against hailstones and galls and against unfriendly climates. This was in a major recognised by those responsible for the making of our constitution and consequently in number of provisions were included in it for safeguarding the unity of India. Of these the important are

1. The concurrent list of subjects in respect of which the union parliament has overriding legislative authority
2. Provisions enabling parliament to legislate in respect of matters in the state list in cases of grave emergency or in the national interest when the Rajya Sabha by a two third majority decide to so legislate
3. Provisions enabling parliament and President to assume and executive functions in states when the normal constitutional machinery fails and provisions rising this issue of special directive by the centre in the event of a financial emergency and
4. Provisions empowering the union government to give directions to state to ensure with the laws made by parliament and to ensure that the executive power of every state is not so exercise as to impede or prejudice the power of the union executive.

These special provisions however are primarily remedial in character and are meant to prevent a breakdown in the state and to save guard the powers of the union within its own sphere. They do not detract from the fact that under the constitution the states constitute cornerstones of the political and administrative structure of the country with a real measure of autonomy. In fact, dean Appleby has recently expressed the view that "the new national government of India is given fewer basic resources in power than any other large and important Nation, while at the same time having rather more sense of need and determination to establish programs dealing with matters important to the national interest". He has further observed, "no other large and important national government I believe is so dependent as India on a theoretically subordinate but actually rather distinct unit responsible to a different political control."

There has been attendance during the last few years in which the new constitution has been in force to lay more and more emphasis on the autonomy of the states. This has to be considered in relation to the encouragement of regionalism with the emphasis on language as the basis for the creation of a state is bound to give.

Group loyalties and nationalism

It has to be remembered that the linguistic and other group loyalty have deep roots in the soil and history of India. The culture-based regionalism, centring round the idea of linguistic homogeneity represents to the average Indian values easily intelligible to him.

Indian nationalism on the other hand has still to develop into a positive concept.It must acquire a deeper content before it becomes ideologically adequate to withstand the gravitational force of the traditional narrower loyalties. In these circumstances further emphasis on narrow loyalties by equating linguistic regions with political and administrative frontiers will diminish the broader sense of unity of the country.

Other considerations

Undue emphasis on the linguistic principle is likely to impede the rapid development of new areas brought under cultivation and the rehabilitation of displaced persons. If the main or exclusive criteria for the demarcation of state boundaries is to be community of the language, the state governments will naturally view with concern, and take measures to stop, the settlement in newly colonised areas of people belonging to different language groups particularly when such areas happened to be on the borders of the state.

A concrete case maybe cited by way of illustration. This sponsors of the movement for a Punjabi speaking state had advanced a claim to the Ganganagar district of Rajasthan which came into existence as a result of the colonisation of part of the former Bikaner state under the Ganga Canal system. Apart from the fact that the Punjabi speaking people constitute only about 26% of the population of Ganganagar district and that the claim is therefore untenable even on linguistic ground it has to be remembered that this area is essentially a part of Rajasthan and that the Punjab has no legitimate claim to it. If in a case such as this the area is allowed to be separated from the parent state this would create a very unhealthy precedentand the people not belonging to the dominant language group might be looked upon as alien settlers who would sooner or later agitate for its separation from the state.

Finally, there are certain aspects of the claim for linguistic units the implications of which should be carefully analysed an understood. The most important of these is the doctrine of an area cleaning to be the homeland of all the people speaking a particular language. Itsimplication is that a Bengali and Andhra or a Malayali wherever he is settled has his home land in Bengal, Andhra or Kerala or that he has loyalty to that home land overwriting the loyalty to the area of his domicile and that in the same way the homeland state has claims on him whenever he may be. We cannot too strongly emphasize the dangerous character of this doctrine especially from the point of view of our national unity.

If any section of people living in one state is encouraged to look upon another state as its true home land and protector on the sole ground of language then this could cut the very root of the national idea.

It follows from the acceptance of the doctrine of the homeland that the homeland itself should be the marked with care and it has accordingly been proposed that in determining the boundaries between linguistic groups the village should be taken as the unit. In border villages generally the population is largely mixed. If on the basis of the majority belonging to one language group a village is separated from the administrative unit to which it is now attached then it follows that special provision will have to be made to see that the language composition of such a village does not change at any future time. This is obviously impossible in what is lightly to be a dynamic economy.



Figure 156 Book on Attack on Bihari and UP migrants in Maharashtra

The idea that all people who speak the same language and constitute majority whether in a village or Taluk should be attached to their homeland will do immense harm to our national growth and must therefore be rejected unequivocally. The allegations that sensors return in the border areas have been tampered with illustrate the dangerous possibilities inherent in this idea.

The homeland concept must also deepen majority and minority consciousness and there by aggravate the minority problem. The constitution of India guarantees common citizenship to all Indian people. There can therefore be only one nationality in India and the idea of majority, a minority would seem to run counter to it. Unfortunately,in a number of states discriminatory practices against people from other units seem to exist even at the present time. The homeland doctrine if encouraged is bound to accentuate these trends. This is a problem of considerable importance.

Composite States

The question whether multilingual sates will strang the unity of India is not easy to determine. In states having more than one developed language there has been no marked tendency in the past to develop a sense of loyalty to the state. There was never any noticeable Madrasi sentiment when the state was a composite one. The same holds true about Bombay and Madhya Pradesh. Marathi and Gujarati feeling grew up side by side practically to the exclusion of any particular loyalty to the province or state of Bombay. In Madhya Pradesh the MahaVidharva sentiment based on the Marathi language has been vocal for many decades.

The idea that the creation of multilingual state will weaken the loyalty to language groups does not therefore seem to be justified. This is however one difference between composite and linguistic States. Undoubtedly the maintenance of multilingual unit will prevent the utilisation of the machinerystate for furthering programs of linguistic exclusiveness and in favourable conditions may lead to tolerance and adjustment especially in the importance which is now a test to economic development diverts attention from the less importantquestions and the barren controversies regarding culture and language.

The composite state in which languages are integrated territorially may have another value. National loyalties do not demand that other loyalty should be eliminated. It is how ever essential that no political values or social attitude should be accepted at the state level concepts around which we desire over National Unity to grow. A composite state which makes adequate provision for the protection of culture and the encouragement of local languages would help to prevent the growth of anti-multinational trends.

Conclusion

Figure 157 Programs on National Unity spreading unity in spite of linguistic and cultural diversity ***(Ek Anek Aur Ekta (1974)***

We now summarize are final views on the role of language as a factor bearing on the reorganisation of States. After a full consideration of the problem in all its aspect we have come to the conclusion that it is neither possible not desirable to reorganise states on the basis of the single test of either language or culture but that in balance approach for the whole problem is necessary in the interest of our national uity

Such a balanced approach would appear to be:

1. To recognise linguistic homogeneity as an important factor conducive to administrative convenience and efficiency but not to consider it as an exclusive and binding principle overriding all other considerations administrative financial or political.
2. To ensure the communication educational and cultural needs of different language groups whether resident in predominantly unilingual or composite administrative units are adequately met.
3. Where satisfactory conditions exist and the balance of economic political and administrative considerations favour composite states to continue them with the necessary safeguards to ensure that all sections enjoy equal rights and opportunities.
4. To repudiate the homeland concept which negates one of the fundamental principles of Indian Constitution namely equal opportunities and equal rights for citizens throughout the length and breadth of the union
5. To reject the theory of one language one state which is neither justified on the grounds of linguistic homogeneity because there can be more than one state speaking the same language without offending the linguistic principle nor practicable

Figure 158 Efforts through program by India government to unite different cultures.

since different language groups including the vast Hindi Speaking population of the Indian Union cannot always be consolidated to form distinct linguistic units.

6. Finally,to the extent that the realisation of unilingualism at state level would tend to breed a particularistic feeling.To counter balance that feeling by positive measures calculated to give a deeper content to Indian nationalism, to promote greater interplay at different regional culture and interstate corporation and accord and to reinforce the links between centre and the state in order to secure greater coordinated working of national policies and programs.

Integration of princely states.

During 1946, there were over 560 princely states. In the erstwhile India there was British India and the rest well, princely states.A constituent mission plan was formulated which proposed for the creation of a Constituent Assembly of Independent India. It was decidedthat the Constituent Assembly will have indirectly elected representatives from the political parties such as Congress and others, and nominated members of the princely states. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel adopted soft politics and Baroda was the first to join the Constituent Assembly, followed by Bikaner. But Muhammad Ali Jinha demanded for a separate nation for the Muslims, leading to Direct Action Day where huge riots broke across the country and finally the Mountbatten Plan was accepted to have India partitioned to India and Pakistan (East and West) based on religious minorities. An Indian Independence Act of July 5th, 1947 came into being. According to this, an option was put before the princely states either to join the Indian Union or that of Pakistan or remain independent. To join any one of the Union, they had to sign and become Party to the Instrument of Accession Created by Sardar Patel and VP Menon as well as Lord Mountbatten. Now further Patel started to pursue the princely states to join India. They were offered a Privy purse offering lucrative deals. All the princely states joined in the Indian Union except for Junagarh, Hyderabad, and Jammu Kashmir.The ruler of Junagarh Nawab Muhammad Khan decided to join Pakistan under the influence of his dewan Shahnawaz Bhutto a close aide of Jinnah but the majority of the population were Hindu and not could not join with the territory of Pakistan. Though Jinnagwanted to accept Junnargarhin Pakistan but being a Muslim dominated nation, it was against the norms set by Pakistan.Whereas the case of Jammu and Kashmir was absolutely opposite.Here the dominant population was Muslim and the ruler was Hindu.Under such circumstances, Nehru opinionated about carrying out



Figure 159 Map of Princely States of India under British Raj (1934-1947).

a referendum. But when Mongrol and Babriawadh resented to accede into Pakistan against the decision of the Nawabs of Junagarh, military forces were sent by Saagar Patel to help them implement their decisions and get annexed to the Indian dominion.An *ArzeeHukumat* or a provincial government was set up in the Bombay State under the leadership of Samaldas Gandhiand anti-pak movement was initiated among the masses which influenced even the mindset of the masses of Junagarh.Under such circumstances, the Nawab of Junagarh, fled to Pakistan and the Government of India took over Junagarh via

Figure 160
Samaldas Gandhi

Rajkot Regional Commissionerate through both administrative and military measuresthough referendum was still an option given by India.After the referendum on the 20th February 1948 was completed, Junagarh officially became part of the Indian Dominion.Following Junagarh, the process of Hyderabad being annexed into the Indian territory began in Hyderabad. The Nizam then was Mir Usman Ali Khan, who wanted to remain independent and not join either India or Pakistan, but geographically and strategically it was a loss for the Indian Union. As an advocate of a separate Muslim nation, Qasim Rizvi and his organisation Ittehad -ul-Muslimunplayed the major role in it. In November 1947, a status quo agreement with autonomy was signed up on with Indian government but as the popularity of Rizvi and his separatist ideology started to gain momentum and negotiations started, it failed. Thus,in September 13th 1948, Operation Polo was started where Indian military Guard, defeated the troops of the Nizam and the Razakars in a matter of just four days.

Figure 161Mir Usman Ali Khan

Figure 162 Qasim Rizvi

Figure 164Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru

The last and the most complex annexation was that of Jammu and Kashmir. The problem associated with it lingers still today. The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir during 1947 was Raja Hari Singh of the Dogra dynasty, whose prevalence can be traced back to 1850s.Raja Hari Singh too chose to stay independent and wanted to sign on a standstill agreement. Though Pakistan signed the standstill agreeing to allow free passage of goods and services. But India delayed it. Pakistan, suspicious of India's motive, began to stop transportation

and communication to Kashmir.Sheikh Abdullah played a significant role in annexing Kashmir to India.He was detained by the Hindu Maharaja andafter that Sheikh Abdullah had gathered revolt against the Maharaja. He preferred a secular government through referendum.Tribal insurgency took place in the meantime through Punj and Uri through Baramulla and Srinagar, and the Maharaja requested for military assistance from the Indian government. In return, the Maharajas signed on the instrument of accession an Article 370 somewhat began to be initially implemented. On 26th of October 1947, Kashmir was annexed with India. During this time when the war had ended between the insurgents and the Indian army, aline of ceasefire was declared through the Karachi Agreement of 1940 made with the intervention of the United Nations Organisation between India and Pakistan.The ceasefire line drawn betweenThe Line of Control, or LOC, and the Gilgit Balochistan region is known as Pak Occupied Kashmir or POK.

Figure 163LOC and POK

he Congress of India has long been aware of the power of language to rouse and move in a land with many languages, each with its distinct script, grammar, vocabulary, and literary traditions. To give space to this diversity, the Congress committed itself to creating linguistic provinces in a free India. Freedom fighters such as Lokmanya Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi wanted to preserve the linguistic and cultural richness and add convenience in the administrative procedure. The idea of organising the country into linguistic regions were discussed in various meetings, namely Calcutta Session 1917, Nagpur Session 1920, Nehru Commission Report 1928 and was part of the INC Manifesto of Elections. In British India in 1945-46 Provincial Congress committees were made on the basis of mother tongue, which still are present in India. But the separatist forces were becoming active post partition and there was a lot of uncertainties regarding this issue. After the formation of our Constituent Assembly in 1948, Rajendra Prasad ordered for a Linguistic Provinces

Committee which is also known as the S K Dhar Committee and whose main objective was to look into the feasibility of demarcating India on the basis of the dominant language spoken. But based on the chaotic situation during those days, it was decided that regionalization should be done on the basis of administrative convenience and in order to achieve a there should be geographical contiguity, financial self-sufficiency leading to the development and definitely the decision made would be democratic in nature. To review the above recommendations of a JVP committee named after Jawahar Lal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and PattabhiSitteramaya) was formed. According to JVP committee, the main target should be to promote stability, security and economic development, and the states should be so organised that these targets were met in case of very pronounced areas with linguistic and cultural characteristics may be zoned together with a mutual agreement, and to begin with Andhra, if at all implemented. The Commission was led by Fazal Ali, Kunju and K M Pannikar. This report had exhaustively dealt into the factors of reorganising States and Submitted a report on 1955. According to the report of the Commissioner, the following factors should be taken into consideration in addition to that of the language and culture, and not solely based on it.

1. Welfare of the people.
2. Financial viability.
3. National security.
4. Large enough in size for administrative efficiency.
5. Mandate of the people.
6. Geographical Contiguity.
7. Present political situation would be preferred more than historical background.

The Commission also provided a few recommendations and they said to terminate the fourfold classification. Delhi, Manipur, Andaman and Nicobar Riddick, Laird ‘s Union Territories. Following the recommendations of the Commission, the State Reorganisation Act of 1956 was implemented.

Now began the reorganisation of the states on the basis of the dominant mother tongue in the region in 1950, when the Indian Constitution came into being, there were four-fold classification of states.

1. Former British provinces which included (Uttar Pradesh MadhyaPradesh which were at that time known as the united province and the central province)
2. The princely states.
3. Chief Commissioner
4. Andaman and Nicobar, Controlled by the lieutenant governor and the central government.

In 1917, a separate Andhra circle was formed, followed by a separate Sindh circle the following year. After the Nagpur Congress of 1920, the principle was extended and formalized with the creation of provincial Congress Committees (PCCS) by linguistic zones, such as the Karnataka Pradesh PCC, Orissa PCC, and Maharashtra PCC. These committees did not follow and were often at odds with the administrative divisions of British India. Mahatma Gandhi was also appreciative of the linguistic diversity of India. He believed that a living language is a vital thing, ever changing, ever growing, and mirroring the people who speak and write it. His great provincial languages are ancient languages with a rich inheritance, each spoken by many millions of people, tied up inextricably with the life and culture and ideas of the masses as well as the upper classes. It is axiomatic that the masses can only grow educationally and culturally through the medium of their own language. However, by 1947, Gandhi had other thoughts about the country's division based on religion. He believed that dividing the country further on the basis of language would encourage the break-up of the Union and should keep intact existing administrative units like Madras, which had communities of Tamil, Mala-yalam, Telugu, Kannada, Urdu, and Konkani speakers, and Bombay, whose peoples spoke Marathi, Gujarati, Urdu, Sindhi, Gondi, and other languages. Nehru gave voice to these reservations in a speech to the Constituent Assembly three months after Independence. While the Congress had once promised linguistic provinces, he said that the country now faced a very critical situation resulting from partition. Disruptionist tendencies had come to the fore, and one had to underline the security and stability of India. Gandhi thought that the reorganization of provinces should be postponed until such time as India was strong and confident in her capacity to meet all possible dangers and face all problems. In a prayer meeting held on 25 January 1948, Gandhi returned to the subject of linguistic states. He believed that if new provinces were formed on the basis of language, and if they were placed under the

authority of Delhi, there would be no harm at all. However, it would be very bad if they all want to be free and refuse to accept central authority. Within a week of Gandhi's death, the men in power had other urgent matters to attend to. Millions of refugees from East and West Pakistan had to be found homes and gainful employment, an undeclared war was taking place in Kashmir, and a new constitution had to be decided upon. Elections had to be scheduled, economic policies framed, and executed. For now, and perhaps indefinitely, the creation of new provinces had to wait. The JVP Committee (, a committee appointed by the Congress to address the issue of linguistic provinces, was appointed in 1948 and 1949. It argued that language was not only a binding force but also a separating one, and that the primary consideration should be the security, unity, and economic prosperity of India. This report, known as "cold-water therapy," slowed things for a while. However, the fires soon started up again, with movements aimed at linguistic autonomy in 1948 and 1949. These included the campaign for Samyukta (Greater) Karnataka, which sought to unite Kannada speakers across the states of Madras, Mysore, Bombay, and Hyderabad. The division by religion did not perfectly map division by language, as Punjabi was seen as merely a local dialect of Hindi, while Sikhs believed it was not just a language in its own right but also a holy one.

Andhra Pradesh: Without question, the most vigorous movement for linguistic autonomy was that of the Telugu speakers of the Andhra state. Telugu was spoken by more people in India than any other language besides Hindi, and it had a rich literary history and was associated with symbols of Andhra glory such as the Vijayanagara Empire. The Andhra Mahasabha had worked hard to cultivate a sense of identity among the Telugu-speaking peoples of the Madras presidency, who argued that they had been discriminated against by the Tamils. After Independence, the speakers of Telugu asked the Congress to implement its old resolutions in favour of linguistic states. The Andhra movement was a significant force in the struggle for statehood in India, with various methods used to advance their cause. In 1950, former Madras Chief Minister T. Prakasam resigned from the party on the issue of statehood. Telugu-speaking legislators in the Madras Assembly urged the immediate creation of a state named Andhra Pradesh, and Congress-politician-turned-swami Sitaram went on hunger strike in support of the cause. After five weeks, the fast was given up, in response to an appeal by the respected Gandhian leader Vinoba Bhave. The election results encouraged the revival of the Andhra movement. Swami Sitaram began a march through

the Telugu-speaking districts, drumming up support for the struggle. He said the creation of the state ‘could not wait any longer’ and that Andhras ‘were ready to pay the price to achieve the same’. The agitating Andhras had two pet hates: the prime minister and the chief minister of Madras, C. Rajgopalachari. Both had gone on record as saying that they did not think that the creation of Andhra was a good idea. This enraged the Andhras, who had a strong demographic and economic presence in the city, and who believed they had as good a claim on it as the Tamils. On 22 May Nehru told Parliament how his foremost efforts have been directed to the consolidation of India. However, this attitude of Nehru appeared too vague and evasive to the Andhras. Impatient for an answer, the Andhras intensified their protest. On 19 October 1952, a man named Potti Sriramulu began a fast-unto death in Madras, with the blessings of Swami Sitaram and thousands of other Telugu speakers also present. He had studied sanitary engineering before taking a job in the railways and suffered a double tragedy when his wife died along with their newly born child. Two years later, he resigned his post to join the salt satyagraha and later spent some time at Gandhi’s Sabarmati ashram. A hagiographic study published in 1985 by the Committee for History of



Figure 165 Potti Sriramulu



Figure 166 Madras Presidency

Andhra Movement claimed that Potti Sriramulu’s stay at Mahatma Gandhi’s ashram was epoch-making. On 25th November 1946, the disciple had begun a fast-unto-death to demand the opening of all temples in Madras province to untouchables. Other Congress representatives, their minds more focused on the

impending freedom of India, urged him to desist. When he refused, they approached Gandhi, who persuaded him to abandon the fast. The Mahatma then wrote to T. Prakasam that he was glad that the fast of Sreeramulu ended in the happy manner. That fast of 1946 Potti Sriramulu had called off at Gandhi's insistence; but in 1952 the Mahatma was dead. In any case, Andhra meant more to Sriramulu than the untouchables once had. This fast he would carry out till the end or until the government of India relented. On 3rd December 1946, Nehru wrote to Rajagopalachari, suggesting that the time had come to accept the Andhra demand. He warned that complete frustration would grow among the Andhras, and he warned Rajaji that inviting Swami Sitaram to Delhi might prevent more mischief. By December 15th, fifty-eight days into his fast, Potti Sriramulu died, and chaos broke loose in Andhra. Government offices were attacked, trains were halted and defaced, and damage to state property ran into millions of rupees. Nehru had once claimed that 'facts, not fasts' would decide the issue, now faced with the prospect of widespread and possibly uncontrollable protest, he gave in.After Sriramulu's death, a state of Andhra was declared, leading to the separation of Telugu districts from Madras province. The formation of Andhra Pradesh was met with skepticism from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who feared the formation of Andhra would cause a hornet's nest. The creation of Andhra led to increased demands from other linguistic groups. The Indian government appointed a States Reorganization Commission (SRC) toaddress the linguistic problem. The Commission travelled across India, interviewing over 9,000 people and receiving 152,250 written submissions.

Figure 167 State Reorganisation Commission

Maharashtra and Gujarat: One of the most interesting submissions was from the Bombay Citizens Committee, led by a leading cotton magnate, Sir PurushottamdasThakurdas, and prominent industrialists like J.R.D.Tata. The Bombay Citizens Committee had a single agenda: to keep Bombay out of the state of Maharashtra. They printed a 200-page book, which outlined historical, sociological, and geographical aspects of the city. The first chapter focused on historical settlements, while the second chapter highlighted the importance of Bombay in India's economic life. The third and fourth chapters emphasized

the city's multilingual and multicultural character, while the fifth chapter argued for its physical isolation from the Marathi-speaking heartland. The Bombay Citizens Committee argued that Bombay and North Konkan cannot be considered part of the Maharashtra region as claimed by the protagonists of Samyukta Maharashtra. The Gujaratis, who dominated the'save Bombay' movement, believed that if Bombay became the capital of a greater Maharashtra state, the politicians and ministers would be mostly Marathi speakers. This was not entirely pleasing to the Gujarati-speaking bourgeoisie, who staffed, financed, and basically ran the Bombay Citizens Committee. Nehru and M. S. Golwalkar were sympathetic towards the idea of keeping Bombay out of the control of a single language group. They thought that the creation of linguistic states would lead to bitterness and give rise to fissiparous tendencies endangering the unity of the country. In May 1954, Golwalkar spoke in Bombay at the invitation of the Anti-Provincial Conference, which saw linguistic demands as a manifestation of 'the menace of provincialism and sectionalism'. The Samyukta Maharashtra Parishad, led by Congressman Shankarrao Deo and economist D.R. Gadgil, sought a state that would unite Marathi speakers dispersed across many different political units. The Parishad prepared an impressive 200-page document of its own, which defended the principle of linguistic states, arguing that a new and unified state of Maharashtra had to be created with Bombay as its capital. The Parishad answered that there were more people speaking this language than any other. It was in the nature of great port cities to be multilingual. Bombay was surrounded by Marathi-speaking districts; it must be the capital of a new state of Maharashtra. The Citizens Committee claimed that Bombay had been nurtured mostly by non-Maharashtrians, and therefore must therefore be constituted as a separate city-state. Could the two sides ever agree? In June 1954, Shankarrao Deo visited Sir

Figure 168 Pre independence Bombay

PurushottamdasThakurdasto discuss a compromise. Deo said that there was no negotiation possible on their core demand – Bombay as capital of Maharashtra – but said that they could work together to retain the same autonomous character of the metropolitan city, ensuring its cosmopolitan life; its trade, commerce, and industry, etc. Sir Purushottamdas was willing to give up the city-state idea in favour of a composite bilingual province of Marathi and Gujarati speakers. The matter of Bombay was referred to the States Reorganization Commission, the hottest of the many hot potatoes it became their misfortune to handle.

The States Reorganization Commission (SRC) did not permit the creation of a united Maharashtra, proposing a separate state of Vidarbha, comprising Marathi-speaking districts of the interior. The SRC's recommendation that Bombay be the capital of a bilingual state was discussed in Parliament on November 15, 1955. Bombay MP S. K. Patil believed the Commission should have gone further by creating a city-state of Bombay. He argued that the prospective city-state had a "cosmopolitan population" and that if left to govern itself, Bombay would become a miniature India run on international standards. Patil, like the SRC itself, asked the Maharashtrians to give up their claim on Bombay in the spirit of compromise. However, it soon became clear that he did not speak for his fellow Maharashtrians. Congress MP N.V. Gadgil, speaking immediately after Patil in the Lok Sabha, insisted that there is a limit to language recognition, and that anything short of Samyukta Maharashtra with the city of Bombay as capital will not be acceptable. If these sentiments went unheeded, the future of Bombay would be decided on the streets of Bombay. The SRC urged the Maharashtrians to accept the loss of Bombay in the name of national unity. Gadgil protested against this attempt as blackmail, stating that the last 150 years had seen Maharashtrians contributing selflessly to the growth of national feeling. He said that Maharashtra was the beehive of national workers and that Maharashtrians were being lectured on the need to work for the unity and safety and good of the country. The matter now shifted from the chamber to the streets, warning of an unrest that may possibly erupt into something terrifyingly coercive, making ordered life impossible for some time to come. Discontent was being stoked by politicians of both left and right, with prominent communist S. A. Dang, leading low-caste politician B. R. Ambedkar, Jana Sangh, and the Socialist Party being among the most active. Many dissident Congress Party members also joined, making this a comprehensively representative coalition of angry and disillusioned Maharashtrians. In January 1955, the Bombay police swooped down on leaders and

activists of the newly constituted All-Party Action Committee for Samyukta Maharashtra, making nearly 400 arrests in all. This led to a general strike on January 18th, which saw shops and factories closed, buses and trains stopped running, and processions burned effigies of Nehru and Gujarati-speaking chief minister Morarji Desai. Two days earlier, clashes between police and protesters had been reported, with mobs going on the rampage, looting shops and offices. For nearly a week, the city was brought to a complete standstill, and 15,000 policemen were called out to battle the rioters.The Bombay riots in 1956 were the worst in living memory, with over a dozen people dead and property worth billions of rupees destroyed. Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply shaken by the events, believing that the linguistic question was more serious than even the situation created by the Partition. He directed the All-India Congress Committee to discourage forces of disruption, separatism, and provincialism and instead work for the integration of all parts of the country. The Congress chief ministers of Bihar and West Bengal issued a joint statement proposing that their two states be merged into one, hoping to quell separatist tendencies, aid economic progress, and be a significant example of that positive approach to the problem of Indian unity that the party bosses had called for. Among Nehru's allies were the home minister, G. B. Pant, and his fellow-in-effigy Morarji Desai. Desai claimed that the intention of the protesters was to overturn the Government practically and take possession of the city by force. However, this interpretation was vigorously contested by N. V. Gadgil, who believed the administration had overreacted. Gadgil wrote to both Nehru and Pant of how the firing and lathi-charges by the police had been "on a scale which will make even the ex-British officials in England blush." The slogan on almost every Maharashtrian's lips was "Lathi golikhayenge, phirbhiBambailayenge" (We will face sticks and bullets, but get our Bombay in the end). On 26 January, Republic Day, black flags were flown in several working-class districts of Bombay. When Jawaharlal Nehru planned a visit to the city in February, the Samyukta Maharashtra people organized a petition signed by 100,000 children to be presented to the prime minister with the slogan "Chacha Nehru, Mumbai dya" (Uncle Nehru, hand over Bombay). Nehru came, but amid tight security; he did not meet the press, let alone the children. In June 1956, the annual session of the Congress was to be held in Bombay. Nehru was met with black flags at the airport and all along the route. The atmosphere outside the meeting hall was tense. On the second day of the Congress, a crowd threw stones at the members, several were hurt, prompting a volley of tear-gas shells by the police. Through the summer of 1956, both sides waited anxiously for the centre's

decision on Bombay. While the cabinet had accepted the other recommendations of the SRC, it was rumoured that both Nehru and the home minister, Pant, were inclined to make Bombay city a separate union territory. In the prevailing climate, this was deemed unfeasible. On 1st November, the new states based on languagecame into being. Joining them was a bilingual state of Bombay. The only concession to the protesters was the replacement of Morarji Desai as chief minister by the 41-year-old Maratha Y. B. Chavan. The movements for linguistic states revealed an extraordinary depth of popular feeling. For Kannadadigas and Andhras, for Oriyas as for Maharashtrians, language proved a more powerful marker of identity than caste or religion. This was manifest in their struggles and behaviour when the struggle was won. Official patronage of the arts and architecture became a symbol of the new states. The new assembly-cum-secretariat of the state of Mysore built opposite the Bangalore High Court, a fine columned building in red. However, the Mysore chief minister, KengalHanumanthaiya, saw the High Court as a colonial excrescence and decided that the new Vidhan Sabha would dwarf and tameit. The end product drew eclectically from the architecture of the great kingdoms of the Carnatic plateau.Linguistic reorganization has been a controversial topic in India, with some fearing it would lead to the Balkanization of India and the creation of more Pakistan's. However, in retrospect, it has consolidated India's unity and provided a constructive channel for provincial pride. The creation of linguistic states has allowed for peacefully Kannadiga, Tamil, or Oriya Indians to be contentedly Indian. An example of this was the assembly elections in Andhra in 1955, where the Congress won in a landslide, redefining what it means to be Indian. The Andhras did not secede from India, but they redefined what it means to be Indian.

Figure 169 The Vidhan Sabha building of Karnataka

Following this, eventually the recommendation of SRC was adopted, but now the Gujarati's under the leadership of Indulal Kanhaiya Lal who demanded for Mahagujarat. Followed by Khambi satyagraha. The demand for Mahagujarat continued for the next four years until the Bombay Reorganisation Act in 1960, led to the separation of Gujarat in 1st May 1960.

Goa Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli: They were under the Portuguese rule.The oppressive rule in these areas continued till 1930s.The Goa Congress Committee under the leadership of Dr. Tristao Briganza, Ram Manohar Lohia started revolting against the Oppression. Many local armies were formed, namely United Front of Liberation, Goa Liberation Army, Azad Gomantak Dal etc. Indian government started to act at international level to create pressure by withdrawing its ties with Lisbon, imposing visa restriction on movement in and out of Goa, and rejecting the referendum suggested by the Portuguese Government. In 1955 Nagar Haveli through its revolt and muting against the Portuguese rulers got its freedom. Again in 1955, in Goa, 30 people were killed in a protest rally which infuriated the public and the movement for freedom gained strength. India government initiated economic blockade which stopped all kinds of transport and communication in and out of Goa. Later on in 17th December 1961 Operation Vijay was declared to free Goa of Portuguese rule. The Portuguese army surrendered in front of the Indian Army bringing an end to the 451 years thus ending colonialism through the 12th Amendment Act of 1963. Goa Daman and Diu became a Union territory and so did Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Later, in 1987, Goa was declared a state and Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli merged to form a union territory on November 27th, 2019.

Figure 170Dr. Tristao Briganza

Punjab and Haryana: During the 18th century, the local rulers that ruled different *Kasbas*across the Indus Valley formed parts of Punjab. After the Anglo Sikh War, the region was taken over by the British and both WestPunjab, Haryana, Punjab of India and Himachal Pradesh came under the rule of the British.The Siromani Akali Dal had played a significant role post-independence and this Akali Dal was founded in 1920 which looked into the task force committee managing the various chores of gurudwara across different



Figure 171 Formation of Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab and Haryana

parts of Punjab.It was principally responsible for representation of the Sikhs and was led by Master Tara Singh. Master Tara Singh, born in June 1885, was an important figure in Indian history who represented the interests of politically conscious Sikhs since the 1920s. He was arrested several times between 1948 and 1952, for defying bans on public gatherings and for what were seen as "inflammatory" speeches. He had strong support among the Sikh peasantry, particularly among the upper-caste Jats. Tara Singh's use of the term "independence" was deliberately ambiguous, as the Jat peasants wanted a Sikh province within India, not a sovereign nation. They wanted to get rid of the Hindu-dominated eastern Punjab, leaving a state where they would be in a comfortable majority. By hinting at secession, Tara Singh put pressure on the government and convinced his flock of his commitment to the cause. Not all Sikhs were behind Tara Singh, however.

Figure 172 Master Tara Singh

The low-caste Sikhs, who feared the Jats, were opposed to the Akali Dal. Some Jats had joined the Congress, and many Punjabi-speaking Hindus returned Hindi as their mother tongue in the 1951 census. The biggest blow to Tara Singh was the general election itself. In the Punjab Assembly, which had 126 seats, the Akalis won a mere 14. He raised his voice since 1948 for a separate state like others, and wanted it to be named as Punjabi Suba consolidating 7 Sikh majority districts in eastern Punjab as the demand for a separate state gained momentum, one of the Congress leaders, Bhim Sen Sachar suggested a formula known as Sachar formula. According to him, the Subba would be an amalgamation of both Punjabi and Hindi zone. In Punjabi zones, the school education would be following Punjabi language till the matriculation level and Hindi would be started at primary level and vice versa in the Hindi zones. The proposal by Sachar was outrightly rejected.The small princely states known as PEPSU or the Patiala in East Punjab States Union had their election in 1952 where Akali Dal other parties warned the election and formed a coalition government Defeating the Indian National Congress. But the rest of the state had Indian National Congress as the

Figure 173 Pre Independence-Punjab

Figure 174 Administrative map of Punjab through decades

ruling party.Thus, the Akali Dal, after gaining support from the local people, started demanding for the merger of PEPSU in Punjabi Subba. In 1953, when the State

Reorganisation Commission started listening to the various demands, it was observed that Akali Dal wanted a Punjabi Subba inclusive of PEPSU with exclusion of Hindi speaking belt.

On the other hand, the Indian National congresssuggested merging of East Punjab, PEPSU, Himachal Pradesh along with Delhi. But during this period the Congress party, had banned slogans for a Punjab subba creating resentment among the people. During a peaceful protest demonstration in theGolden Temple, the police raided killing almost 200 protestors.Anti Congress feelings started developing post this massacre. In 1955, the Siroma Akali Dal (SAD), organised the Amritsar conventions in order to decide upon the recommendations of the State Reorganisation Committee (CRC), which suggested merger of PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh into Punjab. The SAD turned down these suggestions. In spite of being rejected by SAD on the basis of recommendations of SRC the State Reorganisation Act of 1956, suggested PEPSU be merged with Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. With the ongoing agitation among both Punjabi and Hindi speaking people, a regional formula came into the picture on which discussions were initiated in 1956. The regional formula suggested separate states for Punjabi and Hindi speaking people, their respective legislators and education in their mother tongue. As the Punjabis were on the verge of getting their demands fulfilled, the Jan Sangh and Hindi Raksha Samiti too wanted their separate state and started violent protests in order to have their demands met. Several gurudwaras were damaged and Sikh sentiments were hurt. The Punjabi-Hindi conflicts took the turn to become Hindu-Punjabi riots. The Punjabis now were adamant of not settling on anything other than a separate Punjabi Subba. With their demands the SAD initiated a march to Delhi and the rally was cracked down by the police and their leader Tara Singh was arrested in 1960. With Tara Singh behind the bars, the leadership of SAD shifted to Sant Fateh Singh. When several meetings between Nehru and Sant Fateh Singh failed to provide any positive conclusive outcome, the latter started fast unto death. Though Nehru accepted the linguistic majority of the Punjabis in the region but still he did not commit to provide a separate state. By 1965, the Indo-Pak war began and the protest was kept on hold. Later a 22-member committee was formed which included all the stakeholders. The Committee formed in 1966, submitted a report strongly suggesting formation of two

states as essential on linguistic basis. Punjab formed for the Punjabi speaking masses and Haryana for the Hindi speaking population; rest parts were merged with Himachal Pradesh. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister passed the Punjab reorganisation Act, 1966 in the parliament bringing Punjab and Haryana two separate states into existence on 1st November, 1966.

In the northeastern region of India, several tribes with different languages and cultures dwelt as for the State Reorganisation Committee. Tribal leaders from the tribal-dominated hills of Khasi, Jantia, Garo, and Lusai, which were previously part of Assam state, desired the formation of a hill state. Although the hill state movement was well



Figure 175 Bengal and the North East (Source: https://www.euratlas.net/)

supported in other Assam hill regions, it was limited to the Garo, Khasi, and Jaintia hills. The demand was reaffirmed in 1954 at the Tura Conference of Tribal Leaders. They established the Hill Tribes' Union, with W.A. Sangma as chairman and B.B. Lygndoh as Secretary of its ad hoc executive body. Hill chiefs gathered in Aizawl in October 1955 to launch the Eastern India Tribal Union (EITU). At the urging of William Sangma, the APHLC (All Party Hill Leaders Conference) was created in 1960 to replace the EITU. The passing of the Language Bill in the Assamese Assembly in 1960, which was seen as an

imposition of Assamese language on non-Assamese groups, further accelerated the demand for hill statehood. The APHLC sought unification of all districts, with the exception of Naga Hill, included in Part A of the table in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. The Naga Hill area was omitted because the Naga Hills' leadership desired an autonomous state, whilst the APHLC's leaders desired statehood inside the Indian Union. Nehru offered the hill leaders a Scottish model of autonomy for the hill territories in 1960, which they refused. However, the offer was accepted by the Assam Hills Peoples Conference (HSPC), a group of the APHLC. As a result, the Pataskar Commission was constituted to investigate the autonomy of the hill territories. The Pataskar Commission advised against making any changes to the Sixth Schedule. The APHLC was displeased. It boycotted the 1967 General Election in protest. When Indira Gandhi visited Shillong on January 11-13, 1967, she vowed to reorganise Assam. As a result, on December 24, 1969, theParliament enacted the 22nd Constitutional Amendment, i.e., the Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Bill, establishing Meghalaya as an "Autonomous State" inside Assam. In 1971, the President of India signed Acts that resulted in the formation of various new states in northeast India, including Manipur, Tripura, and Meghalaya, as well as the Union Territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh. The Assam Accord of 1985, which ended a six-year anti-foreigner campaign in Assam, also granted sovereignty to two union territories: Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. As a result, we can observe that several states were formed in northeast India at different times. However, despite the emergence of these states throughout time, the demand for distinct states has not abated. The post-Assam Accord period witnessed an increase in demand for Bodoland and autonomy in the Karbianlong area. In northeast India, there are numerous similar cases.

Tripura and Manipur, rest all other districts were either clubbed into Northeast Frontier Agency or under not a tribalArea. The north east tribes, which included Anghami., Ao,Chang, Chakesang, Khiamniungam, Phom, Lotha, Pochury, Kuki, Konyak etc of which the first two played a dominant role In the movement for a separate state for Nagaland's political consciousness. About their rights had developed post World War I. They had formulated a Naga club who preferred British rule as the latter had very little interference in their societal activities. After Simon Commission's recommendations the district council was set up in 1946 for the Nagas which later become Naga Hills District Tribal Council which united all the Naga tribes and spoke on their behalf. This during 1946 got renamed

into Naga National Council (NNC). The dominant members were from Angami tribe who were for independence and Ao tribe who wanted autonomy under the Indian union. In 1946, the Naga National Council made it clear that they would not be bounded by any regulations which had been made without their consultation. They put forth a few demands



Figure 177 The reorganisation of North East States (Source: livemint.com)

of the then interim government where they were against Assam being grouped into Bengal. They wanted autonomous free Assam and a separate electorate. In 1947 February NNC met together and agreed upon a 10-yearinterim govt and post that they would decide whether to be independent or autonomous. In June 1947 Naga-Akbar Hydari agreement, also known as the 9-point agreement came into being where it was decided upon that Nagas would have considerable amount of flexibility and autonomy in executive and judicial matters, land ownership and taxation with immense power to NCC. This agreement eventually formed the basis of the 6th schedule of the constituency where hill and tribal areas were given special powers. The 9thpoint in this agreement became a matter of contention and dispute because of misinterpretation. On 12th

Figure 176ZopuPhiza

August, 1947, Nehru met the Khonoma extremist group and warned them not to demand independent state. As a repercussion to this the Nagas declared themselves independent on 14thAugust, 1947 and rejected the 6th schedule which was to be implemented from 1948. By 1950, Angami ZopuPhiza who became the president of NNC carried out a plebiscite where the Nagas wanted to be independent, but Nehru refused to provide independence in lieu of greater autonomy. This followed mass protest and civil disobedience. As a result, to curb the uprising Assam Maintenance of Public Order (Autonomous Districts) Act. 1953, was declared on them followed by Assam Disturbed Areas Act, 1955, Armed Forces Special Powers (Assam and Manipur) Act, 1958.Under such circumstances of a parallel government being run. The military took extreme measures by burning down villages and raging massacre. A federal government of Nagaland was declared in 1956, under the leadership of Phizo putting guerilla resistance into action. By 1957, the moderates among the Nagas began to dominate the scenario realising they cannot have a peaceful settlement against India's strong military force. A Naga Peoples Convention, 1957, led to amalgamation of Naga Hill District and Tuensang Area of NEFA to Nagaland. In Ungma Convention (1957) and Mokochung Convention (1959), after agreeing to provide several autonomies to the Nagas, through the State of Nagaland Act, 1962, on December 11, 1962 Nagaland became the 16th state of India.

Deterritorialization for the formation of new provinces in India in the new millennium



Figure 178 *State formations (Source: https://bagariaamit.com/)*

The formation of four new states in India, Uttarakhand, Chhatisgarh, and Jharkhand in 2000, and Telangana in 2014, are recent examples of state reorganisation. Unlike in the 1950s and 1970s, when language and culture formed the foundation for the establishment of new states, in the 1990s, it was the degree of development that became the basis for their demand and construction of new states.

Uttarakhand/Uttaranchal

One such demand for the formation of additional states from the state of Uttar Pradesh was for the formation of Uttarakhand. The idea for a separate state of Uttar Pradesh hills

was proposed in the Congress conference in Srinagar in 1938. Even as the country's independence approached, political figures in Tehri Garhwal advocated for the secession of the hill area from the plains of Uttar Pradesh. In 1946, BadriduttPande, a lawyer and political leader interested in the defence of forest residents' rights and the fight against

Figure 179 New States in the 2000s (Source: livemint.com

British, presented the problems during a public demonstration in Haldwani. With the union of Kumaon, Tehri Garwal, and British Garhwal with the state of Uttar Pradesh, the demand was ignored. P.C. Joshi, a communist leader, asked in a paper in 1952 in note to Nehru, who forwarded it to the SRC, he stated that the UP hills, as a backward region, should be turned into a distinct state. Nehru turned down the request. K.M. Pannikar was opposed to establishing UP a large state that would be difficult to manage. Indeed, three regional chief ministers, H.N. Bahuguna, N.D. Tiwari, and G.B. Pant, had opposed the formation of a new state. Pant's argument was that because there were no employment or businesses in the region, it would be best to keep it in UP. During the 1960s and 1970s, the elite continued to grow the demand. Uttarakhand Kranti Dal(UKD), a political party, was founded on July 25, 1979, under the command of D.D. Pant, a former Vice President. Kumaon University's Chancellor. The goal of UKD was to create a breakaway state comprised of Uttar Pradesh's hill districts. It ran in the assembly elections in 1980 and 1986. The BJP took up the topic in the late 1980s. The BJP administration led by Kalyan Singh in 1991, the SP-BSP government in 1994, and the BSP-BJP government in 1997 all

approved resolutions in the legislative assembly calling for the formation of Uttarakhand. In addition, on several times, calls have been made for the formation of Harit Pradesh from the western area of UP, Bundelkhand from the southern sections of UP and several districts of Madhya Pradesh, Poorvanchal from the eastern region of UP, and Oudh Pradesh from the central region of UP. Uttarakhand's demand peaked in the early part of the 1990s. grew increasingly popular as individuals from many walks of life participated. Initially, the campaign for Uttarkahand was unrelated to the desire for a separate state; it arose from a protest movement organised in 1994 against the expansion of quota for OBCs to the hilly districts of UP. Because the population in hilly regions that were then part of UP was dominated by high castes rather than OBC, there was concern that extending quota into the region might harm their interests. The residents of the UP highlands were outraged by the government's choice. As a consequence, the police and the agitators clashed. Several individuals were killed when the cops opened fire. This is known as the Khatima incident. The firing in the Khatima incident enraged individuals who said they were discriminated against in the current status of UP. They claimed that they should have their own state in order to rule themselves. As a result, there is a high demand for Uttarakhand. Following the Khatima tragedy, elections in 1996 and 1998, 1999 Lok Sabha, and 1998 Vidhan Sabha were appropriate circumstances for realising the desire for the establishment of Uttarakhand. The fact that there were NDA administrations in both the central and UP made it possible to accept the demand.

Telangana State

The state of Telangana was created in 2014 after the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh had a distinct identity from the other two regions, Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra. The Congress and Communist Party of India had demanded the formation of a state Andhra consisting of Telangana, Rayalaseema, and Coastal Andhra, on the basis of a common language spoken in these regions. In 1953, Gandhian Potti Sriramulu died during a massive strike demanding the creation of Andhra state consisting of Telugu speaking districts of the erstwhile Madras Presidency and Telangana region in Hyderabad state. The central government appointed the State Reorganization Commission (SRC) to look into the need and criteria to reorganize states. The SRC found that Telangana and

other regions Rayalaseema and Coastal Andhra were not homogenous and recommended the creation of a separate state of Telangana for five years, and formation after the expiry of the five years of a state of a single state of Telugu-speaking regions consisting of other two regions – Rayalaseema along with Telangana Coastal Andhra regions. However, much before the expiry of five years of formation of Telangana state, the state of Andhra Pradesh was created in 1956 on the basis of common language – the Telugu, consisting of

Figure 180 Protest for separate Telangana State (Source: The Indian Express)

Telangana, Rayalaseema, and Andhra regions. The formation of Andhra Pradesh was received with the apprehension that Andhra region would be placed in the dominant position in the new state due to its superior economic position and higher literacy rate than those in the Telangana region. An agitation took place against the formation of the Andhra Pradesh State, leading to the signing of the Gentleman's Agreement in 1956. Within a few years, there was resentment in the Telangana region that the promises made in the agreement were not fulfilled. In 2001, the demand for creation of Telangana was revived with the formation of the Telangana Rashtriya Samiti (TRS) by K. Chandrashekar Rao (KCR). The TRS-Congress alliance formed the government in 2004 following its victory with chief minister from the Congress. At the center's level, since the TRS was a partner in the UPA alliance, creation of Telangana wasincluded in its manifesto.

The Telangana issue dominated the 2009 Lok Sabha election with TRS supporting and the Congress opposing it. However, the UPA government at the centre appointed a committee headed by Justice Srikrishna to look into the Telangana issue and submitted the report by 31 December 2010. On 7 February 2014, the Union Cabinet of the UPA government cleared a bill for the division of Andhra Pradesh into two states – Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, which was later passed by both houses of Parliament. On June 2, 2014, the state of Telengana was created.

Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand

The name 'Chhattisgarh' derives from an interpretation that it refers to the number of forts in the territory, which is 36. The call for a separate state was originally made in the early 1920s. Since then, such demands have resurfaced at regular intervals via various forums, rallies, and movements. Finally, with the admission of Uttarakhand and Jharkhand in 2000, the demand for Chhattisgarh was approved, resulting in the establishment of a new state. Many causes contributed to the desire for a new state, the most important of which was a clear acknowledgment, both inside and beyond the territories, of a distinct socio-cultural identity developed over generations. A sense of relative impoverishment also ledi dividuals to assume that a separate state was required for the region to prosper. The political aspirations for political autonomy among the Gonds and Bhils in India have been a topic of discussion since the period following independence. Raj Gond leaders, such as Raja Naresh Singh, demanded the formation of a separate state for the adivasis, which was carved out of tribal areas of Chattisgarh and contiguous districts of Rewa region and Vidarbha. In 1963, Narain Singh Ukey, President of the Gondwana Adivasi Seeva Mandal, reiterated this demand for the formation of the Gondwana state. The Jharkhand Party emerged as a major party in the Chotanagpur-Santal paragana region of Bihar from 1952 to 1957. The party's influence extended to Orissa, where it captured five seats and held the balance of power in the state politics. However, the party's decline began in the early 1960s due to factors such as tribal involvement in development, rivalry between advanced Christian tribals and backward non-Christian tribals, and shifts in support from non-Christian tribals to the Congress and Jana Sangha. The Jharkhand Mukti Morcha emerged as a major political force in the



Figure 181 Future States

industrial and mining belt of Chotanagpur and in state politics after the 1980 general elections. It sought to broaden the separatist movement by including peasant and working classes. The Jharkhand is described by its ideologues as an internal colony being exploited by outsiders, and the region avails itself of only 15% of the state's budget for development. Through various vicissitudes, the groundswell of support for a separate state continued and intensified, bringing major political parties within its sweep. The Committee on Jharkhand Matters recommended setting up an autonomous authority, the Jharkhand Area Autonomous Council (JAAC), in 1993. However, it fell short of the expectations of the people who demanded nothing short of a full state. In the two general elections held in 1995 and 1996, all India parties advocating a separate state swept the polls, making Jharkhand state a reality on 15 November 2000.

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